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Rwanda had presented the world with the most unambiguous case of genocide since
Hitler's war against the Jews, and the world sent blankets, beans, and bandages to camps
controlled by the killers, apparently hoping that everyone would behave nicely in thefuture.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The justifications for international criminal liability for perpetrators of
the international crimes of genocide,2  war crimes, 3  and crimes against
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. The author gratefully
acknowledges the support of the William Cook Research Fund in the preparation of this Article and also
appreciates insightful critiques by Susan Damplo, Robert Howse, Myriam JaYdi, Made line Morris, John
Murphy, Gerald Neuman, Paul Robinson, Kelly Whiting, as well as participants at faculty colloquia at
Columbia University and Columbia Law School, St. John's University School of Law, the University of
Miami School of Law, and Villanova Law School.
1. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROw WE WILL BE KILLED
wrrIH OUR FAMILIES 170 (1998).
2. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 195 1) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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humanity4 have remained essentially unchanged in the half century since
World War H's Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. Despite the vast literature on
those famous ? rosecutions, including extensive critiques leveled at what they
accomplished, there is a remarkable degree of consensus among international
lawyers in favor of international criminal accountability for mass murderers,
rapists, and torturers. To the extent there is debate concerning that question, it
remains framed by the legalist/realist divide that dominates international law.
6
Political realists argue that the choice of whether or not to prosecute
perpetrators must be left to the discretion of the sovereign states where such
mass atrocities occur, since new governments within such states must retain
the power to decide whether to forgive the prior regimes' transgressions for
the sake of securing peace.7 Legalists, including most international lawyers,
contend either that international law requires prosecution or that even if the
law leaves states with considerable discretion, states ought not permit
8impunity for perpetrators. They argue that criminal accountability is
compatible with, and perhaps vital to, lasting peace and real national
reconciliation.
9
Recently, in the wake of horrendous massacres within Rwanda and the
territories of the former Yugoslavia,10 the international legalists have
3. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention No. I), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention No. I), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention No. 11I), Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of
War (Geneva Convention No. IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 28.
4. While crimes against humanity have not been codified in a treaty regime, such offenses
were defined in the course of the Nuremberg trials, and have been the subject of extensive scholarly
commentary. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Need for a Specialized
Convention, 31 COLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457 (1994). As Bassiouni notes, international lawyers regard
such crimes as well established under customary international law. See id. at 465-66.
5. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 335-91 (1994); MICHAEL P. SCHARF,
BALKAN JUSTICE 3-17 (1997); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992);
Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War
Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 57 (1995); Telford Taylor Panel: Critical Perspectives on the
Nuremberg Trials, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 453 (1996).
6. See infra notes 49-52, 89-92 and accompanying text. For a sweeping survey of this
divide, see MARTrI KOSKENNiEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989).
7. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. At this writing, Cambodian government elites
appear to be struggling with such decisions. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, A Tale of a Cambodian Woman:
Assigning the Guiltfor Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1999, at Al.
8. See, e.g., IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 28-30
(Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; Diane Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J.
2537 (1991); Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to
Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 41. But see Carlos S.
Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100
YALE L.J. 2619 (1991) (casting doubt on the alleged duty to prosecute at least in the case of Argentina).
9. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
10. By most accounts it appears that some 250,000 civilians have been killed, perhaps 20,000
women raped, and another 2 million driven from their homes in the course of the recent breakup of the
former Yugoslavia while, over an even shorter period of some 100 days in 1994, a staggering 500,000 to
800,000 people have been massacred in the Hutu/Tutsi killings of Rwanda. See, e.g., ALAINDESTEXHE,
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prevailed. For the first time since the end of World War II, international war
crimes tribunals have been established" and the states that have emerged from
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are, warily, engaging in an
international legal process specially designed to deal with atrocities in-their
respective territories.12 Further, in the wake of these two ad hoc tribunals, the
establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) is also
underway.
1 3
This Article examines the arguments of the epistemic community 14 of
international lawyers (primarily scholars, human rights activists, and others
involved in the establishment or the operation of the ad hoc tribunals) that
have been used to justify the creation, jurisdiction, and ongoing operation of
the Balkan and Rwanda tribunals. First, international lawyers characterize
offenses in both regions as crimes of states, because such offenses, either by
definition or because of their scale or scope, tend to require the connivance or
at least acquiescence of governmental authority. They are seen as crimes
committed by states. 16 Second, they are seen as crimes of states because, atleast since Nuremberg, if not before, such offenses have been criminalized by
RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 68 (Alison Marschner trans., 1995); GtRARD
PRuNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 265 (1995); SCHARF, supra note 5, at xiv.
However, as is all too common in the immediate wake of such atrocities, there are considerable
difficulties in accurately assessing these figures. See, e.g., PRUNiER, supra, at 263-73 (detailing the
bases for the figures cited in the text with respect to Rwanda); Eric Alterman, Bosnian Camps: A Barbed
Tale, THE NATION, July 28, 1997, at 17 (disputing the figures cited with respect to the Balkans). In both
regions, there are reports of continued violence.
11. Both the war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as well as the tribunal for Rwanda
were established by the U.N. Security Council under its Chapter VII powers. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, para. 2 (1993); Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report] (establishing the tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
(establishing the tribunal for Rwanda). The tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was based in The Hague,
the Netherlands, and the tribunal for Rwanda was based in Arusha, Tanzania.
12. For a readable account of the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the difficulties in securing cooperation from local governments, see
SCHARF, supra note 5, at 51-73. For accounts of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda's
(ICTR) establishment despite Rwandan government opposition, see Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of
Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349 (1997) and William A.
Schabas, Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to
Impossible Problems, 7 CRiM. L. F. 523 (1996). See also infra Section I.B.
13. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Under that treaty's Article 126, the new ICC
would come into being 60 days following the deposit of the 60th instrument ofratification.
14. Political scientists have defined an "epistemic community" as groups sharing a particular
expertise and a social agenda. See, e.g., Special Issue, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy
Coordination, INT'L ORG., Winter 1992 (focusing on the studies of such communities in distinct
international settings).
15. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Conclusion: Combating Impunity, in IMPUNITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 281, 295 (discussing how this community of lawyers, scholars, and
human rights activists "was instrumental in disseminating arguments based on international law, which
were then picked up and used in subsequent national debates"); see also ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMBS
111-33 (1998) (same).
16. See infra notes 300-309 and accompanying text (discussing requisites for genocide and
crimes against humanity).
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the collective action of sovereign states. Since the international community of
nations has defined the requisites of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes, these criminal norms belong to the international community of
states that gave them legal imprimatur through treaties or through the practice
and opinio juris that creates customary international legal norms. 17 Finally,
they are considered to be crimes of states because states' failure to prevent
such offenses or to punish perpetrators has a direct impact on interstate
interests (for example, because of the consequences to international peace and
security or because of the implications for the credibility of international
norms and institutions). 18 International lawyers build a set of arguments from
the notion of crimes of state, which I call the international legal paradigm, to
justify and operationalize international criminal accountability. I argue that
seeing the underlying offenses as primarily crimes of states helps explain
certain important but troublesome characteristics of these ad hoc tribunals.
19
I contrast the international legal paradigm, not with the realist accounts
with which it is usually compared, but with a perspective that is common to
many journalistic accounts of events in the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda.2° Many of these accounts, relying on interviews with alleged
perpetrators and victims, present a grass-roots perspective that is not grounded
in Nuremberg or the unfulfilled needs of the international community for
effective enforcement of international law. Journalists are more likely to
characterize atrocities in both regions as crimes of hate-the product of
homegrown struggles having little to do with the needs of, or the norms
defined by, the international community. This second, less state-centric
perspective highlights the localized, often ethnic nature of offenses in both
regions, while the international legalist regards an emphasis on ethnicity as
antithetical to criminal accountability.2
1
International lawyers are right to be suspicious of more ethnocentric
accounts. Much of the day-to-day reporting about Rwanda's "tribal warfare"
or Balkan "ethnic conflicts" has been simplistic. However, international
lawyers have been insufficiently attentive to the particularities of distinct
atrocities and overly dismissive of the significance of ethnicity in these events.
They have not paid sufficient attention to how international efforts are
perceived by and affect local communities, institutions, and the national Tale
of law. They have not given sufficient consideration to the nature of the
17. See generally M. CherifBassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need
for Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 9, 13-18 (surveying the international
community's "normative framework").
18. See infra notes 48, 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing interstate interests cited for
establishing the ICTY and ICTR).
19. See infra Part II.
20. The two "paradigms" described might best be seen as Weberian "ideal types"-.
generalized rubrics for arguments made by a number of commentators that do not necessarily represent
the views of any single person as such. See generally MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 89 & n.5 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons, trans., 1947) (defining "pure"
or "ideal" types as part of the methodological foundations of sociology). Readers will have to judge for
themselves whether the paradigms as outlined usefully describe the respective views of two relatively
distinct epistemic communities.
21. See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
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crimes of hate or to the enormous difficulties these offenses have engendered
for the governments where such crimes have been committed. It is time to
consider exactly what type of "synergy" exists between international and
national attempts to provide accountability for mass atrocities.
22
This Article uses the dichotomy between the "crimes of states" and
"crimes of hate" perspectives to critique the international community's
response to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. This critique is not premised on
cultural relativism. While there may indeed be idiosyncratic cultural or
historical reasons why Rwandans or other groups may resist solutions
designed or imposed by the international community-some of which are
suggested here-my reexamination of the international legal paradigm
assumes that international lawyers are correct in arguing that perpetrators and
victims have common needs despite differences among the afflicted societies.
For the purposes of this Article, I assume that many of these needs might be
remedied or at least ameliorated by criminal accountability.23 The emphasis
here is on demonstrating the tensions between the international lawyers'
approach to international criminal accountability and these lawyers' own
goals.
Part II contrasts the international legal paradigm with the more
ethnocentric journalistic one. I outline the premises of each, noting how the
first purports to respond to the flaws of the second. This Part highlights three
fundamental, interrelated elements of the international legal paradigm: its
preference for international fora; its insistence on achieving impartial results
through "ethnically neutral" methods; and its need to characterize the
underlying offenses as aberrant or exceptional deviations from the norms of
interstate behavior. Parts II to V show the consequences of each of these
elements, indicating how the pursuit of each may prove inconsistent with, and
even undermine, international lawyers' goals to preserve collective memory,
vindicate and respond to the needs of victims, affirm the national and
international rule of law, and promote national reconciliation. Part VI
identifies the lessons that emerge if the underlying offenses in Rwanda are
regarded as both crimes of states and crimes of hate and applies these lessons
not only to Rwanda but to current efforts to establish a permanent
International Criminal Court.
The principal lesson drawn is not that the establishment of international
forms of accountability, whether through ad hoc tribunals or through a
permanent international court, is invariably a mistake. On the contrary, I agree
with international lawyers that international tribunals may be vital to achieve
the goals commonly articulated to support criminal accountability, including
22. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Is International Law Moving Towards Criminalization?, 9 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 18, 31 (1998) [hereinafter Meron, Criminalization] (suggesting that there is a "clear synergy"
between universal crimes submitted to domestic jurisdiction and those prosecuted at the international
level); Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes ofAge, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 462,468 (1998) [hereinafter
Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age] (noting that criminalization at the international level "will
inevitably influence national laws governing crimes subject to universal jurisdiction").
23. See, e.g., STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ARAMS, AcCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATRocITIEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-23 (1997) (making similar assumptions).
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the affirmation of the rule of law. This is especially the case when there are no
viable alternatives. Nor is the lesson that national courts applying national
laws are invariably better alternatives to be pursued or preferred. Sham trials
by insincere regimes implicated in the very atrocities adjudicated or political
show trials by successor regimes bent on vengeance instead of justice are not
likely to -advance the rule of law at either the national or international levels.
Such all or nothing alternatives only replace one mistaken, one-sided
perspective with another. Recent events in Rwanda suggest that international
law and fora should mediate, but not dictate, the forms of criminal
accountability. The paramount lesson is that the international community
needs to be responsive to the idiosyncratic conditions that give rise to massive
violations of human rights as well as to the conditions prevailing in those
societies in the immediate wake of atrocities. In instances such as those facing
Rwanda in 1994, international processes for criminal accountability need to
encourage and adapt to local processes directed toward the same end;
international judges may need to, for example, apply local law, including laws
with respect to sentencing. Rwanda provides a cautionary tale against a "one
size fits all" approach to international criminal justice.
I. Two PARADIGMS
If one asks an international lawyer to explain why mass atrocities have
repeatedly occurred fifty years after the Holocaust, one is likely to get a state-
centric response that reflects the state-centric nature of much of international
law, namely, that these crimes of states result from the actions of government
perpetrators and the failure of other government actors to respond.24 For
international lawyers, recent atrocities demonstrate the failure to enforce,
against rogue government actors, fundamental rules of international
humanitarian law proclaimed at Nuremberg by the victors of World War II
and ratified many times since, including by the United Nations. Massacres in
the Balkans or in Rwanda are regarded as shameful reminders that the
promises of that law, solemnly memorialized by governments in a multitude
24. International lawyers commonly (if imprecisely) call the offenses committed in Rwanda
and the Balkans "war crimes" even though these extend beyond violations of the laws and customs of
war and international crimes and include, inter alia, genocide and crimes against humanity, whether or
not committed by agents of government. The terminology is suggestive of the entrenched state-centricity
of international law. As Steve Ratner has pointed out, although some international crimes extend to acts
by private individuals, international criminal law, like human rights law, has been primarily concerned
with state-sponsored violence and "some nexus to official conduct is still a useful starting point for
criminalization, even if some treaties currently go beyond it." Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of
International Criminal Law, 33 Tax. INT'L L.J. 237, 254 (1998); see also infra note 307 (discussing the
requirements of "systematic" violence for crimes against humanity). The deep-rooted nature of the
crimes of states perspective is also suggested by progressive developers' struggle to secure recognition,
including by the ICTY and ICTR, that certain war crimes norms apply even when states (in the plural)
are not involved. See, e.g., Meron, Criminalization, supra note 22, at 25-30 (discussing the need to
extend international humanitarian law to non-international armed conflicts). For a more general critique
of the state-centricity of international law, see Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991); Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15
HUM. RTs. Q. 63 (1993).
of international instruments, 25 remain unfulfilled because of a lack of political
will at the national and international levels. 26 At the same time, international
lawyers condemn the atrocities as aberrant deviations from the authorized
rules for the conduct of war and argue that such behavior justifies the
admittedly rare application of international criminal law by international
society to express that community's collective outrage against those relatively
few state actors who violate fundamental norms of civilized behavior.27
Having defined the problem in interstate terms, international lawyers
have tended to define the solution in similar ways. Since the perceived
problem is the breakdown in enforcement of the international rule of law
against rogue state actors, the solution needs to be provided, in top-down
fashion, by the international community's most reputable enforcer, namely the
United Nations.28 This state-centric perspective continues to dominate the
international lawyers' approach to war crimes even though the central aim of
criminal accountability is to enforce international obligations upon
individuals, not states, and even in instances, as with respect to Rwanda,
where the vast majority of perpetrators were civilians with no clear
governmental ties.
The creation of two ad hoc war crimes tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR,
established in 1993 and 1994 respectively by the U.N. Security Council, the
most credible enforcer of norms directed at sovereigns, responds to the
international legal paradigm. Established by Council fiat in reaction to two
perceived "exceptional" threats to the international peace, the two tribunals, as
international in composition as the organization that created them, are granted
the power to enforce international criminal law in the context of two
geographically and temporally limited instances: post-1991 offenses
committed within the territory of the former Yugoslavia and those committed
within Rwanda during 1994.29 To international lawyers, these tribunals are
25. It is estimated that, through 1996, some 315 international instruments address 24
categories of either international or transnational crimes. See JORDAN PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 11 (1996).
26. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. I. INT'L L. 2, 7 (1998). For a survey
of efforts to capture or to try violators of international humanitarian law, see PAUST ET AL., supra note
25, at 707-857.
27. See, e.g., MARSHALL FREEMAN HARRIS ET AL., BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE
(1997) [hereinafter DAYTON CENTER REPORT]; Kenneth Roth, Why Justice Needs NATO, THE NATION,
Sept. 22, 1997, at 21. For a related argument, suggesting that what international criminal law proscribes
is necessarily "aberrant" human behavior because "it would be unrealistic to expect a legal system to
penalize behavior that is either widespread or inherent to human nature," see, for example, Payam
Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations
War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 737,741 (1998).
28. As succinctly put by Saul Mendlovitz and John Fousek, "International jurisdiction is
clearly more effective than state jurisdiction, since genocide is commonly state-sanctioned. For this
reason, primacy or even exclusive jurisdiction should be given to the UN, preferably through the
creation of a permanent International Criminal Court." Saul Mendlovitz & John Fousek, The Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in GENOCIDE, WAR, AND HUMAN SURVIVAL 137, 141-42
(Charles B. Strozier & Michael Flynn eds., 1996). As this statement, by two political scientists, implies,
the popularity of the international legal paradigm is not limited to international lawyers.
29. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11, art. 2 (establishing the ICTR); S.C. Res. 827, supra note
11, para. 2; Secretary-General's Report, supra note 11.
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hopeful signs that the international system is finally taking seriously the
lessons of Nuremberg and is, at last, inching towards the effective
enforcement of fundamental human rights norms against state actors.
30
International law scholars, prosecutors, and judges within these
tribunals, and the leaders of influential human rights organizations, see these
new tribunals-backed by the sanctions power of the Security Council and, at
least in the Balkans, a NATO-led force capable of giving effect to tribunal
orders compelling the presentation of evidence or the arrests of suspects-as
significant steps towards effective international law enforcement.' As an
official of the ICTR stated, "[t]here is more at stake beyond the image of the
United Nations. This is the first time the international community has really
geared up with a determination that it is no longer going to allow these kinds
of crimes., 32 The ad hoc tribunals are also seen as important precursors to the
eventual establishment of a permanent international court capable of enforcing
the commitments contained in treaties such as the Genocide and Geneva
Conventions. 33 Further, pending establishment of a permanent court, the ad
hoc tribunals are regarded as providing the most significant and the best
prospects for the progressive development of international humanitarian law.
3 4
30. See, eg., Cassese, supra note 26, at 7.
31. Human rights organizations have been among the strongest advocates for multilateral
action, including economic sanctions and the use of force, to enforce the tribunals' orders for evidence
and for the arrest of suspects. See, e.g., Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1997, at A7; Roth, supra
note 27. The position of the human rights community has received the forceful backing of many
lawyers. See, e.g., John F. Hector, Why U.S. Troops Must Arrest War Criminals, A.B.A. NAT'L
SECURrrY REP., Summer 1997, at 7; Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., International Obligations to Searchfor and
Arrest War Criminals: Government Failure in the Former Yugoslavia?, 7 DUKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L.
411 (1996). Prior to the successful conclusion of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal
Court, see supra note 13 and accompanying text, it was widely feared that should these new tribunals
not succeed, their failure would postpone or even destroy the prospects for such a court. See, e.g.,
Graham T. Blewitt, International and National Prosecutions, in REINING IN IMPUNITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SIRACUSA CONFERENCE 17-21 SEPTEMBER 1998, at 155 (Christopher C. Joyner & M. Cherif
Bassiouni eds., 1998) [hereinafter REINING IN IMPUNITY].
32. James C. McKinley, Jr., On 1994 Blood Bath in Rwanda, Tribunal Hews to a Glacial
Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at Al0 (quoting Agwu Okali, registrar of the tribunal). That credible
enforcement of international humanitarian law is essential for the credibility of post-Cold War
international institutions, including the Security Council, is a theme that is often repeated among the
advocates of ad hoc tribunals. See, e.g., Richard Goldstone, The United Nations' War Crimes Tribunals:
An Assessment, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 227, 239 (1997). For a discussion of the contradictions between
this perspective and the common assumption that international law is characterized by the absence of
Austinian sanctions, see Lucas W. Andrews, Sailing Around the Flat Earth: The International Criminal
Tibunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a Failure of Jurisprudential Theory, I I EMORY INT'L L. REV.
471 (1997).
33. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in 75 Years: The Need to
Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 11 (1997); Cassese, supra
note 26, at 8-10; Goldstone, supra note 32, at 237; Theodor Meron, The Casefor War Crimes Trials in
Yugoslavia, FOREIGN ArF., Summer 1993, at 122. International lawyers see the establishment of such a
court, by treaty, as one way to obviate the need to resort to the Security Council to establish further ad
hoc tribunals. See, e.g., Louis Joinet, The Administration ofJustice and the Human Rights of Detainees,
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 49th Sess., Annex II, Principle 21, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, reprinted in LAW & CONrEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 250,271-72.
34. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights
Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP'. & INT'L L. 461 (1997) (discussing the significance of these precedents with
respect to gaps in international law's approach to sentencing); see also Theodor Meron, International
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At the same time, the carefully circumscribed jurisdiction of these tribunals-
limited to a small number of "well-established" international crimes within the
context of two egregious instances of atrocities-as well as the limited
resources allocated to them, convey to other sovereigns the more subtle
message that recourse to such tribunals is an exceptional response to
35aberrational crimes.
The distinguished jurist, Antonio Cassese, presently a judge on the
ICTY, has best expressed the essential components of the international legal
paradigm. Cassese argues that (1) the rendering of justice (that is, criminal
accountability) is better than the alternatives (including private vengeance,
collective amnesia, or general unconditional amnesties for perpetrators); (2)
international justice is preferable to national justice; (3) international justice is
not in conflict with peace; and (4) the major stumbling blocks to effective
international justice can be remedied with sufficient political will.36
Cassese's arguments for preferring criminal accountability are premised
on morally grounded practicality. Forgetting, he argues, "makes a mockery of
the dead" and is, in any case, a fiction since injustices are never truly forgotten
but fester.37 Cassese contends that conditional amnesties, such as that by
South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, while suitable to
nations that are undergoing a real democratic transition, are not the best option
for countries of the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda since "(a) they have been
the scene of appalling atrocities which are beyond amnesty, (b) they are still
riven by the violent nationalisms or ethnic hatred over which the wars were
fought, and (c) they are not yet willing to be reconciled. 3 8 In such cases, he
argues:
trials establish individual responsibility over collective assignation of guilt, i.e., they
establish that not all Germans were responsible for the Holocaust, nor all Turks for the
Armenian genocide, nor all Serbs, Muslims, Croats or Hutus but individual
perpetrators-although, of course, there may be a great number of perpetrators;
Justice dissipates the call for revenge, because when the Court metes out to the
perpetrator his just desserts, then the victims' calls for retribution are met;
Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1995) (suggesting ways that the ad hoc
tribunals can progressively develop the substantive law); Meron, Criminalization, supra note 22 (same);
infra note 46 and accompanying text (same).
35. For a discussion of the ICTR's jurisdictional limits, see infra Section III.B. The limits on
the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals, as well as the rare resort to such mechanisms, recognize that the
Security Council can only be an effective enforcer to the extent it is not called upon to sanction too
many states for offenses too many other nations are prone to commit.
36. See Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. I
(1998). In a more recent article, Cassese outlines the basic elements of the international legal paradigm
as a historical progression. See Cassese, supra note 26. The subtitles of this article reveal the building
blocks of the international legal paradigm: (1) "international criminal prosecution as a means of
enforcing international humanitarian law"; (2) "the failure of prosecution through national jurisdiction";
(3) "the failure of prosecution through international jurisdiction prior to 1993"; (4) "the turning point:
the new world order"; (5) "the post-Cold-War Twin-Track: the establishment of ad hoc international
tribunals and work on the establishment of a permanent international criminal court"; (6) "the problems
of international criminal courts as a means of enforcing international humanitarian law"; and (7)
"international criminal justice v. State sovereignty." Id. at 2-3.
37. Id. at 2-3.
38. Id. at 5.
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by dint of dispensation of justice, victims are prepared to be reconciled with their
erstwhile tormentors, because they know that the latter have now paid for their crimes;
a fully reliable record is established of atrocities so that fiture generations can remember
and be made fully cognizant of what happened.
39
Cassese's arguments for criminal accountability, strongly reminiscent of
the rationales originally offered for the Nuremberg trials, are repeated, almost
as a mantra, by other advocates of modem international war crimes
prosecutions. Again and again, advocates stress the singular significance of
international trials, namely that such proceedings produce historical accounts
of barbarism vital to preserving collective memory and preventing its
reoccurrence, 40 mollify surviving victims or families of the dead, affirm the
national and international rule of law, and thereby promote national
reconciliation.41 Many contend, in addition, that bringing war crimes suspects
to trial encourages governments to respect human rights more generally as
well as to democratize.42
39. Id. at 6; see also Antonio Cassese, The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 229 (Luigi Condorelli et al. eds., 1996).
40. One commentator has defined "collective memory" as a "contemporary experiencing, a
constant reinterpretation, of the historic past... [that is] in constant flux, subject to relatively sudden
changes" and that "plays a key role in the symbolic discourse of politics, in the legitimation of political
structures and action, and in the justification of collective behavior." Robert R. Shandley, Introduction
to UNWILLING GERMANS? THE GOLDHAGEN DEBATE 1, 10-11 (Robert R. Shandley ed., 1998) (quoting
Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich).
41. See, e.g., Statement by France at the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th
mtg. at 8, 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3175 (1993); Statement by the United States at the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 12-17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993). For similar lists of goals, see
SCHARF, supra note 5, at 214-48; Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes
Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 DUKE J.
COM. & INT'L L. 325 (1997); Payam Akhavan, Punishing War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: A
Critical Juncturefor the New World Order, 15'HUM. RTs. Q. 262 (1993); Bassiouni, supra note 17, at 9;
Richard Goldstone, Conference Address, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1997); Richard J.
Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and International Criminal
Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 485 (1996) [hereinafter Goldstone, Justice as a Tool]; Mark W.
Janis, The Utility of International Criminal Courts, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 161, 163-67 (1997); Theodor
Meron, Answeringfor War Crimes, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1997, at 2; Meron, supra note 33; Michael P.
Scharf, Reining in Impunity for International Crimes Report of the Rapporteur, in REINING IN IMPUNITY,
supra note 31, at 127; Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An Interim Assessment, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 16 (1997); Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 EUR. 3. INT'L L. 501; and M. Comelio Sommaruga, Allocution
d'ouverture du Pr6sident du Comitj international de la Croix-Rouge, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 39, at 21, 25.
42. See, e.g., Iris Almeida, Compensation and Reparation for Gross Violations of Human
Rights: Advancing the International Discourse and Action, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 31, at
399, 401. For an account that sees accountability as "intrinsic to the legitimation of democratic states
and theoretically prior to conceptions of human and property rights," see JOHN BORNEMAN, SETrLING
ACCOUNTS at ix (1997). Bomeman argues that trials for mass atrocities are ritualistic performances
needed for democratic legitimacy. See id. at x; see also Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to
Serious Human Rights Abuses: of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1996, at 81 (considering the pros and cons of criminal prosecutions in terms of the promotion of
democracy); Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106
YALE L.J. 2009 (1997) (arguing that the role of law in transitional jurisprudence centers on its use as a
paradigm for the new political regime).
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This first set of arguments has readily led judges like Cassese, as well as
many other international lawyers, to their second set of contentions in favor of
international forms of accountability. Thus, it is argued that the rendering of
justice is too important to be left to the whims of governments that are prone
to compromise either on enforcing the law against perpetrators or on
guaranteeing them due process.43 It is also said that, even when national
authorities demonstrate a willingness to try perpetrators fairly, international
fora more readily fulfill victims' expectations for the "highest form of
justice'" 4 and are better at upholding the "rule of international law." 45 By
comparison to national courts, international tribunals are perceived to enjoy
certain advantages: they are less destabilizing to fragile governments, are less
likely to cede to "short-term objectives of national politics," can count on the
expertise of jurists who are better qualified and able to progressively develop
international law, are more impartial than proceedings adjudicated by judges
"caught up in the milieu which is the subject of the trials," are more likely to
be respected by national authorities, can investigate crimes with ramifications
in many states more easily, and can render more uniform justice.46 Further,
because international tribunals are purportedly impartial, they are best able to
build "impartial and objective" records of events that are more "far-reaching
and thorough than those undertaken by a fact-finding comniission."'47
Arguments in favor of international prosecutions are also linked to the need to
promote and maintain international peace; international trials are seen as
superior methods of meeting the symbolic and practical needs of the
international community.48
Cassese's third and fourth arguments, contending that the pursuit of
international criminal accountability is fully consistent with peace and can be
made effective, address international lawyers' bite noire-the views of
political realists.49 Cassese argues that international trials "do not make wars"
but that the absence of such trials leaves undeterred advocates of ethnic
nationalism, thereby perpetuating ethnic and religious hatreds and preventing
43. See Cassese, supra note 36, at 6; see also Cassese, supra note 39, at 241 (indicating that
international tribunals are "arguably, in a better position to enforce international humanitarian law," at
least with respect to high-level perpetrators).
44. Goldstone, supra note 32, at 238.
45. Cassese, supra note 26, at 9.
46. See Cassese, supra note 26, at 9-10; Cassese, supra note 36, at 8-9. For similar
arguments, see RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 184. See also Cassese, supra note 39, at 232-43,
245 (discussing ways international tribunals clarify the substantive and procedural law relevant to
international crimes and stimulate wider appreciation for international humanitarian law); Meron,
Criminalization, supra note 22 (same).
47. Cassese, supra note 26, at 9-10.
48. Thus, Payam Akhavan argues that the destabilizing effects of the Balkan conflict spilled
over into neighboring states and created a "general sense of insecurity on the part of other vulnerable
minorities," creating a need for a general warning to would-be aggressors everywhere. See Akhavan,
supra note 27, at 740-41; see also id. at 742 (arguing that the ICTY contributes to general deterrence in
the world through the "moral propaganda of international criminal justice").
49. Repeatedly, supporters of the ad hoe tribunals have striven to answer the demands of
realpolitik. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 17, at 11-13; Elizabeth Odio Benito, Justice for Peace: No
to Impunity, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 31, at 149, 151.
1999]
376 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:365
the installation of pluralist democracy. 50 He argues that the major stumbling
blocks to effective international justice, its remoteness from the locale of
evidence and witnesses, and the reluctance of states to enforce international
edicts, can be overcome if states prove amenable to treating orders issued by
war crimes tribunals as lawful commands.5' As this suggests, misplaced or
parochial worries about the erosion of state sovereignty are regarded as the
main threat to the "vertical" enforcement of international norms by the
international community through such tribunals.
5 2
The rules and jurisdiction of the new ad hoc tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda correspond closely to these contentions. The
jurisdictional provisions within each of these tribunals' statutes provide for
"primacy" over national courts.53 This reflects the prevailing wisdom that
trials organized within the regions affected by mass atrocities should either be
discouraged, as within the Balkans where they are likely to be political show
trials that would undermine public support for the rule of law, or kept at a
distance, as within Rwanda, where such second-best alternatives would prove
selective in applying the law and less competent in applying the requirements
of the treaty and customary law developments that have emerged in the fifty
years since Nuremberg. Creation of these tribunals pursuant to U.N. Charter
authority also accords with the view that it is politically desirable, as well as
legally justified, to conduct such proceedings at the international level given
the interstate interests implicated by the nature or extent of atrocities in the
former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.
5 4
50. See Cassese, supra note 36, at 8-9.
51. See id. at 9-10.
52. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 26, at 11-12, 16 (describing "excessive clinging to state
sovereignty" as the main threat to ad hoc tribunals' effectiveness).
53. See Statute of the International Tribunal, art. 9(2), available at
<http://www.un.org.icty/basic/i-b-ens.html> [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 8(2), available at <http://www.ictr.org/statute.html> [hereinafter ICTR
Statute].
54. These interests were enumerated by the Security Council when it established both the
ICTY and the ICTR. In both instances, the Council determined that crimes committed in these regions
entail credible "threats to the international peace," as foreseen under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
because the offenses create waves of refugees across international boundaries; the failure to prosecute
international crimes threatens the stability or efficacy of the international rule of law and the credibility
of the United Nations; at least some of the crimes involve the actions of more than one state; and the
international community is entitled to assume that governments that unleash such brutal forces, even
against their own citizens, are, sooner or later, apt to commit aggression against other states or aliens
within their borders. See, e.g., Secretary-General's Report, supra note 11, para. 6; S.C. Res. 955, supra
note 11, pmbl. Apart from the endorsement of the U.N. Secretariat and the Security Council,
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals on the basis of such justifications has won the endorsement of the
General Assembly, the human rights community, the vast majority of legal commentators, and the
judges on the ICTY. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/10, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 39, at 7, U.N.
Doe. A/RES/49/10 (1994) (encouraging full funding for the Yugoslav Tribunal); Financing of the
International Ciminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighboring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994: Report of the Fifth Committee (Part III),
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 160, at 4, U.N. Doe. AI50/852/Add.2 (1996) (allotting an
additional $32.5 million to the Rwanda Tribunal for 1996); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PLAYING THE
"COMMUNAL CARD": COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1-17 (1995) (discussing Rwanda and
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There is also widespread consensus among international lawyers that the
flaws of prior proceedings at Nuremberg and Tokyo have been largely
corrected and that the new ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda are more credible instruments of the international community in
terms of their respective bases of jurisdiction, rules and procedures, bench,
and bar.55 To date, most international lawyers regard proceedings within these
ad hoc tribunals as more attractive than available alternatives and few criticize
the jurisdictional primacy these entities enjoy.56
International lawyers' emphasis on international fora has also been
accompanied by clear preferences as to whom to indict. From the outset, most
international lawyers have argued that the scarce resources of the international
community need to be devoted to trying those perpetrators who have the
greatest responsibility, by which they mean the leaders and instigators, at a
high policy level, of mass atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda.5 7  While circumstances, such as the fortuitous sighting and
subsequent arrest of a low-level Serbian perpetrator, Dusko Tadic, compelled
the ICTY to proceed with his trial as its first full-fledged effort, tribunal
insiders and supporters have generally argued that the tribunals' success will
be judged by the degree to which both reach high-level perpetrators.58
Logistical limitations are not the only reason for this emphasis on
investigating, indicting, and prosecuting primarily high-level individuals, even
if this results in few actual trials.59 Such preferences are directly linked to the
the international community's response).
55. See, e.g., RATNER& ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 185; SCHARF, supra note 5, at 3-17.
56. For a rare critique of the ICTP's jurisdictional primacy, see Morris, supra note 12, passim.
Significantly, jurisdictional primacy is not anticipated for the permanent international criminal court. See
infra note 551 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, most international lawyers evince a clear preference
for a permanent international criminal court over the establishment of additional ad hoc bodies. See, e.g.,
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 184-89; PROCEEDINGS OF THE 89TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 301, 301-04 (1995) (remarks by James Crawford).
57. Compare Bassiouni, supra note 17, at 20 & n.51 (urging that, as a matter of policy,
international prosecutions be limited to high-level perpetrators except where low-level trials may
usefully generate information regarding high-level actors), and Joinet, supra note 33, para. 48 (arguing
that, since international criminal tribunals can try only a few people annually, perpetrators at the top of
the hierarchy should be tried first), with Morris, supra note 12, at 370 (questioning international
lawyers' traditional preference for high-level international prosecutions). See ao Cassese, supra note
39, at 242 (arguing that the Chapter VII mandate of the ad hoc tribunals justifies a focus on bringing to
trial those who are most responsible for the underlying threat to international peace).
58. Dusko Tadic was the first defendant in the ICTY's first full trial and the judgment against
him the first international war crimes judgment since Nuremberg. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-
T (ICTY May 7, 1997) available at Opinion and Judgment (visited Mar. 30, 1999)
<http:/www.un.orglI.C.T.YItrialc2jugement-e/70714se2.htm> [hereinafter Tadic Judgment]. As that
judgment indicates, Tadic was not ultimately charged with genocide and there was no claim that he was
in charge of or instigated Balkan "ethnic cleansing." Tadic was convicted of physical beatings and other
abuses committed against approximately 30 individuals. See id. while some international lawyers have
argued that there are tactical benefits to trying low-level perpetrators, see, e.g., SCHARF, supra note 5, at
85, most have stressed the need to focus the tribunals' energies on those regarded as most responsible
for atrocities, especially high-level government officials. See also id. at 219, 225 (noting that the ICTY's
deterrent value may ultimately be judged by whether its reach extends to Karadzic and Mladic, two
high-level Bosnian Serb leaders).
59. As might be expected, international lawyers argue that trials for large numbers of
perpetrators are not necessary to achieve most, if not all, of their goals. Thus, Payam Akhavan argues
that general deterrence is achievable without punishing large numbers because "the ultimate foundation
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premise that these are crimes of states. Only exceptional crimes, after all, are
committed by government elites, are the subject of international treaties or
customary law, and implicate transborder issues of direct concern to
organizations such as the United Nations. In addition, some contend that the
enforcement advantages enjoyed by international tribunals apply only with
respect to the prosecutions of "higher ups" and that, for this reason, low-level
perpetrators should mostly be dealt with by national courts "as guided by the
decisions of the international tribunal." 60 The ICTR's prosecutors have been
especially attentive to such recommendations. To date, the public indictments,
suspects in custody, and ongoing trials of that tribunal, although few in
number in proportion to the number of likely Rwandan perpetrators, have
involved a veritable who's who of prominent persons within the former
regime in Rwanda.
61
Journalists, by contrast, argue that recent atrocities in Rwanda and the
Balkans can only be understood by comprehending the underlying social and
other conditions of the regions affected, including the prevalence of endemic
ethnic hatred. To many people, especially foreign correspondents who cover
Rwanda and the Balkans, atrocities in these regions are prototypical crimes of
hate-that is, particularly virulent forms of intergroup violence with only
sporadic, incidental interstate dimensions. Contemporaneous press accounts,
as well as many other chronicles by those outside international law circles,
tend to describe Rwanda and Balkan atrocities as arising from situations in
which a variety of individuals (from politicians to cultural icons) and groups
(from political parties to churches) have chosen to revive latent hostilities,
thereby inflaming groups to act on familiar fears or hatreds of "the other" as
defined by gender, race, religion, or ethnicity (or a combination of all of
these).62 While explanations for these crimes of hate vary, by region and by
storyteller, these perspectives rely less on the failures (and potential benefits)
of international law.
This second paradigmatic perspective does not view the Rwandan
genocide or Balkan "ethnic cleansing" as aberrant deviations from the norm of
interstate behavior and neither tragedy is regarded as having much in common
with classical resorts to interstate aggression. Thus, while popular press
for prevention of future criminal behavior is the transformation of popular conceptions of correct
behavior and the gradual internalization of values that encourage habitual conformity with the law."
Akhavan, supra note 27, at 747. For the argument that criminal trials for too many perpetrators may
undermine the goals of international accountability, see infra note 441 and accompanying text.
60. Cassese, supra note 39, at 241.
61. See Suspects (visited Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.wcw.org > (providing an alphabetical
listing of 21 suspects indicted by the ICTR through May 29, 1998, including 13 in custody or in the
midst of trials and Rwanda's former vice president, four former mayors, one cabinet minister, and seven
other ministers or elected officials).
62. For a distillation and detailed enumeration of press accounts relating to the Balkans, see
GENOCIDE AFrER. EMOTION: THE POSTEMOTIONAL BALKAN WAR (Stjepan G. Meltrovi6 ed., 1996)
[hereinafter GENOCIDE AFrER EMOTION]. Some of the press coverage seems inspired by Samuel
Huntington's predictions about looming intra-cultural wars. See BORNEMAN, supra note 42, at 141-42
(contending that this "culturalist" perspective assumes that all differences are inherited from the weighty
past and fails to explain change); Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF.,
Summer 1993, at 22-49 (predicting future clashes).
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accounts acknowledge that these conflicts have international dimensions in
terms of effects (given the resulting streams of refugees, for example) and are
partly caused by the shipment of arms and people across borders, most of
these descriptions emphasize instead the degree of similarity between the
Balkan and Rwanda massacres and ubiquitous domestic pogroms having little
to do with transborder aggression.
63
For minorities within the United States, and possibly throughout the
world, this second perspective is likely to have more resonance than the first.
The typical person of color in the United States or a member of a recognizable
minority group anywhere scarcely needs a briefing on the laws of war or the
structure of the Westphalian system to find familiar analogues to the ugly
appeals to "ethnic purity" that have preceded and accompanied these
massacres and that are still commonly encountered in both regions. The
psychological tools used to inflame perpetrators seem sadly familiar. The
propaganda spewed forth by hate-mongers in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, pitting Serb against non-Serb or Croat against Muslim or Hutu
versus Tutsi, replicate the rhetoric, the tactics, and many of the arguments
used by white supremacists in the United States or neo-Nazi skinheads
elsewhere in Europe. Hate groups throughout the world, it seems, target
perceived enemies through nearly identical appeals. In all cases, the message
conveyed is that members of the other group are subhuman, not entitled to
respect, and a threat to core values. Further, to the extent violence in either
Rwanda or the Balkans has been directed at women, perpetrators there seem
to have borrowed a page from age-old misogyny and the ageless tendency to
target groups that are among the least empowered. 64 In both Rwanda and the
Balkans there is much evidence of gender-specific violence and considerable
evidence to suggest that where it does occur, as with respect to systematic
rapes against Muslim women in the Balkans or against Tutsi women by Hutu,
such crimes are often committed against those who are of the "wrong"
ethnicity, tribe, or religion and who are female.65 In both regions, gender has
63. See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Machete Returns to Rwanda, Rekindling a Genocidal
War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at Al; James C. McKinley, Jr., Searching in Vain for Rwanda's Moral
High Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1997, at C3 [hereinafter McKinley, Searching in Vain for Rwanda's
Moral High Ground]; Tina Rosenberg, Defending the Indefensible, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 19,
1998, at 46; Ronald Steel, Let Them Sink, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 2, 1992, at 15.
64. While certain aspects of such crimes, including allegations of deliberate campaigns to
rape-with-intent-to-impregnate in the course of Balkan "ethnic cleansing," may constitute new forms of
victimization, the vast bulk of gender specific violence, especially in Rwanda, has been (sadly)
reminiscent of an ancient connection between rape and warfare. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
SHATTERED LiES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH (1996);
NEIER, supra note 15, at 172-91.
65. With respect to the Balkans, see, for example, the Final Report of the Commission of
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, Commission of Experts, U.N. SCOR,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, at 57-60 (1994); and Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based Terrorism in
the Former Yugoslavia and the Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries,
46 AM. U. L. REV. 793 (1997). With respect to Rwanda, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64, at
42-52.
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been used as a tool of discrimination against the offending other, in addition to
ethnicity or religion.66
Despite its appeal among some audiences, this more ethnocentric 7
perspective has been subject to severe criticism in the context of Rwanda and
the Balkans. Some political scientists and historians have argued that accounts
of mass atrocities that attribute these offenses to "ethnic conflict" encourage
facile generalizations across continents and time at the expense of
inconvenient facts, including the existence of significant groups within the
Balkans and Rwanda who resisted the calls for violence (and who sometimes
paid for their tolerance with their lives),6 8 as well as the problem that similar
appeals to ethnic violence have not always succeeded.69
Other observers have challenged not only the accuracy of these
descriptions but also their suggested prescriptions. Ethnocentric accounts
appear objectionable to the extent they imply that outsiders should do nothing
in response since ancient "tribalisms" in the Balkans or in Rwanda would only
be worsened by ignorant, even if well-intentioned, foreign intervention. 70 An
emphasis on the alleged ethnic origins of the conflict can easily lead to
condemnation of all groups in the regions affected by violence or to the
conclusion that cases of feuding neighbors are not deserving of outside
intervention because such cases are characterized by the equal or at least
66. See Simon Chesterman, Never Again... and Again: Law, Order, and the Gender of War
Crimes in Bosnia and Beyond, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 299, 324-42 (1997); Christine Chinkin, Rape and
Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law, 5 EuR. J. INT'L L. 326, 326-30 (1994); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1993); see also supra notes
64-65 (enumerating instances of gender violence in both the Balkans and Rwanda).
67. Max Weber's extremely generalized notion of "ethnicity" seems suitable in this context.
"We shall call 'ethnic groups' those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common
descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both or because of memories of
colonization and migration." Giorgio Ausenda, Postscript: Current Issues in the Study of Ethnicity,
Ethnic Conflict and the Humanitarian Intervention and Questions for Future Research, in WAR AND
ETHNICITY: GLOBAL CONNECTIONS AND LOCAL VIOLENCE 218 (David Turton ed., 1997) [hereinafter
WAR AND ETHNICITYJ (quoting MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIErY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 389 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978)). This inclusive conception of ethnicity is
grounded in subjective perceptions of identity or extended kinship that make distinctions based on
racial, geographic, linguistic, religious, tribal, and even cultural lines. See, e.g., Amy L. Chua, Markets,
Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 10
(1998) (quoting Donald L. Horowitz). An ethnocentric approach to mass atrocities suggests an emphasis
on the discriminatory animus that drives perpetrators to target individuals based on perpetrators'
subjective definition of the target group's status as "the other." To this extent, such approaches can be
adapted to examining gender-based, as well as ethnic, bigotry.
68. For critiques of such accounts, see, for example, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 54,
at 17 (discussing Rwanda); Tom Gallagher, My Neighbor, My Enemy: The Manipulation of Ethnic
Identity and the Origins and Conduct of War in Yugoslavia, in WAR AND ETHNICITY, supra note 67, at
47, 68-70 (discussing the Balkans).
69. See, e.g., Stefan Troebst, An Ethnic War That Did Not Take Place: Macedonia, Its
Minorities and Its Neighbors in the 1990s, in WAR AND ETHNICITY, supra note 67, at 77; cf. Eric Stein,
On Peaceful Resolution of Ethnic Differences, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMACKER 321
(Ulrich Immenga et al. eds., 1996) (discussing the Czecho-Slovak separation).
70. For examples of such prescriptions, see, for example, John Stedman, The New
Interventionists, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992, at 3, 7-8, 14-16; Steel, supra note 63. Thus, the British
historian Paul Johnson has argued that Balkan problems are "rooted in the nature of the inhabitants" and
that "[s]hort of exterminating them, there is really nothing to be done." NEIER, supra note 15, at 146
(quoting Paul Johnson).
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comparable guilt of all sides.71 Critics complain that an emphasis on race,
ethnicity, or religion can become a comfortable rationale for passivity for
those outside the affected region.72
There also appear to be latent forms of racism in Western newspaper
editorials suggesting that, given the supposed intractability of Rwandan tribal
antagonisms or the ostensible irrationality of Bosnia's fundamentalists, it
might be best to simply leave the parties to fend for themselves, or even kill
themselves off. Such stereotyping of the antagonists in both regions seems
sadly reminiscent of the racist propaganda that helped to inflame the
massacres themselves. 73 Similarly, those who admit that gender-specific
violence has occurred but resist calls for outside intervention either to prevent
its reoccurrence or to punish perpetrators seem to be suggesting, at least sub-
rosa, that "boys will be boys" or that rape and sexual assaults are endemic to
war and impossible to eradicate.74
There is, finally, suspicion of the motives of those whose accounts focus
on discrimination based on ethnicity and who draw cautionary lessons from
the spiral of ethnic politics. Political conservatives in the United States have
argued that violence in Rwanda and the Balkans suggest the perils of
encouraging, particularly through government policies, ethnic identity at the
expense of a united national identity, as through government efforts that
reportedly "promote" ethnic self-identification, such as affirmative action
programs.75 Similarly, some have suggested that Western feminists have
71. Compare McKinley, Searching in Vain for Rwanda's Moral High Ground, supra note 63,
at 3 (describing Rwanda as a "moral quagmire"), with GOUREViTCH, supra note 1, at 185-86
(questioning such journalistic accounts).
72. For such critiques, see PRUNIER, supra note 10, at 339-40 (discussing French officials'
statements suggesting that the killings in Rwanda in 1994 were "double genocides" whereby both sides
were equally guilty); Michael Sells, Religion, History, and Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in
RELIGION AND JUSTICE IN THE WAR OVER BOSNIA 23, 41 (G. Scott Davis ed., 1996) (critiquing "moral
equalizing" in the context of the Balkans); see also GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 59, 185-86 (observing
the simplicity of media reports and the possible passivity that those reports cause); HuMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 54, at vii (stating that international inaction is "more easily excused if the source of
... violence is understood to be beyond control'); James J. Sadkovich, The Response of the American
Media to Balkan Neo-Nationalisms, in GENOCIDE AFrER EMOTION, supra note 62, at 113-57. As David
Turton points out, those who see these massacres as the result of the unfreezing of suspended ancient
hostilities in the wake of the end of the Cold War or the collapse of communism are apt to recommend
against intervention. See David Turton, Introduction to WAR AND ETHNICITY, supra note 67, at 1, 33-34.
For international lawyers' responses, see infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text (discussing
Akhavan).
73. With respect to Rwanda, see generally GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 154-57. With
respect to the Balkans, see, for example, Turton, supra note 72, at 32-34; and GENOCIDE AFTER
EMOTION, supra note 62, passim. As one Croatian journalist, commenting on how concepts of the
"other" have been deployed in the Balkans, put it: "For Europe, the 'other' is the wild 'Balkans' that
they pretend not to understand." See Violet B. Ketels, Havel to the Castle!: The Power of the Word, 548
ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCL 45, 60 (1996) (quoting Slavenka Drakvli6).
74. Cf. Rhonda Copelon, Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape in Time of War, in
WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 197, 197 (Julie Peters &
Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) (noting that military tribunals rarely indict rape). For an account of how the
"gender culture of the military" may contribute to the likelihood of rape, see Madeline Morris, By Force
of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 654 (1996).
75. See generally Kenneth Anderson, Illiberal Tolerance: An Essay on the Fall of Yugoslavia
and the Rise of Multiculturalism in the United States, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 385, 420 n.91, 424-27
(discussing such arguments); The Balkanization of American Culture, CHRONICLES, June 1993, at 25
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exploited the gender-specific aspects of these atrocities to promote their own
domestic agendas.
76
The problems with some of the more ethnocentric accounts, real or
imagined, have only reinforced the confidence of international lawyers.
Because it does not rely on the significance of race, ethnicity, religion, or
gender, and only deals with such issues to the extent these are relevant to
prove particular charges under international humanitarian law, the
international legal paradigm seems free from many of the same critiques.
Since international lawyers start from the premise that international
crimes were committed in both Rwanda and the Balkans, they presume from
the outset that there are culprits and innocent victims, aggressors/perpetrators,
as well as law-abiding soldiers and civilians, all of whom can be judged in
terms of moral, or at least legal, culpability. As noted, international lawyers
argue that international criminal prosecutions will show the guilt of
identifiable individuals, and not Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Hutus, Tutsis, or any
other group. As Cassese contends, the point is to discourage notions of
collective complicity by finding individual perpetrators, and not ethnic
groups, accountable. 7
Contrary to those who would blame ancient ethnic hatreds, international
lawyers are proactive and non-defeatist. They believe that the rule of law can
be applied even in the face of mass atrocity, that criminal accountability is
appropriate because all sides are not equally guilty, and that international
intervention to encourage accountability is neither useless nor
counterproductive. International lawyers assert that "there is always
something to be done."78 The international legal paradigm is therefore hostile
to the view that the primary causes for atrocities in the former Yugoslavia or
Rwanda are "primordial tribal hatreds" or historically predetermined but
spontaneous outbursts of uncontrollable bloodlust between distinct ethnic
groups. Accordingly, Payam Akhavan, presently a prosecutor in the ICTR,
argues that "primordialist" views imply that trials for perpetrators could only
have a marginal impact on deterrence, the prospects for reconciliation, or
(featuring a series of perspectives on the "balkanization" of American culture).
76. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 397 n.39.
77. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Akhavan, supra note 27, at 741-42
(arguing that one goal of the ICTY is to produce a historic account that demonstrates that individuals,
primarily leaders, bear responsibility, and not groups); Meron, supra note 41, at 2-3 (stating that
criminal trials "assign guilt for war crimes to the individual perpetrators and the leaders responsible,
rather than allowing blame to fall on entire groups and nations"); Roth, supra note 27, at 21 (same). Nor
are these views limited to the scholarly community. See, e.g., The Search for Justice in the Former
Yugoslavia and Beyond: An Interview with Minna Schrag '75, COLUM. L. SCH. REP., Autumn 1996, at
25 (quoting Minna Schrag, a former prosecutor at the ICTY); Sharp, supra note 31, at 454 (quoting the
top human rights officer at the U.S. Department of State on the importance of bringing war criminals to
justice); Mary Ann T6treault, Justice for All: Wartime Rape and Women's Human Rights, 3 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 197, 197 (1997) (quoting the former chief prosecutor within the tribunals on the
importance of individual guilt).
By comparison, alternatives to criminal trials, such as lustration, are seen as fundamentally
defective precisely because they encourage notions of collective complicity. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda,
Civil and Political Sanctions as an Accountability Mechanism for Massive Violations of Human Rights,
in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 31, at 313, 322-23.
78. Anderson, supra note 75, at 405.
peace-building. 79 He proposes countering such ethnocentric views by showing
that genocide is the end product of a deliberate campaign by leaders and other
elites to artificially create an ethnic enemy, a "calculated conspiracy that is
capable of definition, containment, and prevention." 80 From Akhavan's
perspective, the international legal paradigm is partly defined by its rejection
of primordialism since it is that rejection that helps to justify the pursuit of
accountability, legitimizes the targeting of high-level architects of violence,
excuses the failure to punish each and every one of the thousands of other
(particularly low-level) perpetrators, and answers realist critics who argue that
trials and the truths they reveal accomplish nothing.
While international lawyers do not ignore the ethnic origins of these
conflicts, their paradigm is premised on an "instrumentalist" view of ethnicity
that tends to subsume its importance:8 1 Although ethnicity is barely discussed
by the supporters of the ad hoc tribunals, to the extent it is addressed, ethnic
82identity is seen as pliable, artificial, constructed, and therefore dismissible.
Thus, for example, Payam Akhavan argues that ethnic identity is essentially a
"tpolitical contrivance of elites" that, in the context of the Balkans, became an
instrument of systematic incitement to mass violence.83 He argues that Balkan
ethnic cleansing, far from representing a historically determined "clash of
civilizations," was really a "clash of political elites." 84 Akhavan therefore
concludes that one of the major functions of the ICTY is to recount the story
of how "elites manipulated ethnic identity to foment violence and consolidate
political power." 85 He argues that by revealing this truth, the ICTY serves to
counter Rwandan political elites' campaign of collective demonization,
thereby promoting alf the laudatory goals of criminal accountability. 86 Under
the international legal paradigm, judicial accounts of mass atrocity should
avoid dwelling on alleged ethnic differences but should emphasize how ethnic
identity came to be exploited by high-level instigators of violence.87 It also
implies that for criminal trials to be effective conveyors of the truth, they need
to be seen as impartial public fora far removed from the vestiges of ethnic
79. See Akhavan, supra note 27, at 752-65.
80. Id. at 752.
81. See, e.g., id. at 752-65. Revealingly, Akhavan entitles this portion of his article
"Understanding the Non-Ethnicity of Ethnic Conflict." Id. at 752. The dismissal of ethnic concerns may
lead to policy recommendations that go beyond the issues addressed here. Thus, Mendlovitz and Fousek,
for example, recommend the establishment of a transnational "Genocide Police Force" on the basis that
it would "bypass the politically volatile issues of national identity." Mendlovitz & Fousek, supra note
28, at 147.
82. Benedict Anderson's concept of "imagined communities" is frequently cited for this
purpose. See, e.g., David Wippman, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHMNIc CONFLICT 4
(David Wippman ed., 1998). As Wippman points out, international lawyers' dismissal of ethnicity as an
"ordinary or natural category for legal analysis," id. at 2, also stems from liberal assumptions regarding
the ostensibly diminishing significance of ethnicity in the wake ofmodemization. See id. at 6.
83. Akhavan, supra.note 27, at 753.
84. Id. at 758-65.
85. Id. at 765.
86. See id.
87. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REv.
2031, 2044-53, 2066-68 (1998) (analyzing how the ICTY attempted to follow this approach in the
course of the Tadic case).
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indoctrination and misinformation. For this purpose, the international legal
paradigm relies on a judiciary whose composition and judgments evince
ethnic neutrality.88
As is suggested by Cassese's third and fourth arguments above,8 9 the
main critique of the international legal paradigm has come from political
realists, including a few renegade lawyers who regard the arguments for
international trials as based on naive internationalism or utopian visions of
world order. 90 For such realists, the establishment of these tribunals is an
exercise in hypocrisy and constitutes only a cowardly attempt to disguise the
West's failure to prevent predicted atrocities in both regions. Apart from the
few that decry all attempts to impose international criminal accountability, the
main lines of contention are between those who suggest, as does W. Michael
Reisman, that amnesties need to remain part of the lawyers' "toolbox,"
especially when perpetrators are not defeated on the battlefield and need to be
enticed to make peace, and those, like Cassese, who strenuously deny that
criminal trials are incompatible with achieving peace.
92
88. See Akhavan, supra note 27, at 771 (arguing that international tribunals can arrive at
objective truth or at least "an empathy for human suffering that transcends the bonds of blood and soil");
see also supra text accompanying note 46 (citing Cassese); infra Part IV (questioning attempts to
implement ethnic neutrality).
89. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., ALFRED P. RuBIN, ETHicS AND AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 156-57, 183
(1997); Anderson, supra note 75, passim; see also Akhavan, supra note 27, at 738-40 (discussing the
"peace versus accountability" debate that initially surrounded the ICTY); Alfred P. Rubin, An
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 7-17 (1994)
(discussing the contradictions between the Westphalian legal order and an idealistic, "monist"
conception of the United Nations).
91. See Robert M. Hayden, Reply, 55 SLAvIc REv. 767 (1996) [hereinafter Hayden, Reply];
Alfred P. Rubin, Dayton, Bosnia, and the Limits of Law, NAT'L INTEREST, Winter 1996-97, at 41
(suggesting alternatives to establishing a tribunal). For a more general critique of international
humanitarian law, see Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical
History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L LJ. 49 (1994). See also Robert M. Hayden, Schindler's
Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers, 55 SLAVIc REV. 727, 736-43 (1996)
(criticizing attempts to criminalize "ethnic cleansing" in the European context) [hereinafter Hayden,
Schindler's Fate].
92. Compare W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive
Violations of Human Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 75 (warning of "judicial
romanticism"), with supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (noting Cassese's responses), The
legalist/realist divide is also evident with respect to arguments about whether or not accountability
demands criminal liability. The realist school argues that, given objections to international criminal
liability likely to be posed by reluctant sovereigns and the need to secure prompt peace on the ground in
fragile states that have been the site of mass atrocities, it may be sufficient in some cases to pursue other
remedies. Other remedies may include compensation commissions or other forms of public
acknowledgment on behalf of victims, truth commissions, or lustrations. See generally IMPUNITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 13-70 (surveying such techniques); Reisman, supra, at 76 (claiming
that to achieve all the goals of public order more means than just criminal tribunals are required).
Compare Goldstone, Justice as a Tool, supra note 41, at 492-501 (distinguishing the South African
Truth Commission from the ICTR and ICTY), with Emily H. McCarthy, South Africa's Amnesty
Process: A Viable Route Toward Truth and Reconciliation?, 3 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 183 (1997)
(critiquing aspects of the South African Truth Commission approach). For an argument for a permanent
international truth commission as an adjunct to international and national prosecutions, see Michael P.
Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375
(1997).
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This Article leaves the realist critique to others. My intent here is,
instead, to use the disjuncture between the two paradigms described-between
"crimes of states" and "crimes of hate"--to explore its implications for
criminal accountability for mass violence. Assuming for the purpose of this
Article that, as Cassese argues, justice ought to be pursued in cases of mass
atrocity,93 I consider a further question: should the perspective that offenses
are crimes of hate inform the views of international lawyers, along with their
solutions? I address whether the crimes of hate perspective has implications
for where we should try offenders (internationally or domestically), who we
should try (high-level leaders versus others), and how those selected for
prosecution should be tried, including what criminal charges should be
brought (international offenses or crimes under domestic law), and by what
kind of judges.
In the Parts that follow I critically examine, within the context of recent
events in Rwanda, three aspects of the international legal paradigm-its
preference for an international venue, its emphasis on ethnic neutrality, and its
insistence on pursuing exceptional and high-level perpetrators of crimes of
state. I argue that the international legal paradigm fails to address the
interaction between local and international proceedings and fails to accord
sufficient importance to the ethnic divides that characterized the underlying
atrocities and continue to exist in their wake. These failings have implications
for whether international trials will preserve the collective memory of
barbarous acts, mollify victims, affirm the rule of law, or promote national
reconciliation.
III. THE PERILS OF PRIMACY
The international legal paradigm attempts to merge the "profoundly
consensual" body of international law with the "profoundly coercive" nature
of domestic criminal law. 94 International lawyers assume that if this tension is
resolved in favor of effective international tribunals enjoying primacy with
respect to jurisdiction, the Nuremberg-inspired goals of accountability will be
achieved. There are many difficult problems involved in making international
tribunals as effective in enforcing the law as most domestic courts. Perhaps
because these have proven so intractable, international lawyers have avoided
examining the premise that the goals of accountability are furthered by
primacy for international tribunals.
The statutes of both the ICTR and the ICTY resolve jurisdictional
conflicts in their favor. While both statutes recognize that national courts,
particularly those in the states in which the atrocities occurred, may have
concurrent jurisdiction over the international crimes enumerated in these
statutes, both insist that the respective international tribunals enjoy "inherent
93. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
94. Louise Arbour, Progress and Challenges in International Criminal Justice, 21 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 531, 531 (1997). Cassese's fourth argument attempts to reconcile the tensions between these
two bodies of law. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also James Crawford, An International
Criminal Court?, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 255, 256, 262 (1997) (noting the same tension).
1999]
386 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:365
supremacy" not in the usual sense of being able to review the decisions of
lower courts but "rather to exercise jurisdiction in the first instance as a trial
court."95 "Primacy" under both tribunals' statutes means that "at any stage of
the procedure" the international tribunal may order national courts to defer to
its competence and release a suspect to its custody for trial.96 Moreover, for
the ICTR the principle of primacy applies with respect to all national courts
that exercise jurisdiction.9  The international prosecutor's right to insist on
jurisdictional primacy applies whenever "what is in issue is closely related to,
or otherwise involves, significant factual or legal questions which may have
implications for investigations or prosecutions before the Tribunal."98 Neither
the international tribunal nor a national court, however, can attempt to retry an
95. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMERYUGOSLAVIA 126 n.378 (1995).
96. See ICTY Statute, supra note 53, art. 9; ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 8. Article 8(2)
provides that the ICTR shall have primacy over the national courts of all States: "At any stage of the
procedure, the International Tribunal for Rwanda may formally request national courts to defer to its
competence in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda." ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 8(2). For a survey of some of the
interpretative and practical issues raised by this provision in terms of the ICTR, see Frederick Harhoff,
Consonance or Rivalry? Calibrating the Efforts to Prosecute War Crimes in National and International
Tribunals, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 571 (1997). See also Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or
Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal
Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 395 (1998) (discussing the justification for this "extraordinary
jurisdictional priority"). As Brown notes, although these provisions state that the respective tribunals
may "request" national courts to defer to their jurisdiction and some permanent members of the Security
Council initially suggested that the tribunals could not require states to defer, the appellate chamber of
the ICTY has endorsed the view that states must comply with tribunal requests to defer to international
jurisdiction. See id. at 395-404. As the ICTY put it:
Indeed, when an international tribunal such as the present one is created, it must be
endowed with primacy over national courts. Otherwise, human nature being what it is,
there would be a perennial danger of international crimes being characterised as
"ordinary crimes".., or proceedings being "designed to shield the accused," or cases not
being diligently prosecuted ....
If not effectively countered by the principle of primacy, any one of those stratagems
might be used to defeat the very purpose of the creation of an international criminal
jurisdiction, to the benefit of the very people whom it has been designed to prosecute.
The principle of primacy of this International Tribunal over national courts must be
affirned; the more so since it is confined within the strict limits of Articles 9 and 10 of
the Statute and Rules 9 and 10 of the Rules of Procedure of the International
Tribunal ....
Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1, Oct. 2, 1995, paras. 58-59 (appeals decision), available at
<http://www.un.orglicty/tadielappealldecision-e1510022.htm>.
97. Compare ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 8(2) (providing for primacy "over the national
courts of all states"), with ICTY Statute, supra note 53, art. 9 (providing for primacy merely "over
national courts"). It is not yet clear whether this difference in wording will lead to differing results.
98. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 9(iii), available at
<http://www.un.orglicty/basic/rpe/IT32_revl3con.htm>; ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule
9(iii), available at <http:llwww.un.orglictr/rules.html>. Brown contends that under Rule 9(iii), both
tribunals can assert their primacy "in virtually any situation, not merely when it will remedy specific
problems with an ongoing national proceeding." Brown, supra note 96, at 397. The ICTY Rules also
provide for deference to international jurisdiction if the act being investigated at the national level is
characterized as an ordinary crime; there is lack of impartiality or independence; the investigations or
proceedings are designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility; or the case is
not diligently prosecuted. See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra, Rule 9(i)-(ii).
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individual for acts that have already been diligently prosecuted as an
international crime.
99
In the succeeding Sections I present a brief account of the Rwandan
genocide and thereafter indicate how the ICTR's jurisdictional primacy may
undermine the preservation of accurate collective memory, the national rule of
law, the realization of justice, and even the effective development of
international criminal law. I conclude that international lawyers' struggle to
wrestle primary jurisdiction away from Rwanda was probably not a battle
worth winning.
A. History of a Genocide
The Rwandan government that came to power in the wake of the 1994
genocide has, as might be expected of a regime that consists of many of those
targeted by that genocide, a strong incentive to punish Rwanda's
genocidaires, 100 and yet cast the sole vote within the Security Council against
establishing the ICTR.'01 At this writing, years after creation of the ICTR and
with several trials underway within that body, relations between the ICTR and
the Tutsi-dominated government in Rwanda remain "frosty."' 10 2 The reasons
for this are grounded in the history of the genocide. That history, although
well told elsewhere, is worth summarizing here. 103
While no one knows the exact origins of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa
peoples (the latter representing only one percent of Rwanda's population),
there is little evidence of deep-rooted or ancient hatreds among these castes, at
99. See ICTR Statute, supra note 53, arts. 9-10 (addressing non-bis-in-idern). Article 9 of the
ICTR Statute provides:
1. No person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations
of international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he or she has
already been tried by the International Tribunal for Rwanda.
2. A person who has been tried by a national court for acts constituting serious violations
of international humanitarian law may be subsequently tried by the International Tribunal
for Rwanda only if:
a. The act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime; or
b. The national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to
shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not
diligently prosecuted.
3. In considering the penalty to be imposed on a person convicted of a crime under the
present Statute, the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall take into account the extent
to which any penalty imposed by a national court on the same person for the same act has
already been served.
ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 9; see also ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 98,
Rule 13 (authorizing Trial Chambers to issue a "reasoned order" to a national court requesting the
discontinuation of national proceedings).
100. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 12, at 353-57 (describing the Rwandans' objections to
various provisions of the new International Criminal Tribunal).
101. See id. at 357.
102. McKinley, supra note 32; see also GOUREVrrCH, supra note 1, at 252-53 (noting how
some Rwandans regard the ICTR as an "insult").
103. I have adopted much of the foregoing account from the following sources: DESTEXB-,
supra note 10; GOUREVITCH, supra note 1; PRUNIER, supra note 10; Morris, supra note 12; Schabas,
supra note 12; and Frontline: Rwanda Chronology (visited Mar. 24, 1999)
<http:llwww.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontlinelshows/rwanda/etc/cron.html>.
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least prior to colonial rule.104 While intermarriage did not occur often, Hutus
and Tutsis spoke the same language, shared the same territory, fought
common wars against outside aggressors, and followed the same traditions.
This began to change with European colonization and the import of "race
science" first by the Germans and later the Belgians, who governed the former
German colony as a U.N. protectorate. Rwanda's colonizers encouraged
"tribalism without tribes," classifications that corresponded to European racist
aesthetic preferences. 105 The colonizers of Rwanda made distinctions based on
physical characteristics and perceptions of differences in political and social
organization that reinforced preexisting economic and social differences
between Tutsis and Hutus.10 6 With the onset of colonial rule, Tutsis, despite
their minority status, gained greater economic and social status over the Hutu,
particularly through a division of labor that gave many Tutsis control over
cattle and left hard labor to Hutu agriculturalists. 10 7 In the twentieth century,
Europeans "played an essential role in creating an ethnic split and ensured that
the important feeling of belonging to a social group was fueled by ethnic,
indeed racial, hatred."108 Destexhe concludes that the ethnic classification
scheme recorded on identity cards, first introduced by the Belgians, served as
the basic instrument for the genocide of the Tutsi people who were "guilty" on
104. See DESTEXHE, supra note 10, at 36-37. For a more thorough account that is essentially in
accord with Destexhe's, see PRUNIER, supra note 10, at 1-23.
105. DESTEXHE, supra note 10, at 36 (quoting JEAN-PIERRE CHPTEN, BURUNDI, L'HISToIRE
REfROUVtE (1993)).
106. According to Destexhe:
The colonisers established a distinction between those who did not correspond to the
stereotype of a negro (the Tutsis) and those who did (the Hutu). The first groups,
"superior African," were designated Hamites or "white coloureds" who represented a
"missing link" between the "Whites" and the "Blacks" ..... Although lacking proof,
successive colonial administrators and missionaries become convinced that the Tutsi
were immigrants to the region and that these cattle owners were of different genetic stock
to the Hutu.... [and were] "Europeans under a black skin."... According to this theory,
the Hutu (the majority of the population) are assimilated to the Bantu. Although first used
to describe a linguistic group, the term Bantu rapidly took on a pejorative racial
connotation to designate the "negroes" as members of another human species who played
the role of serfs within society.
DEsTEXHS, supra note 10, at 38-39; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 54, at 1-2 (containing
a similar account); PRUNiER, supra note 10, at 23-54 (same).
107. See DESTExHE, supra note 10, at 39-40.
108. Id. at 41. The book describes how Germans subscribed to the "superior race" theory and
promoted military assistance to Tutsi; how Belgian colonizers' introduction of chiefdoms and identity
cards reinforced Tutsi domination; and how the Roman Catholic Church and missionaries generally
further encouraged such sentiments and used the Tutsi power structure to evangelize downward from the
Tutsi chiefs to the "Hutu masses." See id. at 40-41. The book's overview of recent history concludes:
What happened in Rwanda illustrates a situation where the coexistence of different social
groups or castes metamorphosed into an ethnic problem with an overwhelmingly racist
dimension. The caricature of physical stereotypes... was manipulated to provide proof
of the racial superiority of one group over the other. Archaic political divisions were
progressively transformed into racial ideologies and repeated outbreaks of violence
resulting from the colonial heritage which was absorbed by local elites who then brought
it into the political arena. The present generation has internalized this ethnological
colonial model, with some groups deliberately choosing to play the tribal card. The
regimes that have ruled Rwanda and Burundi since independence have shown that they
actually need ethnic divisions in order both to reinforce and justify their positions.
Id. at 47.
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three counts: They were a minority; they were a reminder of a feudal system;
and they were regarded as colonizers in their own country.
10 9
Although the Belgians favored the Tutsi with privileges and Western-
style education and used the Tutsi elite to enforce their rule, historical
circumstances, including those elites' increasing challenge to the colonial
order, along with the pressures of the Cold War, prompted a shift in European
sympathies on the "eve of independence."11 Eventually, both Belgium and
France became closely aligned with the majority Hutu against the Tutsi
minority.
11
In the late 1950s to early 1960s, Rwanda became a more polarized
ethnic state with the Hutu majority conducting periodic, systematic, violent
purges of Tutsis, thereby prompting periodic streams of Tutsi refugees to
neighboring countries. 112  Despite independence, foreign intervention
continued. The French served the financial and military needs of the
Habyarimana government, despite growing evidence of governmental
incitements to, and occasional outbreaks of, killings directed at Tutsi. The
purges and ever-increasing harsh conditions imposed on Tutsis within
Rwanda led to a substantial exile community abroad and, in 1986, Tutsi exiles
in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Thereafter, RPF
guerrillas made occasional raids into Rwanda from bases in Uganda, and
French forces were often called to help the Habyarimana government repel
them. Despite the constant reports of purges and the growing pattern of
exclusion of Tutsis from every segment of Rwandan society, French troops
and arms continued to flow to the Habyarimana government into the early
1990s, apparently on the premise that the threat to that government posed
particularly by Tutsi refugees in Uganda was, in reality, an "Anglo-Saxon"
threat to Francophone Africa. 113 French troops deployed in Rwanda in this
period, while not directly involved in combat, freed Rwandan troops for
frontline duties, provided logistical support, organized artillery positioning
and ammunition supplies, ensured radio communications, and even undertook
the interrogation of detained suspects.
114
In 1990 to 1991, amid continuing massacres of Tutsis, the Rwandan
army began to train and arm civilian militias known as the interahamwe
("those who stand together"). 1 5 As late as 1992, French agents were not only
serving as intermediaries for the Rwandan government with countries such as
South Africa for weapons, but also were "in complete control of [Rwandan],,116
counterinsurgency operations while repeatedly denying "rumors" of
109. Id.
110. GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 61.
111. See, e.g., PRUNIER, supra note 10, at 44-100 (chronicling the emergence of Belgian and
French alliances with the Hutu majority).
112. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 58-62.
113. See PRUNIER, supra note 10, at 106; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 54, at 6
(noting expansive French monetary and military aid).
114. See PRUNIER, supra note 10, at 110-11.
115. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 93; Frontline: Rwanda Chronology, supra note 103.
116. PRUNIER, supra note 10, at 149.
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massacres.117 In November 1992, a prominent Hutu activist appealed to Hutus
to send the Tutsis "back to Ethiopia" via the rivers, and, by the next year,
fierce fighting erupted between the Rwandan government and RPF forces. In
August 1993, a peace accord was signed, permitting the repatriation of
refugees, but on April 6, 1994, the eve of the long delayed implementation of
this agreement, President Habyarimana's plane was shot down by missiles.
Some believe that Hutu extremists were behind the attack. That evening, the
long-anticipated massacres of Tutsis began in earnest.
Beginning the day after Habyarimana's death, Rwandan Armed Forces
(FAR) and the interahamwe set up roadblocks and went on a house-to-house
search to identify and kill Tutsis. While the 2500 U.N. troops deployed in
Kigali to implement the peace accord stood by, thousands of Tutsis were
killed in these initial weeks. After ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed on
April 21, 1994, the United Nations effectively withdrew its troops, leaving a
token force behind. Amid a wave of refugees and a new offensive by the RPF,
the U.N. Security Council finally agreed to send 6800 troops into Rwanda, but
their arrival was delayed over debates on who would pay for the expense. In
June, the Security Council authorized instead the deployment of French forces
to establish a "safe area" in a government-controlled area in southwest
Rwanda. Troops in that deployment, Operation Turquoise, were welcomed as
"French Hutus" by the local population.118 At this time, the French
government's position appeared to be that Rwanda presented a case of a
"double genocide" in which all sides were guilty; nonetheless, it is alleged
that the French deployed forces in Rwanda to defend the genocidaires from
the RPF. 119 According to Gourevitch, the net effect of Operation Turquoise
was (one hopes not by conscious design) "to permit the slaughter of Tutsis to
continue for an extra month, and to secure safe passage for the genocidal
command to cross, with a lot of its weaponry, into Zaire."' 20
While the motivations and actions of the French government remain the
subject of conjecture, what is less debatable is that even after the 1994 killings
began, French (and Belgian) troops, still loyal to the Hutu, ignored killings of
Tutsis committed before them, helped circumvent the U.N. arms embargo,
repeatedly refused to take opportunities to condemn the killing of Tutsis as
"genocide," and even extended official presidential welcomes to some of the
117. Id. at 148-49, 176.
118. See GOUREvrrCH, supra note 1, at 155.
119. See id. at 156-157. A French parliamentary committee, which issued its report in
December 1998, had a different assessment. While that report blamed the French government for "errors
ofjudgment," it concluded that the "French in no way incited, encouraged, aided or supported those who
orchestrated the genocide ..... The report does indicate, however, that from 1990 to April 1994, France
sold 137 million francs worth of arms to Rwanda, and provided more than 10,000 mortar rounds,
1,000,000 bullets, and six Gazelle helicopters. The report also acknowledges that while French soldiers
did not participate in battle, they worked closely with Rwandan forces on the ground. Not surprisingly,
the report criticized the United Nations, and especially the United States, for failing to respond with
force earlier to prevent the genocide. See Craig R..Whitney, Panel Finds French Errors in Judgment On
Rwanda, N.Y. TIES, Dec. 20, 1998, at A17. For the underlying report, see Mission dinformation sur le
Rwanda (visited March 24, 1999) <http:llwww.assemblee-nationale.fr/2/2rwanda.html> [hereinafler
French Report].
120. GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 161.
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top Rwandan leaders implicated in the genocide. 121 For all these reasons, the
principal historian of the Rwandan genocide, Gerald Prunier, concluded that
French authorities "played an important part in one of the worst genocides of
the twentieth century." 122 Of course, as French officials have since indicated,
the entire international community, including the U.N. and the United States,
shares some of the blame for failig to prevent these killings and for letting
them go on for as long as they did.
The mass wave of killings stopped by mid-July 1994 and by July 17, the
RPF captured the city of Kigali. As of that date, governmental authority came
under the effective control of those who had been victimized by the genocide,
or at least the RPF. 124 While the actual numbers of dead will probably never
be known, what is known is that in the course of some hundred days in the
early summer of 1994, between 500,000 and 800,000 people were put to death
through a clear programmatic effort to eliminate Tutsis, along with Hutu
"moderates" believed to be sympathetic to Tutsis. The numbers of those
implicated in these killings are even more difficult to estimate, but given the
principal methods used---"inefficient" individual killings by machete-it is
assumed that many thousands, perhaps millions, were directly involved. 125 But
if the extent of complicity was very probably massive, so was the extent of
victimization. Indeed, a UNICEF study posited that five out of six children
present in Rwanda during the killings had, at the very least, witnessed
bloodshed.126 As Gourevitch suggests, we can readily assume that "[n]obody
in Rwanda escaped direct physical or psychic damage."
127
Ironically, even at the end of an entirely preventable genocide, the
international community seemed to show greater concern for its perpetrators
than for its victims. During the first few months following the genocide, the
attention of the international community was directed at the plight of Hutu
refugees from Rwanda and not on internal conditions in that devastated
country. 128 While the Rwandan government waited'in vain for desperately
needed foreign assistance for a country ravaged by the worst atrocity since the
Holocaust, foreign aid and humanitarian agencies flooded the refugee camps
121. See PRUNIER, supra note 10, at 276-80. Prunier argues that the later French humanitarian
intervention, authorized by Security Council Resolution 929, was an attempt by the French to wash off
"genocidal bloodspots" and came too late to save the Tutsis from slaughter. See id. at 281-98.
122. Id. at 340.
123. See, e.g., French Report, supra note 119. Indeed, Gourevitch calls the Rwanda genocide
and its aftermath a "ease study of international negligence." GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 326; see also
id. at 150 (noting the commander of UNAMIR's estimate that the 5000 troops would have effectively
halted the genocide); id. at 335-36, 350-52 (noting candid acknowledgments after the fact by high-level
officials, including President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeline Albright).
124. As Gourevitch argues, the common journalistic description of the new "Tutsi-dominated"
regime was, at least in the immediate wake of the 1994 genocide, inaccurate since 16 of the 22 cabinet
ministers, including the Prime Minister and Ministers of the Interior and Justice, were Hutu and the
government as a whole appeared committed to a multiparty, multi-ethnic Rwanda. See GouREVIrCH,
supra note I, at 222.
125. See id. at 244.
126. See id. at 224.
127. Id.
128. For a damning portrait of the ironic efforts of humanitarian relief agencies, see id. at 161-
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even though many in those camps were genocidaires. 129 Worse still, killings
of Tutsis continued within the camps and continue to the present day as a
result of a continuing series of raids by Hutu guerrillas into Rwanda.13
0
As many close observers of the Rwandan genocide have repeatedly
stressed and as the ICTR has itself confirmed, 13 1 this was not "a spontaneous
outburst of killing" but the product of a heavily orchestrated campaign that
had begun as early as 1990, and dating back to the mid-1993 founding of
Radio-T6l1vision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), an ostensibly "private"
radio station founded by leading Hutu extremists from the government,
military, and business communities. 132 Well before 1994, RTLM began
broadcasting vitriolic appeals to private militias and individuals intended to
incite killings of Tutsis (along with Hutus regarded as being sympathetic to
Tutsis). As early as 1992, U.N. officials and nongovernmental human rights
organizations were warning that radio transmissions within Rwanda were
playing a central role in inciting ethnic tension and ethno-political murders.
133
Knowledgeable observers regard the mass killings that began in April 1994,
therefore, as "an important component of the implementation of genocide"
planned long before; indeed, there had been calls for the jamming of RTLM
broadcasts before the actual killings began. 134 Unlike secret government
disappearances, such as in Argentina, there was nothing concealed about
either the continuous public incitements to mass killing or the 1994 killings
themselves. 135
B. Primacy, the Rwandan Authorities, and Collective Memory
In mid-1994, the new Rwandan government, then a non-permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council, sought international assistance in
129. See, e.g., id. For a description of one modest attempt by the U.S. military to assist
Rwandan judicial authorities, see Peter H. Sennett & Gregory P. Noone, Working with Rwanda Toward
the Domestic Prosecution of Genocide Crimes, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LErAL COMMEN. 425 (1997). As
Sennett and Noone point out, at least through 1996, the international community failed to provide
significant assistance to the Rwandan authorities for this purpose and left the Rwandans "to their own
devices." Id. at 442.
130. See GOUREVTCH, supra note 1, at 164-67, 229. For one report ofa Hutu guerrilla attack
on a Tutsi refugee camp and retaliations by the Rwandan army, see James C. McKinley, Jr., Machete
Returns to Rwanda, Rekindling a Genocide War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at Al.
131. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. IT-9-4-T (ICTR Sept. 2, 1998), § 5, available
at <http:/www.un.orglI.C.T.R./englishljudgementsakayesu.html> [hereinafter Akayesu Judgment]; see
also NEmR, supra note 15, at 204-05.
132. See Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio
Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 630-31 (1997).
133. See id. at 629.
134. Id.
135. Indeed, some have suggested that the present Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, ignored
detailed evidence of the impending genocide as early as January 11, 1994. See GOUREVITcH, supra note
1, at 103-07 (reporting on cable from the field and Annan's office's reaction); see also Triumph of Evil,
FRONTLiNE ONLINE (visited May 10, 1999) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
evil/warning/ cable.html> (presenting the exchange of cables between Secretary-General Kofi Annan's
Office and Booh-Booh/Dallaire, text of Jan. 11, 1994); Memorandum from Kofi Annan's Office, United
Nations, New York, to Booh-Booh/Dallaire (Jan. 11, 1994), available at
<http:lwww.pbs.orgwgbhlpageslfrontlinelshowslevillwaminglunresponse.html>.
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prosecuting the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. It proposed establishment
of an international tribunal for this purpose. 136 The Rwandan government
wanted the tribunal's jurisdiction to extend to the full range of offenses
committed by the prior Hutu regime, including to many acts of incitement that
preceded the great wave of actual killings from April through July of 1994.137
In addition, it hoped that international assistance would take the form of joint
trials and investigations, or at least international proceedings within
Rwanda.138 As discussions for an international criminal tribunal progressed
within the Security Council, Rwanda, as a member of the Council, argued that
the jurisdiction of any self-standing international tribunal should be limited to
offenses committed through mid-July 1994-that is, prior to the new
government's assuming power. To some, this limit on jurisdiction appeared
designed to limit the potential liability of the new Rwandan government's
officials and supporters because it would exclude from international
jurisdiction the majority of Tutsi retaliation killings or other acts of
revenge.139 When the Security Council opted for a foreign tribunal with
jurisdiction extending to offenses committed in calendar year 1994, the
Rwanda government, as previously noted, voted against its establishment.
Subsequently, on September 1, 1996, in response to the need to deal
with the approximately 90,000 detainees then being held in Rwandan prisons
awaiting trial, the Rwandan government enacted a new Organic Law on the
Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide
or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990.140 That law
classifies suspects into four categories according to degree of culpability.
Perpetrators in category one (including leaders and organizers of the genocide
and perpetrators of particularly heinous murders or sexual torture) are subject
to the death penalty. Those in categories two through four, including those
accused of violent offenses of lesser gravity, are entitled to reduced sentences
as part of guilty plea agreements. 141 Preset, fixed reductions of penalties are
available to all non-category-one perpetrators in return for an accurate and
complete confession, a plea of guilty, and an apology to victims.142
As Professor Madeline Morris has noted, the Rwandan law entails
complex compromises between expediency and fairness.143 Although, as its
title indicates, the Organic Law was adopted to deal with the logistical
136. See Morris, supra note 12, at 353.
137. Seeid. at353-54.
138. See Schabas, supra note 12, at 553. Once the tribunal was established, the Rwandan
government also complained that the international community was devoting only meager resources to
the effort. See Morris, supra note 12, at 355, 357.
139. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROSECUTING GENOCIDE IN
RWANDA § 111(1997) available at <http:l/www.lchr.org/pubs/rwanda.htm> (discussing the temporal
limits of the ICTR's jurisdiction).
140. Organic Law of August 30, 1996 on the Organization of the Prosecutions for Offenses
Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990,
No. 08/96 available at <http//www.rwandemb.org/prosecution/law.htm> [hereinafter Organic Law].
141. See id. arts. 2,5, 14-16.
142. See id. arts. 14-16. Under Article 15, perpetrators who plea guilty prior to prosecution are
entitled to further reductions in their sentences. See id. art. 15.
143. See Morris, supra note 12, at 357-61.
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difficulties posed by the enormous number of killings that occurred in the
middle of 1994, to avoid accusations of ex post facto criminal legislation, the
law does not formally charge perpetrators with international crimes that had
not been previously incorporated into Rwandan law. Under that law
perpetrators in category one would not be formally charged with
"genocide." 144 Secondly, the law was limited to actions committed since
October 1, 1990, thereby including most of the actions that precipitated the
1994 genocide but not extending to earlier purges of Tutsis, a move intended
as a more reasonable compromise with respect to the use of judicial resources
than the ICTR's more limited temporal jurisdiction. 145 Thirdly, the law
compromised on demands for individualized criminal trials by adopting a
form of plea bargaining unprecedented in Rwanda (as it would be in most
civil law systems). The law recognized the impossibility of conducting
individual trials for the approximately one percent of Rwanda's population
then in detention. 146 Although intended to balance the need for fair and
expeditious treatment of those detained with the thirst for recompense and
revenge felt by many survivors of the Rwandan genocide, 147 the system
contained in the Organic Law as administered has since drawn the ire of
international human rights lawyers who have pointed to the limited guarantees
of procedural fairness in a context where most prisoners have not been
formally charged, witnesses are difficult to find, few defense attorneys exist,
and where there is a grave risk that innocent suspects may choose to plead
guilty for fear of a worse outcome or extensive delays.
148
Although international lawyers have tended to emphasize the numerous
shortcomings of Rwanda's administration of the Organic Law, 149 the merits of
Rwanda's complaints about the ICTR have largely escaped their notice. While
the new Rwandan government's effort to limit the ICTR's jurisdiction to
offenses committed before July 1994, if intended to secure impunity for
revenge crimes committed by Tutsis, represents an example of an attempt to
impose one-sided "victor's justice," 150 its attempt to expand the ICTR's
144. Category one is defined to cover persons "whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal
participation place them among the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime
of genocide or of a crime against humanity." Organic Law, supra note 140, art. 2. While this provision
identifies who is subject to the Act, it does not itself charge them with the international crimes of
genocide or crimes against humanity. Rwandan prosecutors are, under the law, therefore impliedly urged
to find applicable domestic offenses that cover the criminal acts described. Id.
145. Compare. id. art. I (providing jurisdiction to prosecute criminal acts dating from October
1, 1990 onward) with ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 1 (limiting the ICTR's jurisdiction to events in
calendar year 1994).
146. The number held in Rwandan prisons has, despite the plea bargains, grown to about
130,000 by the end of 1998. See Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the
Accused in Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 544, 549 (1998).
147. See infra note 207. For reports of instances where prisoners have been released only to be
killed, presumably by survivors seeking revenge, see GoUREviTcH, supra note 1, at 245-46.
148. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 139, § VIII.
149. See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 154-56; LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 139, § VIII.
150. An alternative justification for this proposed limit is that the mass wave of killings were
over by mid-July 1994 and that international adjudication of offenses committed thereafter would not be
necessary and would imply distrust of the new Rwandan regime. Indeed, through 1997, the Rwandan
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jurisdiction to include relevant offenses committed before 1994 should not be
so easily dismissed. Rwanda's new government sought criminal trials for
those who incited the genocide, including those who acted before 1994. While
the new Rwandan government undoubtedly regarded pre-1994 prosecutions as
politically useful since they would embarrass the prior regime, the goals of the
international legal ?paradigm, especially its aspiration for a judicial rendering
of the whole truth,' 1 would also support such expanded jurisdiction.
One of the main critiques of the major Nuremberg trials had been
directed, after all, at their temporal limitations. The Allies' decision to charge
only crimes committed after 1939 was not, in hindsight, the best way to
preserve an accurate historic account of barbarism. 152 Critics have long argued
that by failing to direct attention to, for example, Germany's pre-1939 racial
purity laws, the Nuremberg trials failed to show that the Nazis had targeted
Jews, homosexuals, gypsies, and other groups because they deemed them
unfit to live-and not because this was vital to their plan for conquest.153 This
flaw, together with the theory propounded by the Nuremberg prosecution-
that high-level Nazi leaders were an especially evil group of "gangsters" bent
on aggressive conquest and willing to kill innocent civilians who stood in their
government had arrested and charged at least 1000 of its own soldiers, including officers, for revenge
killings and other more common crimes. See Robert F. Van Lierop, Rwanda Evaluation: Report and
Recommendations, 31 INT'L LAw. 887, 897 (1997). Van Lierop, the co-chair of the African Law
Committee of the ABA Section of International Law and Practice, praises these Rwandan efforts as "an
admirable effort to maintain discipline, instill respect for the rule of law, and build a viable system of
justice in Rwanda for the first time in the country's history." Id.; see also GoUREVITCH, supra note 1, at
246 (noting that over 1000 RPF soldiers had been imprisoned in military jails for killings and other
violations of disciplinary rules). But see Barbara Crossette, US. Judge Orders a Rwandan to Surrender
for Trial on Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1998, at A3 (reporting recent Rwandan government killings
in the Congo).
151. See supra note 40 (defining collective memory). The international legal paradigm puts
exceptional emphasis on the need for judicial mechanisms that are "as exhaustive of the truth as
possible." See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for
Accountability, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 31, at 45, 65. Indeed, some have suggested that
victims of mass atrocities enjoy a "right to individualized truth." See, e.g., Joinet, supra note 33, at 265-
66 (Principles 1-4, Annex II); see also Juan E. Mendez, The Right to Truth, in REINING IN IMPUNITY,
supra note 31, at 255, 265 (arguing for such a right on the basis of the Inter-American Court of Justice's
decision in Veldsquez). But see Priscilla B. Hayner, International Guidelines for the Creation and
Operation of Truth Commissions: A Preliminary Proposal, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at
173, 176 (questioning whether a society's right to truth should be turned into an "unbending
obligation"). For a thorough analysis of how the production of a common history judged by common
standards-that is, the production and preservation of"collective memory"--is alleged to produce social
solidarity within the societies affected by mass atrocities as well as the international community as a
whole, see Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 463,470-505 (1995).
152. Compare DAvID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 335, 365-74 (1994) (arguing, among other
things, that the major Nazi trials rendered less evident how the Nazis were able to "bureaucratize" their
final solution), with Cassese, supra note 26, at 9 (arguing on behalf of trials since these "build an
impartial and objective record of events"). Some have argued that a more balanced, historically accurate
portrayal of the nature of the Holocaust has only emerged in the wake of later developments, including
trials within occupied Germany. See, e.g., ANNE SA'ADAH, GERMANY'S SECOND CHANCE: TRUST,
JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRATIZATION 143-88 (1998).
153. For an account of the "mosaic of victims" targeted by the Nazis that is strikingly different
from the proceedings at Nuremberg, see Mary Johnson & Carol Rittner, Circles of Hell: Jewish and
Non-Jewish Victims of the Nazis, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC., Nov. 1996, at 123.
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path-put a political agenda ahead of historical truth. 5 4 It implied that the
Holocaust was incidental to the waging of World War II, thereby obscuring
the scope and depth of the Holocaust by failing to present a forceful account
of the discriminatory animus that motivated leaders and low-level Nazi
functionaries, including many ordinary German citizens.155 In this respect,
critics have argued that the Nuremberg trials were unfair to the memory of the
victims of the Holocaust who died simply because of who they were and not
merely because they were in the way of conquest.
15 6
Since the ICTR has no jurisdiction over aggression and does not limit
criminal liability to offenses committed in the course of aggressive war, it
does not run the same risks. Neither the ICTR nor the ICTY is required to
show that the crime against humanity known as persecution, for example,
occurred in the course of international armed conflict. 157 Nonetheless, the
Rwandan government's complaint about the ICTR's temporal limits has a
legitimate basis. While it is understandable that the international community
may not wish to devote unlimited resources to ICTR prosecutions, it is
important to recognize that these constraints conflict with that community's
own aspirations for the rendering and preservation of an accurate collective
memory.
Various factors explain the ferocity unleashed by appeals to ethnic
hatred, as opposed to appeals to material need or to nationalism. Appeals to
fear or to hatred of "the other" (which some characterize as the "mobilization
of bias") often invoke a mythical invented past; emotive descriptions of
alleged prior victimization at the hands of the targeted group often make such
appeals potent and lasting.158 There are distinctive tactics used to create or
154. See generally SA'ADAH, supra note 152, at 154-63 (describing the goals of the Nuremberg
trials).
155. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 152, at 335-78. For a recent controversial critique of the
ostensibly extraordinary murderers targeted at Nuremberg, see DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAOEN, HITLER'S
WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1997) (providing an account of
the Holocaust that is starkly different from the perpetrator-driven version presented in the course of the
Nuremberg trials). But see NORMAN G. FINKLEsTEIN & RUTH BETrINA BIRN, A NATION ON TRIAL
(1998) (giving critiques of Goldhagen's thesis); UNWILLING GERMANS? THE GOLDHAGEN DEBATE,
supra note 40 (same).
156. Presumably in response to sensitivities concerning the extent to which the Nuremberg
trials may have dishonored the memory of victims of the Holocaust, international prosecutors are now
attempting to ensure that Balkan and Rwandan trials include an accurate account of the broader context
in which war crimes are committed. Thus, the first case to be prosecuted in either tribunal, the case
against a Serbian former caf6 owner, Dusko Tadic, began with month-long testimonies by academic and
policy witnesses, none of whom had witnessed the crimes at issue. These witnesses described the rise of
ethnic, religious, and nationalist bigotry in the Prijedor region of the Balkans. The subsequent judgment
in the Tadic case preserved this testimony in a lengthy section entitled "Background and Preliminary
Factual Findings." See Tadic Judgment, supra note 58, paras. 53-192; Alvarez, supra note 87, at 2053-
58 (criticizing the historical truth recorded in the Tadicjudgment despite these efforts). While the first
judgment issued after a full trial in the ICTR, against a provincial mayor named Jean-Paul Akayesu,
contains a far less elaborate historical section, it too provides a succinct "historical context" for the
events leading to the genocide in 1994. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131, § 1.5.
157. See, e.g., ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 3; ICTY Statute, supra note 53, art. 5.
158. See Harry Goulbourne, Ethnic Mobilization, War and Multi-Culturalism, in WAR AND
ETHNICITY, supra note 67, at 163, 166; see also DESTEXHE, supra note 10, at 28-35 (giving examples);
NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY 234-52 (1994) (same); Slaven Letica, The Genesis of the
Current Balkan War, in GENOCIDE AFTER EMOTION, supra note 62, at 91-112 (same). This may be the
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reinforce "ethnic" nationalism and ethnic identity, as 'opposed to "liberal"
nationalism.159 Economic inequalities and political dislocations, sometimes
exacerbated or created by globalization trends, including the strictures
imposed by intemational lending institutions, may pave the way for ethnic
discontent.' 60 In some recent instances, including in Africa and the Balkans,
the (in)actions of U.N. organs (as through economic sanctions or arms
embargoes), prominent members of the international community, and even
peacekeepers themselves, have worsened ethnic tensions.161 The 1994
Rwandan genocide shares many if not all of these partial explanations.162
Whether or not any criminal trial can ever provide an account of that genocide
that does justice to this variety of causal or explanatory factors, 163 the ICTR's
prosecutions, artificially constrained to events occurring over one year and
limited to actions taken within Rwanda,164 seem especially unlikely to
produce the full account of barbarism that the international legal paradigm
demands.1
65
Moreover, as at least some of the possible factors in the Rwandan
genocide imply, the limits on the ICTR's jurisdiction are not simply the result
of resource constraints. Those limits were the product of a highly political
process within the Security Council and reflect diplomatic concerns. Broader
jurisdiction for the ICTR could well have led to inquiries that would have
embarrassed either the U.N. as a whole or particular permanent members of
the Security Council. 166 But such political factors should also make us
case even with respect to countries with a colonial past such as Rwanda, where, even though ethnic and
racist perceptions may be of relatively recent vintage, they are nonetheless passed on or engendered by
colonizers and later collaborators (in this instance, the Germans, the Belgians, and the French). See
DESTEX-m, supra note 10, at 71-74; PRUNIER, supra note 10, at 336-45; see also supra notes 104-114
and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Jakob Rosel, Nationalism and Ethnicity: Ethnic Nationalism and the Regulation
of Ethnic Conflict, in WARAND EmTNIcTY, supra note 67, at 145, 152.
160. See, e.g., Mark Duffield, Ethnic War and International Humanitarian Intervention: A
Broad Perspective, in WAR AND ETHNICITY, supra note 67, at 203.
161. See, e.g., Turton, supra note 72, at 35. Consider, in this connection, the controversial roles
of French peacekeepers during the Rwanda genocide. See supra notes 117-121 and accompanying text.
162. See generally GOtREVrTCH, supra note 1 (presenting a journalistic account of the
Rwandan genocide); PRNIER, supra note 10 (presenting the most authoritative account of the causes of
the Rwandan genocide).
163. For an exhaustive account of the many ways judicialized histories may fall short in this
respect, see Osiel, supra note 151, at 505-691.
164. Indeed, the geographical limitations imposed on the jurisdiction of the ICTR demonstrates
that its creators decided not to take advantage of the tribunal's international status in this respect. Cf
supra note 46 and accompanying text (arguing that one benefit of international tribunals is their capacity
to consider interstate issues and crimes).
165. This is all the more likely given the relatively few number of perpetrators likely to face
international trials. The selectivity of international trials sends a misleading message about the scope of
the Rwanda massacre, as well as the number of those complicit. Cf supra notes 57-61 and
accompanying text (justifying selective prosecutions).
166. The combination of the ICTR's temporal and subject matter jurisdictional limits helps to
ensure, after all, that no state, other than Rwanda, is likely to face the real prospect that one of its
nationals will face international charges. Cf infra note 171 (discussing the attempt by Akayesu's
defense counsel to draw support from the U.N.'s helplessness). Had the tribunal's jurisdiction not been
restricted to offenses committed in the territory of Rwanda in calendar year 1994, see ICTR Statute,
supra note 53, art. 1, it might have been easier to bring charges of complicity in genocide or other
charges against, for example, French functionaries (both present in Rwanda and abroad). Cf supra notes
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somewhat skeptical of those judicial accounts of Rwandan history produced
by the ICTR even within its limited jurisdiction. It remains to be seen whether
that tribunal, wholly independent in theory from the Security Council but
dependent on it in fact 167 and consisting of judges from a variety of nations
with interests in the way Rwanda's recent history is told, will be able to
engage in the kinds of broad-gauged historical inquiries into the Rwandan
genocide that are essential to preserving collective memory and to generating
public confidence in its accuracy. Thus, whether or not it is true, as many
charge, that U.N., United States, Belgian, and French officials all ignored
clear warnings of impeding genocide, 68 that French officials gave aid and
comfort to genocidaires before the killings, during them, and after,169 or that
international humanitarian relief agencies made it possible for some of the
genocidaires to continue their extermination plans from inside refugee
camps,170 one doubts that such inquiries will be pursued in the course of
proceedings organized and conducted by judges under U.N. auspices and
subject to its funding. One suspects that the ICTR's judges will be sensitive
about encouraging presentation of such evidence at trial (even if such
questions were to arise) or about airing such issues in their judgments.'17
To be sure, Rwandan national courts also face massive practical
constraints with respect to the production and preservation of accurate
collective memory. Resource limitations, as well as the political composition
of the Rwandan judiciary under a regime that came to power in the wake of
Hutu-led killings, make Rwandan local prosecutions unlikely sources for the
rendering of fully truthful judicialized histories. Unassisted, such local trials
are particularly unlikely to provide an accurate account of the full spectrum of
the Tutsis' role in mass atrocities. On the other hand, the sheer number of
local prosecutions and guilty pleas may, in itself, have positive implications
117-121 and accompanying text (questioning French motives). France, a veto-wielding member of the
Security Council, presumably would have objected to an ad hoc tribunal likely to reach such cases.
167. See, e.g., Mark Thieroff & Edward A. Amley, Jr., Proceeding to Justice and
Accountability in the Balkans: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rule
61, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 231, 272 n.188 (1998) (noting that shifting political winds within the Security
Council, unrelated to the ad hoc tribunals themselves, may practically gui their effectiveness).
168. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 117-121 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
171. The legal, as opposed to the moral, culpability of non-Rwandan nationals is not an
academic question, even if the jurisdictional and other limits of the ICTR may tend to make it so,
Consider the case of the first defendant to face a full trial in the ICTR, Jean-Paul Akayesu, the
bourgmestre of Taba commune, who was charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, and
violations of the laws of war. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131. Among the accusations against
Akayesu that ultimately led to his conviction for genocide were a number of charges involving the
failure to act or to prevent what he must have known would occur in the ordinary course of events or for
being present at the scene where crimes were committed. See, e.g., id. § 5.2.1. Indeed, during his trial
Akayesu's defense counsel sought the testimony of Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, former
commander of the U.N. Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in an attempt to show that if the U.N. could not
forestall genocide, no one could expect a small town mayor to be able to do so. Contrary to this defense
claim, it might be argued instead that foreign nationals (including peacekeepers and humanitarian relief
personnel) present in Rwanda during the killings and in positions of considerable real or apparent
authority also had a legal obligation to prevent the killings of civilians.
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for the preservation of a more accurate collective memory.1 72 As some
commentators have argued, speedy and sharply focused trials may be better
than lengthier symbolic ones, especially if the latter face flagging public
attention or take so long that they lose the public support needed to make them
effective purveyors of collective memory. 173 Moreover, as those who have
examined the effects of truth commissions on the construction of memory
confirm, the participatory nature of the exercise matters as much as the final
product. The "home-grown" nature of truth commissions, in terms of
composition, mandate and origin, matters in terms of the impact of its final
product.174 Collective memory, after all, ideally should be constructed by the
collective; it should be a product of local civil society-even if mediated and
assisted by the international community.
175
In addition, not all instances of mass violations of human rights are
equal. There are no "generic" massacres or genocides. 176 The particular
circumstances surrounding the killings in Rwanda make those killings distinct
in ways that matter for purposes of collective memory. As noted, there was
nothing secret about what was done in Rwanda in 1994. As Neier indicates,
the openness with which the slaughter took place was an open act of defiance
directed both at the international community and at Rwandan institutions-
both of which, the-genocidaires felt, would fail to intervene. 177 The attempt to
involve as many perpetrators within Rwanda and to make the international
community indirectly complicit was intended to preclude the possibility of
172. Although the Rwandans began prosecuting cases related to the 1994 genocide only on
December 27, 1996, by February 1997 their courts had issued 11 death sentences, 16 life imprisonments,
and one acquittal. See Sennett & Noone, supra note 129, at 445; see also infra Part IV (discussing the
implications for collective memory stemming from attempts to conduct war crimes trials in ethnically
neutral terms); cf. McCarthy, supra note 92, at 188 (arguing that one advantage of South African truth
commission proceedings over judicial proceedings is that the latter overly individualize the past,
presenting atrocities as more piecemeal and less systematic than they actually were).
173. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, Retroactive Trials and Justice: Radical Evil on Trial, 96
MICH. L. REv. 1456, 1468 (1998).
174. See Abdullah Omar, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Accountingfor the Past, 4
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 5, 6, 12-14 (1998); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 281-86; see also
SA'ADAH, supra note 152, at 186-88 (discussing the significance of"bottom-up strategies" such as truth
commissions as example of "self-help from below"); Akhavan, supra note 27, at 747 (quoting Pospigil,
the Czech legal anthropologist, for the proposition that most law is enforced through internal norms
rather than by external pressure).
175. See supra note 173 and accompanying text; see also Paul Schiff Berman, Rats, Pigs, and
Statues on Trial: The Creation of Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals and Inanimate
Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 288, 315-18, 326 (1994) (arguing that trials are cultural performances that
permit groups to heal themselves by creating their own understanding of crisis and that a society's
primary social institutions must function as storytellers for such "consensus narratives" at such
moments). Even with respect to Germany after World War II, it can scarcely be said that Germany's
collective memory of the Holocaust has been primarily formed by the international trials at Nuremberg.
As the recent public reception of Daniel Goldhagen's controversial book in Germany suggests, a
nation's collective memory of atrocity may be assisted by foreign intervention but is primarily the
product of a continuous series of local interactions that cannot be dictated from abroad. See, e.g., Jirgen
Habermas, Goldhagen and the Public Use of History: Why a Democracy Prize for Daniel Goldhagen?,
in UNWILLING GERMANS? THE GOLDHAGEN DEBATE, supra note 40, at 263, 263-72.
176. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 186.
177. See NEIER, supra note 64, at 217.
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prosecution on the premise that "[if] all are guilty, no one is guilty."' 78 As this
suggests, the truth that needs to emerge must address these specific realities,
as well as the wider circles of complicity. It is not the same kind of truth as
that which was needed and attempted in other cases of atrocities, such as those
involving "secret" government disappearances.
While international trials of a few Rwandan high-level perpetrators will
provide some additional details about much that we already know, namely
how the genocide was orchestrated and how the actual killings were
organized, such trials will tell us next to nothing about those most directly
involved in the killings or about their individual victims. They will not tell
family members where victims are buried or the particular circumstances of
their deaths. And they will not tell anyone how the average Rwandan, not in a
position of authority, was co-opted into mass slaughter. This is the kind of
truth about these crimes of hate that the journalist Gourevitch aspires to
capture in his book, 179 and it is the kind of truth that even the speedy, but
abundant, trials now being conducted inside Rwanda might help to produce
given time. At the same time, such local plea bargains and trials, directed at
the full range of perpetrators, as opposed to international trials for a selective
few, attempt to demonstrate that impunity through massive complicity does
not always succeed in intimidating domestic institutions or the rule of law.
As this suggests, in circumstances such as Rwanda, an accurate
collective memory may require an attempt to make large numbers of
perpetrators accountable, not only because large numbers were culpable, but
also because those who have survived need to have an accounting of what was
done to their own. t8° As Juan Mendez has pointed out, many victims desire
and need individualized justice, particularly a forum in which they can be
heard, have their injuries acknowledged, and be told the truth about what
happened to themselves and to family members.' 8 ' This is less likely to occur
if few trials proceed or if those that do proceed focus on high-level
perpetrators who had little direct contact with their victims, if international
resources are diverted away from national prosecutions and directed at the
ICTR, or if the bifurcation of trials between the international and domestic
levels produces an incoherent collective memory.
Both international and domestic fora face distinct constraints with
respect to the preservation and presentation of a fully realized collective
memory. 182 But, contrary to the premises of at least some international
lawyers, there is no reason to presume that in all cases this goal will be more
178. Id.
179. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 1.
180. Cf. supra note 59 (discussing Akhavan's argument that select prosecutions may be
sufficient). For an argument that, counter to the assumptions of many international lawyers, individual
trials do not, and probably should not, attempt to exonerate the collective, see Alvarez, supra note 87, at
2086-88. These issues are revisited in Part IV.
181. See Mendez, supra note 151, at 265 (identifying the need for "individualized truth").
182. Elsewhere, I have argued that criminal prosecutions play a far more limited role with
respect to producing collective memory than some international lawyers have suggested. See Alvarez,
supra note 87, at 2105-06. The point here is simply that to the extent we rely on criminal trials to help
produce or to preserve the truth, we need to consider the respective strengths of domestic trials.
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effectively realized within international tribunals.18 3 National trials, capable of
reaching further back into Rwanda's recent past than the ICTR's selective
trials of some high-level perpetrators and deeper into the full range of
Rwandan society, may be more likely to provide a fuller account of how these
killings occurred and a more accurate account of the scope of complicity.184 It
may well be that those who want an exhaustive rendering of the Rwandan
genocide, as well as victims who want all those complicit in genocide to be
held accountable, would, all things considered, prefer that jurisdictional
primacy, as well as international resources, be accorded to alternatives that
reach, as under Rwanda's Organic Law, at least to events as early as 1990 and
that are capable of reaching related offenses that have occurred since 1994 as
well, including acts of retaliation.
The Rwandan government's complaints about the international
community's unwillingness to conduct international trials on Rwandan
territory suggest other reasons, quite apart from collective memory, to be
critical of the ICTR's hierarchical primacy. International lawyers, including
the ICTR's first prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, are too quick to dismiss the
Rwandan government's resistance to the ICTR as the product of a lack of
confidence in international procedures or as being due to misguided notions of
sovereignty.
185
Consider Goldstone's account of the contest between the ICTR and the
Rwandan government over the custody of Colonel Theoneste Bagasora, one
of the most important of the prior leaders of Rwanda implicated in mass
crimes who had been arrested in the Cameroons at the request of the Rwandan
government.186 Goldstone relates the story of how he, as international
prosecutor, "was not prepared to surrender the primacy of the Rwanda tribunal
in respect of Bagasora" and suggests why it was important that the ICTR take
custody (as it eventually did) in preference to Rwandan courts: because any
other result would have "subverted" the credibility of the international
tribunal.187 Goldstone further argues that even if the Rwandan government
were, in the future, to request the discontinuation of international trials, the
international community should nonetheless continue to insist on the exercise
of "primacy of jurisdiction through the Rwanda tribunal" because of the
magnitude of the crimes committed, their international consequences, and theag~u 188location of culprits. Even though Goldstone assumes that Rwanda wouldnonetheless continue to prosecute other culprits in national courts, his plea for
183. For more general descriptions of the constraints faced by all courts with respect to the
preservation of collective memory, see Osiel, supra note 151, at 505-648.
184. The issuance of public indictments in lieu of trials, under the tribunals' Rule 61
proceedings, is also unlikely to produce authoritative truth. See, e.g., Thieroff& Amley, supra note 167,
at 248-50.
185. See Goldstone, Justice as a Tool, supra note 41, at 497.
186. See id.
187. See id.; see also ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 98, Rule 59
(establishing that failure to execute a tribunal order for arrest may result in a prompt resort to the
Security Council). But see Harhoff, supra note 96, at 580 (suggesting that the tribunal has followed a
less confrontational approach in practice when asserting its "supremacy over national authorities').
188. See Goldstone, Justice as a Tool, supra note 41, at 498.
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the primacy of the international criminal process rests on the presumed greater
legitimacy of the international process over the local and the need to
continually buttress this presumption. "These were truly international crimes,"
he writes, "and the international community, through the Security Council,
having assumed jurisdiction, has no good reason to surrender it."189
As this incident suggests, the international law paradigm does not
countenance the possibility that the goals articulated for international
prosecutions contain inherently contradictory elements or that some of these
goals imply giving Rwandan courts jurisdictional primacy. Yet, to many
people within Rwanda, and clearly to its present government, conducting a
national trial of someone as significant as Bagasora1 90 may be just as
necessary to affirm the credibility of Rwandan efforts to prosecute these
crimes and to restore the legitimacy of Rwanda's devastated legal system as
conducting such a trial at the international level may be for the credibility of
the U.N. A local trial for Bagasora, even one subject to extensive international
observation or even the possibility of appeal to the ICTR, would have
affirmed to the world, and most importantly to all Rwandans, that Rwanda's
institutions, including its judiciary, were capable of rendering justice even
with respect to formerly exalted public officials. To Tutsis, it would have
symbolically affirmed that their nation was no longer the de facto apartheid
state that targeted them for extermination. 191 By contrast, denying the
Rwandan government the right to try Bagasora withheld from that government
the power to fulfill one of its major political pledges, and undermined its
claim that it was, unlike the former regime, committed to the rule of law in a
multiparty, pluralistic state. 19  Depriving the Rwandan government of
189. Id. As is discussed further, the ICTR's jurisdictional primacy is premised on such
international priorities and not on the possibility that national proceedings will violate the fundamental
human rights of criminal defendants. See infra notes 235-237 and accompanying text. Both Goldstone
and the text of the ICTR's Article 8 proclaim the ICTR's jurisdictional primacy irrespective of whether
or not a criminal defendant's rights are adequately protected by national processes.
190. According to an authoritative account of the Rwanda genocide, Bagasora has the
distinction of being its "general organiser," the one individual who, as director of services of the
Ministry of Defence, seems to have "coordinated the 'final solution' activities as long as they retained
enough coherence to be coordinated." PRUNIER, supra note 10, at 240. Indeed, some suspect Bagasora of
being involved in Habyarimana's murder. See, e.g., GOUREVrrCH, supra note 1, at 113.
191. For the symbolic and other significance of such foundational trials generally, see LuBAN,
supra note 152, at 379-91. For a recent recognition by a German court of the symbolic importance of a
decision in a war crimes context, see Christoph Safferling, International Decisions: Public Prosecutor v.
Djajic, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 528 (1998) (summarizing Public Prosecutor v. Djajic, No. 20/96, excerpted in
1998 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 392, Supreme Court of Bavaria, 3d Strafsenat, May 23, 1997). In
that case, the Bavarian court convicted the defendant of various murders committed in the former
Yugoslavia. Among the rationales given by that court for its decision was the need to safeguard and
foster the trust of German citizens in the national and international legal order, as well as to show the
world that Germany was not sheltering international criminals. See id. at 532. Just as German courts
have their own historic reasons for taking such a position, Rwandan courts have even more immediate
needs to affirm their credibility on such issues.
192. At a more pedestrian but nonetheless significant level, an insistence that those who are
most culpable will not face the death penalty (unlike category one offenders who remain in Rwanda),
would appear to undermine the plea bargaining system contained in Rwanda's Organic Law. As
Madeline Morris has suggested, a prosecutor seeking to induce credible confessions and avoid trials
needs to be able to rely on the threat that those who are more culpable will face the greater penalty.
Remarks of Madeline Morris, International Law Weekend, Nov. 13-14, 1998 (author's notes).
Lessons from Rwanda
conducting the trial of such a high-level perpetrator of the former regime
deprived the current government of legitimacy at a critical time.
It is not self-evident that in a contest between maintaining the credibility
of national law and maintaining the credibility of the ICTR, the needs of the
latter tribunal should always take priority-and yet this is what jurisdictional
primacy implies. On a day-to-day basis, more people rely on the protection
and viability of their own local law and institutions than on international law
or the U.N. The Rwandan people have a greater interest and stake in
empowering their own local courts and other institutions than in protecting the
credibility of the Security Council.193
C. Primacy's Audiences
International lawyers acknowledge that both amnesties and war crimes
trials are intended to send distinct messages to diverse constituencies, national
and international. Amnesties, they contend, signal lawlessness to victims, to
perpetrators, and to relevant national communities, as well as to international
society as a whole. This message is ostensibly countered and the rule of law
affirmed through international criminal accountability. 194 In this Section I will
show why the visions of justice conveyed to relevant audiences by the ICTR
are more contradictory than the international legal paradigm assumes.
For victims of mass atrocities, international justice is not
indistinguishable from national justice. The survivors of mass atrocities
cannot reasonably expect, nor are they likely to receive, the same thing from
both processes. The geographical distance between the place where
international trials are conducted and the place where the atrocities occurred
has consequences, and not merely to the efficacy of international processes.
195
To many surviving family members of the victims of the Rwandan genocide,
it matters a great deal whether an alleged perpetrator of mass atrocity is
paraded before the local press, judged in a local courtroom in a language that
193. As was recognized by the Security Council itself when, in the course of establishing the
ICTR, it stressed the "need for international cooperation to strengthen the courts and judicial system of
Rwanda, having regard in particular to the necessity for those courts to deal with large numbers of
suspects." S.C. Res. 955, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). Despite this
exhortation, international assistance directed at assisting Rwandan courts has been meager, particularly
when it would have mattered most (that is, immediately upon the fall of the former regime in 1994) and
especially by comparison to the sums allocated to the ICTR. See Carla J. Ferstman, Rwanda's Domestic
Trials for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, Hum. RTs. BRIEF, Fall 1997, at 1, 13 (discussing the
failure of the legal assistance program Avocats sans Frontires to provide adequate services); infra note
569 (indicating total aid sums for Rwanda legal assistance). Indeed, the assertion of ICTR primacy could
undermine particular local investigations, prosecutions, or efforts to provide compensation to victims
should any of these appear at odds with concurrent ICTR efforts. See Harhoff, supra note 96, at 576-84
(discussing the need for cooperation between the ICTR and Rwandan courts to prevent such an
outcome).
194. That these groups are the principal intended audiences under the international legal
paradigm seems clear. See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 77, at 313-14 (addressing an audience of the victim,
the defendant, the traumatized society, and the world order).
195. Cf. supra text accompanying note 51 (mentioning the problems of remote witnesses and
evidence).
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they can understand, 196 subjected to local procedures, and given a sentence
that accords with local sentiments, including perhaps the death penalty.
197
Given a choice between local justice and justice once removed (as in a trial in
Tanzania under unfamiliar processes and judges), it should hardly be a
surprise if most survivors of the Rwanda genocide, and not merely Rwandan
government officials, prefer local trials or local plea bargains, especially
where it appears that national venues may produce quicker results than
prolonged international processes.
198
These preferences are supported by tangible reasons, both practical and
psychological. As U.S. courts' reluctance to countenance changes of venue
without good reason suggests, trials are undermined and not merely rendered
more difficult the greater the distance between their venue and the location of
witnesses and evidence. Trials that have to be conducted, as are those in the
ICTR, through the aid of interpreters and without the knowledge of local
culture and manners are bound to lead to misunderstandings at all levels.
Thus, as the Akayesu judgment itself acknowledges, the ICTR judges in that
case had to wrestle with subtleties in the way Rwandans express themselves
that made it difficult to tell whether witnesses had actually witnessed acts that
they were reporting or reporting what others had seen and told them. 199 It is
difficult to know whether the judges came to the correct conclusions
concerning such culturally sensitive questions. Further, local Rwandan
processes provide, at least in theory, recourses for victims that are not
available at the international level: the possibility of concurrent civil suits
against perpetrators; the prospect of a private prosecution should the public
prosecutor fail to proceed; a sentence that accords with local sentiments and
local conditions (including relatively harsh prison conditions and the death
penalty); and local vindication. Local trials are covered extensively on local
radio broadcasts; further, victims' family members and friends, even those
who are not called as witnesses, are far more likely to attend and personally
witness the proceedings and, perhaps most importantly, see perpetrators face
to face.
196. Cf. Sara Darehshori, Inching Toward Justice in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 8, 1998, at
A25 (noting the difficulties for those working within the ICTR of working through one "overworked
translator"). Indeed, the linguistic and cultural gaps within the ICTR (frequently involving translations
from the local Rwandan dialect to French and then to English) required the use of an expert witness on
linguistics during the course of the Akayesu trial. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131, para. 4. That
witness also attempted to clarify that "evidence which had been reported as an eyewitness account was
in fact a second-hand account of what was witnessed." Id. § 4, para. 11.
197. See, e.g., infra note 207.
198. The first trial at the ICTR, against Jean-Paul Akayesu, began in January 1997 and
concluded in March 1998. See Darehshori, supra note 196. As noted in the New York Times, at the
current rate, the ICTR would take 20 years merely to try the 35 people whom it has to date indicted. See
McKinley, supra note 32. The ICTR's current President, Laity Kama, is more optimistic. In a letter
dated Aug. 1, 1997, he estimated that it would take the tribunal at least 88 months to conclude trials for
the 20 detainees then in custody. See Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994, U.N.
SCOR, 52nd Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1997/812 (1997).
199. See supra note 196 (reporting on the ICTR's attempts to deal with these difficulties).
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Victims may also care about having some control over the process. It is
not merely that Rwandans are more likely to regard local courts as "theirs,"
but also that, as is common in continental jurisdictions, local decisions to
prosecute are not invariably left in the hands of public servants. Under
Rwandan law, should a government prosecutor fail to institute proceedings
against some individuals, litigants may themselves institute private
prosecutions as well as civil suits for damages.20 0 At least in theory, Rwandan
courts, unlike the tribunal at Arusha, provide some avenues for survivors of
the Rwandan genocide where they can target their own defendants, choose
their own lawyers, shape their own claims, and direct their own cases.201
As has been noted with respect to civil suits in U.S. courts directed at
Balkan defendants, such a process is potentially more accountable to victims
than proceedings subject to the vicissitudes of international prosecutors, who
must be accountable to many interests and not merely to victims.202 Even if
Rwandan victims do not exercise the option of bringing their own criminal or
civil suits, having such remedies available may, in itself, serve as a comfort
and help to generate greater confidence in those public prosecutions that are
brought.203 Such psychological comforts are all the more important given the
remote prospects that either national or international prosecutions will enable
victims to secure more tangible forms of relief, including monetary
compensation.20 4  While observers of Rwandan processes for civil
200. See Organic Law, supra note 140, art. 29.
201. Cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Remedies for War Crimes at the National Level, J. INT'L
INST., Fall 1988, at 1 (describing the benefits of a civil suit brought by Balkan victims in a U.S. court).
As this suggests, such assertions of control may be more effective modes of catharsis for victims than
the opportunity to serve as mere passive witnesses at prosecutions controlled by others. Indeed,
MacKinnon, who is now involved in a civil suit on behalf of women from the former Yugoslavia in the
United States, see Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995), contends that clients such as hers
found the ICTY more accountable to the international community than to victims and suggests that this
may explain why they have been more forthcoming in the course of her suit than they might otherwise
have been. See MacKinnon, supra, at 1; see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 126-34
(1990) (presenting empirical evidence that the element of control over judicial processes matters to
perceptions of procedural justice).
MacKinnon also contends that her clients have a somewhat different agenda both in terms of
their suit and more generally, namely, "(1) stopping the violations; (2) naming them what they are; (3)
accountability to the violated for what was done to them; and (4) continuity between the legal changes
made and other law, so that what was done here counts and has meaning beyond the context of these
proceedings." MacKinnon, supra, at 23.
202. See id. As MacKinnon puts it, "The process, by design, is accountable to them-not to the
press, not to international politics, not to the bureaucratic imperatives of international organizations, ....
and not to criminal prosecutors enhancing their careers by claiming to represent 'the law."' Id. at 6; see
also Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, 1996 WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996) (providing a civil verdict
against a Rwandan political leader implicated in Rwanda's 1994 killings). For a critique of how the
Tadic trial in the ICTY forced victim/witnesses to relate "fragmented narratives," see Alvarez, supra
note 87, at 2068-69 (arguing that the Tadic trial used victims as "essentially faceless place-holders for
dates, times, and acts" relevant to the indictment).
203. In addition, the prospect of private prosecutions may force public prosecutors to be more
accountable to victims and more responsive to victims' concerns in the charges that they bring.
204. There is little evidence to date that the ICTR will be able to do much by way of
recompensing victims or family members. Cf. ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 23 (providing that
chambers "may order the return of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including
by means of duress, to their rightful owners"). Apart from this provision, nothing in the ICTR Statute
envisions civil claims for damages. See Ahneida, supra note 42, at 404 (suggesting reasons from moral
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compensation have criticized its operation in many respects, 205 no one denies
that, properly conducted, such procedures hold considerable promise in
meeting victims' needs.206
Finally, victims of mass atrocity and their family members, like victims
of crime everywhere, care about the types of penalties imposed on
perpetrators.0 7 The depth of Rwandan feeling on the need to impose the death
penalty on some offenders is underscored by their law's insistence that
"category one" perpetrators cannot escape the death penalty no matter what
they do: whether or not they choose to confess, to name accomplices, or to
spare the state the burden of a trial .20  The international community's
philosophy); see also Yael Danieli, Justice and Reparation: Steps in the Process of Healing, in REINING
IN IMPUNITY, supra note 31, at 303, 308-11 (identifying needs met by restitution and compensation); cf.
Organic Law, supra note 140, art. 10 (anticipating the possibility of civil claims); PRuNIER, supra note
10, at 354-55 (arguing that a minimum cash payment is a necessary component of the justice due to
Rwandan survivors). For an argument that judicial consideration of damage claims are useful, whether
or not judicial awards prove to be enforceable, see Alvarez, supra note 87, at 2102.
205. See William A. Schabas, Compensation and Reparation: Problems of Access to Civil
Justice, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 31, at 445, 451-55 (concluding that given the difficulties
with Rwandan procedures and that country's lack of resources available for compensating victims, the
international community should recognize a degree of international responsibility); see also Drumbl,
supra note 146, at 595-97 (discussing problems with Rwandan procedures for civil liability under its
Organic Law). Despite the reputed connection between criminal accountability for war crimes and the
"international community's interests," international lawyers have been reticent about embracing
Schabas's conclusions.
Few international lawyers have argued'that compensation for victims of international crime,
including genocide, are owed an indemnity by the international community. Compare Theo van Boven,
Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. E9COR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doe,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, reprinted in LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS., Autumn 1996, at 283, 297-303, 344-471
(outlining applicable principles of state responsibility under which the international community would
appear to owe nothing in this regard), and Theo van Boven, Accountability for International Crimes:
The Victim's Perspective, in REINING IN IMPUITY, supra note 31, at 349, 355 (noting that only under
some unspecified "special circumstances" should reparation mechanisms be created at the international
level), with Yvez Sandoz, Reflections on Impunity and the Need for Accountability, in REINING IN
IMPUNITY, supra note 31, at 381, 391 (suggesting that affirming the right to victim compensation is
unrealistic unless the international community is ready to assume collective responsibility for some
cases).
206. For further discussion of the aspirational needs met by the Kadic v. Karadzic litigation and
by civil claims generally, see Judge Jon 0. Newman, Toward an International Civil War Claims
Tribunal, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 245, 245 (1997) (arguing that civil suits could ultimately afford a greater
redress of rights). See also The Genocide Convention After Fifty Years: Contemporary Strategies for
Combating a Crime Against Humanity, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoC. 1, 13-19 (1998) (publishing
remarks by Delissa Ridgeway discussing the significance of reparations to Holocaust survivors).
207. While there is evidence that some victims of atrocity seek only acknowledgment of what
occurred, others, including many of the survivors -in Rwanda, want perpetrators to be punished, in some
cases, severely. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 1,, at 131, 245-46; James C. McKinley, Jr., Ex-
Rwandan Premier Gets Life in Prison On Charges of Genocide in '94 Massacres, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
1998, at A4; . Carrie Gustafson, International Criminal Courts: Some Dissident Views of the
Continuation of War by Penal Means, 21 Hous. J. INT'L L. 51 (1998) (criticizing retributivist reactions
to mass atrocity).
208. See Organic Law, supra note 140, arts. 5, 14. The first 22 executions of Rwandans
convicted for the 1994 genocide occurred on April 24, 1998, amidst calls for more such executions by
Rwandans and considerable international criticism. See Dianna Calm, Justice Must Be Done, ANN
ARIOR NEWS, Apr. 24, 1998, at A3. In the wake of executions, an increasing number of genocide
suspects have been coming forward to confess their crimes in order to get a reduced sentence. See Minor
Tried for Rwandan Genocide Crimes, AFR. NEWS ONLINE (visited May 25, 1998)
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opposition to the death penalty, illustrated by the myriad resolutions and U.N.-
sponsored treaties, spanning decades, devoted to the abolition of the death
penalty,209 as well as *the Security Council's insistence, over Rwanda's
objection, that such a penalty not be available to ICTR judges, 210 thwarts such
sentiments. Moreover, most of the discussion in favor of the abolition of the
death penalty, at both the international and national levels, relates to its
imposition with respect to ordinary crimes of much less magnitude or scale.
Indeed, the international abolitionist campaign has been usually directed not at
the sentence of death as such but to underlying flaws in imposing that
211sentence. It is also clear that at least some of the U.N. members now
criticizing Rwandan executions for perpetrators who have been convicted of
some of the most grievous offenses known to humankind have themselves
refused to forego the use of the death penalty with respect to ordinary
offenders involved in crimes of much less gravity within their own borders.
212
For Rwandan survivors of the 1994 genocide there is considerable
hypocrisy in the United Nations' insistence that those defendants lucky
enough to face trial at the ICTR will not face the kinds of penalties, including
death, imposed under Rwandan law, even if they were the foremost leaders of
genocide.213 Apart from the charge of double standards, few international
lawyers appear to have squarely addressed whether Rwandan authorities have
the legal or the moral right to insist on the death penalty for such cases. By
contrast, the author of an authoritative account of Rwanda's genocide
<http://www.africanews.org/pastlrwanda/stories/19980525_featl.htnl>.
209. For a survey of these, see Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: The USA in World
Perspective, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 517,521 (1997).
210. See Schabas, supra note 12, at 553.
211. See generally Hood, supra note 209, at 529-40 (observing that ordinary crimes for this
purpose are offenses defined solely by reference to national law and not international humanitarian law).
As Hood's survey of the relevant international instruments relating to the death penalty demonstrates,
the infliction of the death penalty for international crimes such as genocide would appear to conform to
the most important U.N. safeguard on its use-that the penalty be limited to the most serious offenses.
See id. at 530-31.
212. Back in 1953, Pope Pius XII noted the problems with such anomalies:
In the case where human life is made the object of a criminal gamble, where hundreds
and thousands are reduced to extreme want and driven to distress, a mere privation of
civil rights would be an insult to justice. When, on the contrary, the violation of a police
regulation, a thoughtless word against authority, are punished by firing squad or by
forced labor for life, the sense ofjustice revolts.
His Holiness Pope Pius XII, Address to the Sixth International Congress of Penal Law, October 3, 1953,
in REINING IN IMPUNrTY, supra note 31, at 13, 17-18. Citing these anomalies, Pope Pius XII
recommended that the fixing of penalties for crimes such as genocide should correspond to their gravity
and not result in more lenient treatment depending on the nature of the tribunal charged with sentencing.
See id. at 18. While presumably the Pontiff was not addressing the death penalty, his arguments apply
perhaps most forcefully in that context.
213. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 131. Indeed, Gourevitch reports that some of the
prisoners released from Rwandan prisons have been the victims of reprisals. See id. at 223, 245-46.
While the Security Council has not prohibited Rwanda from imposing the death penalty on perpetrators
who are convicted as category one perpetrators under Rwandan law within the Rwandan court system,
its insistence that the ICTR has primary jurisdiction, combined with the ICTR's demand for high-level
perpetrators, has the result of effectively preventing Rwandan courts from trying and convicting any
individual that the ICTR's prosecutor chooses to indict and to try. See ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art.
9(1) (prohibiting national courts from retrying persons for crimes for which they have been tried within
the ICTR).
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concludes that at least 100 of the well-known perpetrators of that massacre
"have to die" since this is "the only ritual through which the killers can be
cleansed of their guilt and the survivors brought back to the community of the
living. '214 The pat response made by international lawyers-that international
standards have evolved since those tried at Nuremberg were hanged-fails to
identify, precisely, what international instrument or norms in customary law
actually prohibit Rwanda from executing persons convicted of serious
offenses such as genocide.215
Despite the voluminous literature on the ad hoc tribunals, there is scant
attention paid to addressing the theories of punishment-whether retributive,
rehabilitative or other-that are supposed to underlie the effort.
216
214. PRUNiER, supra note 10, at 355. Prunier states:
The immensity of the crime cannot be dealt with through moderate versions of European
criminal law made for radically different societies. This after all is something Europeans
already know: after the Nuremberg trial the condemned were hanged in the name of the
millions who had died. This is a political and religious question. To reassure the "small
guys" who used the machete and to assuage the immense pain of their victims' relatives,
only the death of the real perpetrators will have sufficient symbolic weight to
counterbalance the legacy of suffering and hatred which will lead to further killings if the
abscess is not lanced.
Id. While Prunier does not indicate his normative framework for his conclusion, advocates of the ad hoc
tribunal's prohibition on the death penalty have also failed to articulate theirs.
215. There do not appear to be any international treaties to which Rwanda is a party that
impose such a ban. Neither is it clear that customary international law does so. See, e.g., William A.
Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 797, 799
(1998) (noting that since, to date, 102 states have abolished the death penalty but 90 have retained it, it is
premature to declare that the death penalty is now prohibited by customary international law). Indeed, if
Destexhe is correct in suggesting that the Rwandan 1994 killings are only one of three genuine
genocides of this century, see DESTEXHE, supra note 10, at 21-35, there is no state practice since
Nuremberg to suggest states have renounced the death penalty with respect to this crime. But see
Mendlovitz & Fousek, supra note 28, at 149 (citing 44 genocides in the 20th century). Even ifDestexhe
is wrong and many genocides have occurred since World War II, the absence of national trials for such
offenses again points to the scarcity of relevant precedents.
Advocates for the ad hoc tribunals have not spent much time addressing why the death penalty
cannot, from a legal, as opposed to a political, perspective, be applied in cases of mass atrocities. Cf.
Jennifer L. Balint, The Place of Law in Addressing International Regime Conflicts, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs., Autumn 1996, at 103, 113 (criticizing the undeveloped nature of international criminology and
its simplistic focus on the alleged choice between justice and peace). Less positivistic arguments against
the death penalty are suggested by commentators who favor restorative, instead of retributivist, justice
and therefore disfavor criminal accountability. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse,
Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Model
for Dealing with Conflicts of the Past (Jan. 20, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale
Journal of International Law); see also Lynn S. Graybill, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission: Ethical and Theological Perspectives, 12 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 43 (1998) (assessing the
potential for national reconciliation in the wake of South Africa's truth commission). While, as these
commentaries suggest, some nations have foregone the imposition of the death penalty even in the wake
of mass atrocities, in none of these cases has the international community required a nation to do this by
binding Security Council order, and those nations that have chosen a more merciful route have therefore
done so based on their own calculation of what would work best for national reconciliation. By contrast,
whenever the ICTR convicts a high-level perpetrator such as Bagasora, its sentence precludes Rwanda
from imposing a more severe sentence on that individual. See supra note 99.
216. There has been, of course, a continuous and lively debate, primarily outside of
international legal circles, concerning such issues. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968); Joshua Dressier, Hating Criminals: How
Can Something that Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 McH. L. REv. 1448 (1990). For a thoughtful
consideration of such issues with respect to instances of mass atrocity, see Stanley Cohen, State Crimes
Lessons from Rwanda
International lawyers do not appear to be concerned about grounding the ad
hoe tribunals' sentences, including the prohibition on the death penalty, in a
coherent moral or philosophical framework. The tribunals' prohibition on the
death penalty is simply the result of the perception that it would be politically
impossible for the U.N. to extract such a penalty or for it to make it possible
for others (for example the Rwandan government) to impose such a penalty
for persons convicted at the international level. For survivors of the genocide,
the questions remain: How exactly does the ICTR confer the "highest form of
justice' 217 when it fails to permit (and may even help prevent) the execution
of someone who has ordered or participated in the death of thousands? Does it
matter that such mercy is shown to perpetrators from a nation that continues to
impose much more severe punishment even with respect to "ordinary"
murderers? What do such anomalies do to the legitimacy of Rwandan criminal
justice? Does it matter for the legitimacy of the international "justice"
conferred that the mercy shown high-level perpetrators was not accorded their
victims by the international community either at the time of the 1994 genocide
or since?2
18
ICTR sentencing procedures are also problematic in other respects.
Under Rwandan law, perpetrators seeking to reduce their sentences must
apologize to their victims.z19 ICTR procedures, by contrast, do not require or
solicit apologies from those who are convicted and nothing in the ICTR's (or
the ICTY's) respective statutes encourages any other comparable act of
contrition-despite evidence that public apologies and renunciations of past
crimes strengthens victim mollification, along with other internationalist
goals.
220
As these issues suggest, those who seek primacy for international
processes are preferring certain goals-including those of the international
community of human rights lawyers who oppose the death penalty in all
of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the Past, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 7
(1995); see also NEIER, supra note 15, at 83 (contending that the pendulum has recently swung in favor
of retributivist approaches "[t]o restore the equilibrium of benefits and burdens in a society unfairly
disrupted by crime and that... needs to demonstrate the seriousness with which it regards its laws
against criminality, its condemnation of transgressions, and its respect for victims").
217. Cf. supra note 32 (citing Goldstone to this effect).
218. For a powerful indictment of the international community's treatment of the perpetrators
of the Rwandan genocide as compared to its treatment of its victims, see, for example, GOUREVITCH,
supra note l,passim.
219. See Organic Law, supra note 140, art. 6(c).
220. See, e.g., The Genocide Convention After Fifty Years: Contemporary Strategies for
Combatting a Crime Against Humanity, supra note 206, at 13 (1998) (remarks by Delissa Ridgway)
(discussing the Holocaust Claims Program); cf. McCarthy, supra note 92, at 244-48 (discussing similar
flaws in the South African truth commission process). Neither the victims of Tadic, the defendant whose
trial was recently completed within the ICTY, nor those of Jean Kambanda, the first defendant to be
sentenced by the ICTR, received a word of remorse or act of contrition from those defendants. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, No. IT-97-23-S (ICTR Sept. 4, 1998), paras. 46, 51 judgment and
sentence), available in <http://www.un.org/ICTR/english/judgements/kambanda.html> (suggesting that
a plea of guilty, standing alone, does not constitute an acknowledgment of remorse or express
contrition). On the other hand, it might be argued that an apology under pain of criminal prosecution is
too much like a forced recantation. One compromise might be to encourage such apologies without
penalizing their absence.
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instances-over the desires of many of those who have been most
immediately affected by genocide. When international lawyers stress the need
for "accountability," the question of accountability to whom is not candidly
addressed. While the advocates of the ICTR repeatedly emphasize the need
for accountability to victims,221 U.N. fora, including the ad hoc tribunals, are
in reality most accountable to their direct patrons-the international
community.222 As is suggested by the ad hoc tribunals' prohibition on the use
of the death penalty over Rwanda's objections, international criminal
proceedings legitimize the developing lexferenda preferred by U.N. bodies. 223
Even if the imposition of the death penalty pursuant to national judicial
procedures with full due process guarantees does not at present violate any
existing norm of customary international law, 224 a U.N. body is not going to
defy the abolitionist sentiment prevalent within an important international
constituency.
As the death penalty issue suggests, international tribunals are
accountable to, and respond most readily to, international lawyers'
jurisprudential and other agendas and only incidentally to the needs of victims
of mass atrocity.225 Quite apart from their presumed importance to the
prospects for a permanent international criminal court, the ad hoc international
tribunals are regarded as important to legitimate international scrutiny over a
government's treatment of its own citizens, even in instances not now
involving international crimes, 226 to legitimize and enforce a large body of
international rights that criminal defendants are believed to enjoy,227 and to, 228
affirm international lawyers' hierarchical claims for jus cogens. Some
221. See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 32, at 489.
222. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 201, at 1 (contending that the ICTY was "not
accountable to survivors, but to international bodies and international politics"). The most tangible way
in which such accountability manifests itself is through financing. In this respect, the tribunals' financial
accountability to the U.N. has been the focus of considerable concern and attention. See, e.g., Blewitt,
supra note 31, at 156 (arguing that financial tensions constantly strain the tribunals' freedom to
"administer [their] own affairs" and presenting specific examples of this impact with respect to the
ability to conduct particular investigations or to prosecute certain cases).
223. But see infra notes 274-358 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with this
assumption).
224. See supra note 215.
225. As Neier reminds us, this was no less true at Nuremberg. See NEIER, supra note 15, at 181
(discussing why rape charges were not brought at Nuremberg).
226. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 32, at 503; Ratner, supra note 24, at 247-48; Thieroff &
Amley, supra note 167, at 268.
227. Thus, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights argues in favor of international war
crimes tribunals on the grounds that national courts are unable to fulfill the increasing panoply of
relevant human rights guarantees, citing the following list of instruments: the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners, the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form
of Detention or Imprisonment, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment, the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the Basic Principles on the Role of
Lawyers, and the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors. See LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, NATIONAL
COURTS AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 72 & n.142 (1995). The breadth of this list suggests the depth
of the perceived international interest at stake.
228. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 17, at 17 & nn.21, 41 & 63 (discussing the tribunals'
impact on jus cogens); Cassese, supra note 26, at 6 (same); see also Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo,
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would add as well that, like all prior war crimes trials, current international
prosecutions are intended to exculpate the international community that
permitted the atrocities to occur but is now trying their perpetrators.22
9
For all of these reasons, international and national prosecutors do not
necessarily have the same goals.230 ICTR prosecutions are intended to be
acceptable to the entire international community, including to many
continental lawyers for whom plea bargains are tantamount to immoral deals
and to human rights lawyers for whom the death penalty is anathema. The
ICTR's prosecutors' need to secure universal acceptability for what they do
means that they must reject certain options that remain of vital interest to local
prosecutors and to others within Rwanda who are attempting to respond to the
needs of the survivors of genocide. Whether or not some aspects of Rwandan
trials fall short with respect to international human rights standards, it is hard
to deny that, if Rwanda's Organic Law were to operate as anticipated, those
local proceedings would be more responsive to the survivors of the Rwandan
genocide.
What about the competing vision of justice offered by the ICTR to those
accused of these crimes? International lawyers assume that, at least with
respect to defendants, proceedings before the ICTR are superior to trials
within Rwanda since the former offer incomparable guarantees of due process
and impartiality.231 This is a misleading comparison as the ICTR's
jurisdictional primacy has little effect on the majority of those facing charges
growing out of the Rwandan genocide.
The ICTR's claim to jurisdictional primacy over national courts is not
based on any finding by the Security Council that the Rwandan judicial
system generally, or its procedures for handling these offences, is prima facie
Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 583
(1997) (discussing the challenge to relativism posed by jus cogens); J.H.H. Weiler & Andreas L. Pauls,
The Structure of Change in International Law or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law?,
8 EuR. J. INT'L L. 545, 564 (1997) (noting the difference between legalists' concept ofjus cogens and
Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis).
229. Cf Dietrich Schindler, Book Review, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 158, 159 (1998) (discussing this
possibility). As is suggested by the historical account in Section HLI.A, there is much the international
community needs to be exculpated from with respect to the Rwandan genocide.
230. See also infra Section I].D (indicating where interests may diverge).
231. There is an emerging critique of the fairness of ICTY and ICTR proceedings from the
perspective of defendants and the defense counsel. See, for example, Mark S. Ellis, Achieving Justice
Before the International War Crimes Tribunal: Challenges for the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 519, which notes the challenges for defense counsel before the ICTY, including the inadequate
payments offered by that tribunal for defense counsel, and Sienho Yee, The Erdemovic Sentencing
Judgement: A Questionable Milestone for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 263 (1997), which addresses the ICTY's acceptance of guilty
pleas. However, these criticisms are nowhere as severe as those that have been directed at local attempts
to prosecute within the former Yugoslavia or within Rwanda. For a survey of some of the ways
Rwandan proceedings are likely to fall short of international standards, see RATNER & ABRAMS, supra
note 23, at 154-56; Drumbl, supra note 146, at 574-633; LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 139, at 47-57. Under Rwandan law, for example, criminal defendants, while entitled to
secure defense attorneys, are not provided with one at government expense. Compare Organic Law,
supra note 140, art. 36, with International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art.
14(3)(d), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (requiring defense counsel) [hereinafter
ICCPR], and ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 20(4)(d) (same).
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unfair.232 Although Rwandan procedures for alleged perpetrators of mass
atrocities have since been criticized, usually severely, by human rights
organizations, neither those organizations nor the United Nations has seriously
proposed that Rwandan prosecutions cease or that the many thousands of
detainees in Rwandan custody be transferred to the ICTR or be freed. Nor has
there been any international assistance effort, comparable in scale to that
conducted with respect to the ICTR, to ensure that national prosecutions
satisfy international human rights standards. 233 Yet, from the date when the
ICTR was initially created until the present, all involved have acknowledged
that international prosecutions are intended to complement, not displace,
national prosecutions within Rwanda.234 Even international lawyers recognize
that Rwandan proceedings, however flawed, are the only viable alternative to
impunity, or bloody reprisals, for the vast majority of perpetrators.
Since the post-genocide courts of Rwanda have acquitted a number of
235Hutu defendants, one might have thought that ICTR proceedings would
take precedence only as needed, as when a country refuses to extradite to
Rwanda a particular perpetrator or after a particularized finding that Rwandan
courts would not grant a defendant a fair trial. But, as suggested by the
Bagasora case,236 the ICTR does not rely on case-by-case determinations of
this kind. Unlike the typical request for change of venue within domestic legal
systems, an assertion of primacy by the ICTR's prosecutor does not rest on
any proof of unfair publicity or any other individualized demonstration of
local bias. The superior hierarchical status of the ICTR relies simply on a
general claim that international fora ought to be preferred, whether or not such
problems are shown to exist.
237
As this suggests, the ICTR's jurisdictional primacy is not premised on
greater fairness to defendants but on the flawed premises of the international
legal paradigm. The rules and procedures for the ad hoc tribunals are justified
on the basis that they constitute a proper balance between the needs of
defendants and victims. International lawyers concede that these rules are
replete with compromises as to the competing demands of defendant and
victim. 238 Whether these compromises, when paired with jurisdictional
232. A claim that the post-genocide Rwandan regime cannot legally undertake these trials
because it is not, for example, a democratically elected government but is a "minority" or "military"
regime would establish new law and pose fascinating dilemmas under, for example, the Genocide
Convention's duty on all governments to prosecute or extradite perpetrators. See Genocide Convention,
supra note 2, arts. V-VII. It would also greatly lessen the prospects for criminal accountability in most
instances of mass atrocities since most of these have not resulted in the establishment of an international
tribunal and most involve transitional, perhaps undemocratic, regimes--at least in the immediate
aftermath of mass atrocities.
233. See infra note 250.
234. Cf Arbour, supra note 94, at 534 (suggesting that the tribunals' jurisdiction represents
"complementarity," albeit with primacy).
235. See, e.g., Van Lierop, supra note 150, at 896. In addition, a number of prisoners have been
released due to illness, age, or lack of evidence. See, e.g., 15 Sentenced to Death, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
1998, at A3 (indicating that 137 persons were freed from Gikondo prison in Kigali).
236. See supra notes 186-192 and accompanying text.
237. See ICTR Statute, supra note 53, arts. 8-9.
238. See, e.g., Thieroff& Amley, supra note 167,passim (discussing the balance struck in the
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primacy, strike the proper balance between the rights of alleged perpetrators
and victims remains to be seen.
A grave problem with the vision of justice allegedly offered to
defendants by the ICTR is that it is illusionary since so few prospective
defendants are likely to see it. Arguments for international primacy premised
on the need for full compliance with the rights due all criminal defendants
under international law are disingenuous. As noted, even proponents of
international trials acknowledge that the ICTR will only indict (much less try)
a minuscule proportion of the likely perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide.
Further, quite apart from resource constraints, the ICTR's geographic and
temporal jurisdictional limits ensure that many of those accused of relevant
offenses before and after 1994 will not have access to its vision of justice.
International lawyers' pleas of concern for defendants do nothing for the vast
majority of alleged perpetrators who are left to the mercy of local courts.
When the ICTR was established the international community did not
attempt to address how all Rwandan perpetrators would possibly be accorded
individualized justice consistent with the full panoply of relevant international
norms. 24 Indeed, the very premise of the ICTR, as noted, was that it would
only conduct a select number of high-level trials. But the realities, both then
and now, remain stark. Rwanda's plea bargaining arrangement attempts to
accommodate vociferous demands for accountability by millions as well as
the needs of the many thousands who remain incarcerated under conditions
that are a great deal harsher than anyone is likely to encounter among the
states that routinely accommodate the requisites of international law. 24'
International human rights lawyers, for their part, are demanding that
Rwandan courts provide those accused of heinous offenses rights rarely seen
in a country that has, since colonial times, routinely denied an effective right
to counsel and accorded no right to confront witnesses or to a writ of habeas
242
corpus. Rwanda is also being asked to meet international standards when,
of the sixteen attorneys in private practice in that nation in 1996, few have
remained untouched by the genocide and are able and willing to objectively
defend those accused, and even fewer share the ethnicity (Hutu) preferred by
context of Rule 61 proceedings). For a critique of the balance struck by the ICTY in the course of its
first judgment, see Alvarez, supra note 87, at 2061-77. See also Kate Fitzgerald, Problems of
Prosecution and Adjudication of Rape and Other Sexual Assaults Under International Law, 8 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 638 (1997) (addressing the ICTY's flaws from the perspective of victims of gender-specific
crimes).
239. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
240. For a listing of these rights, see Article 14 of the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, which is essentially replicated in Article 20 of the ICTR Statute. See ICCPR, supra note
231, art. XIV.
241. See, e.g., Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability
Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 127,
150 (arguing that even the United States's halfa million lawyers would not be able to accommodate the
prospect of 100,000 defendants charged with grave offenses, including genocide).
242. See Van Lierop, supra note 150, at 889; see also Kritz, supra note 241, at 150
(complaining that shortly after the 1994 massacres many within the international community began
calling for prompt domestic prosecutions while soon thereafter many of the same voices criticized
Rwandan authorities for starting these trials too soon).
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most defendants.243 A nation destroyed by mass killings is being asked to
accord these rights in the midst of unstable political conditions and sporadic
renewals of horrific violence that the international community has done
nothing to prevent.
244
These challenges suggest a situation comparable to those "public
emergencies" that, under the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), permit the suspension of rights owed criminal defendants. 245
Since few countries have ever faced a dilemma comparable to that which
Rwanda faces,246 it seems highly presumptuous for the international
community to insist either that Rwanda suspend its local prosecutions or that
these prosecutions meet international due process standards-certainly not
until the international community itself proposes a realistic alternative
whereby the thousands of Rwandan detainees can be given speedy trials that
fully respect Article 14 of the ICCPR.
247
Rwanda's plight calls for a compromise between international lawyers'
demands that all states promptly prosecute individually all those guilty of
genocide while according defendants their full panoply of rights.
Significantly, possible compromises enumerated under one proposed set of
"International Guidelines Against Impunity for International Crimes" include
Rwanda-style plea bargaining, as well as prosecutions for lesser offenses, and
many "second-best" alternatives to criminal liability such as civil liability,
truth commissions, or lustrations.248 Rwanda's chosen path, under its Organic
Law, is consistent with these Guidelines, even if not with most international
lawyers' views of its duties under both the Genocide Convention and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.249 It seems that this
admittedly compromised vision of justice, rather than some illusion, ought to
be the solution the international community should be attempting to perfect.
Even if one concedes that present Rwandan procedures for trying
perpetrators are fundamentally flawed, it is appropriate to ask whether enough
attention and resources have been devoted, internationally, to assisting local
Rwandan processes as have been to the creation and ongoing efforts of the
ICTR. What would have been the state of Rwandan justice today if, instead of
spending between forty and fifty million dollars a year on the ICTR,
comparable sums of money and effort had been put into assisting the
Rwandan government in overcoming the enormous obstacles it faced in the
pursuit of criminal accountability?250 What would be the attitude of Rwandan
243. See Van Lierop, supra note 150, at 899.
244. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
245. See ICCPR, supra note 231, art. IV.
246. See Van Lierop, supra note 150, at 897-98 (noting that given its unique needs, "the
establishment of an independent and effective system of justice in Rwanda is essential to rebuilding the
country and moving the process ofnational reconciliation forward").
247. See Kritz, supra note 241, at 150-51.
248. See, e.g., id at 134-36; Madeline H. Morris, International Guidelines Against Impunity:
Facilitating.Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 29.
249. Compare Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. V (imposing a duty to prosecute), with
ICCPR, supra note 23 1, art. XIV (outlining rights due criminal defendants).
250. Cf. Kritz, supra note 241, at 150 (contending that such sums could have produced "one of
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officials towards the U.N. today if they had seen such genuine concern for
Rwandan justice back in 1994?251 Would a fairer Rwandan criminal process
have been encouraged if the international community had helped the Rwandan
government to prevent ongoing incursions into its territory by Hutu exiles
seeking to continue the 1994 genocide?252 These are but some of the questions
left unaddressed by the international legal paradigm.
And what of the vision of justice allegedly offered by the ICTR to
Rwandan society as a whole? As noted, the most grave difficulty in this
respect may be that the ICTR's vision of justice is scarcely visible within
Rwanda. In a poor country like Rwanda, where the vast proportion of the
population does not have access to coverage of trials conducted outside their
country, it seems doubtful to claim that international processes hold much
253promise for contributing to national reconciliation. Moreover, as
international lawyers are beginning to point out, as in connection with
Cambodia, where ordinary felons now face more serious penal consequences
than the notorious murderers of Pol Pot, to inspire trust, a legal system needs
consistency. 254 The anomalies that result as between high-level perpetrators
who go before the ICTR and those who remain within Rwanda are not likely
to enhance the credibility of the rule of law inside Rwanda.255
For this reason, among others, it is not simply a matter of encouraging
greater media coverage for ICTR proceedings. Studies suggest that among the
things observers of any judicial process value is the sense that fellow
the better justice systems in the region"). For discussion of the types of international assistance most
needed by Rwanda's judiciary, see, for example, Drumbl, supra note 146, at 601-22; and Sennett &.
Noone, supra note 129, at 445-47.
For the calendar year 1998, the U.N. General Assembly appropriated over $50 million to the
ICTR, a sum intended to accommodate a third trial chamber authorized in 1998. See International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, AFRL NEWS ONLINE (visited May 19, 1998) <http://www.africannews.
orgleastlrwanda/stories/19980519_feat3.html>. Despite the sums allocated, as of May 1998, the ICTR
had completed only one full trial, accepted one guilty plea, and was in the process of conducting two
additional trials. See id.
251. In testimony before the U.S. Congress, one knowledgeable observer argued that the
Clinton Administration's failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide contributed to a "go it alone"
mentality on the part of Rwandan authorities, with disastrous consequences for human rights within
Rwanda and the Congo. See The 1994 Rwandan Genocide and U.S. Policy: Testimony of Holly
Burkhalter, AFR. NEws ONLINE, 25 (visited May 26, 1998)
<http://www.africannews.org/eastlrwandalstories/19980519_feat3.htm>.
252. Government retaliations to such attacks, which reportedly have cost the lives of many
civilians, have only perpetrated continuing divisions between Tutsis and Hutus and have undermined the
prospects for effective domestic trials at least by 1998. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
253. See Kritz, supra note 241, at 131-32 (arguing that there was good reason after all for
locating World War I's tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo respectively). Indeed, one of the U.S.
lawyers involved in the Akayesu case felt compelled to travel to Akayesu's village to inform the people
there of his conviction. See U.S. Lawyer a Champion of Rights in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, at
A13. While the Times reports that the villagers he encountered were gratified, one has to question a
process that relies on such personal interventions to reach those whom we most want to reach. Cf James
C. McKinley, Jr., UN Tribunal in First Such Trial Verdict, Convicts Rwanda Ex-Mayor of Genocide,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1998, at A14 (quoting the reaction of a spokeswoman for a group of Tutsi widows
as saying "people in Rwanda can't be satisfied and it's understandable. The survivors are the people
who need justice the most. But we don't know about or understand the procedures of the tribunal").
254. See Seth Mydans, The Long, Erratic Arm ofJustice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1999, at All.
255. The difficulties with such anomalies are further addressed at infra notes 261-267 and
accompanying text.
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community members have been treated fairly by someone who understands
their arguments.256 If Rwandan society shares comparable notions of judicial
legitimacy, it stands to reason that having judges who come from the local
community may itself be determinative of the legitimacy of these processes.
This helps to explain why even some internationial adjudicative processes,
including institutionalized forms of arbitration and the International Court of
Justice 2ICJ), provide mechanisms for party-appointed arbitrators and
judges.2 5 Even international lawyers usually assume that the legitimacy of
judicial processes requires reassurances in the form of a representative
judiciary, that is, that international adjudicators need to include
representatives from both sides of the dispute. The participation of party-
appointed judges, as on the ICJ, sends a message to the respective national
communities involved in ICJ cases. It reassures litigants, and the communities
of which they are a part, that when those judges deliberate, they will be
addressing the merits of their arguments and not simply rolling the dice or,
worse, acting on the basis of national, ethnic, or other prejudices. In tribunals
that rely solely on verdicts by judges (that is, that operate in the absence of a
jury of peers from the local community), such assurances would appear to be
especially necessary. At least within the United States, when a dispute has
prominent ethnic or gender implications, having participants in the process, as
judges or jurors, who appear to be responsive to such concerns is all the more
important if proceedings and subsequent verdicts are to have reasonable
prospects of generating widespread acceptance.
258
The counter-assumption, accepted in connection with the ICTR, that
neutrality demands a "denationalized" bench consisting of persons having no
connections to the region that suffered the atrocities, is not comparable to
instances requiring a change of venue within a locality. Such removals, in the
United States usually stemming from fears of biased juries, nonetheless result
in a trial within a greater national community. The ICTR, with a bench
composed of the principal legal systems of the world but without a judge or
judges from within Rwanda, has no comparable claim to representative
legitimacy.259 These realities raise doubts about the value of ICTR
256. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 201, at 94-112
257. Cf. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 31, June 26, 1945 (permitting party-
appointed ad hoc judges); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 37, available at <http://www.interationaladr.coni/tcl 1.htr> (permitting
party-appointed arbitrators). The international precedents where this tradition has not been followed, as
with respect to the U.N.'s El Salvador Truth Commission, have usually emerged when state parties have
themselves agreed to "denationalization" or to forego appointing ad hoc adjudicators. See, e.g., Thomas
Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497,
503 (1994). It is also true, of course, that the El Salvador process did not involve criminal prosecutions.
258. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, An African-American Sense of Fact: The O.J. Trial and
Black Judges on Justice, 7 B.U. PmB. INT. L. J. 219, 244-49 (1998).
259. See generally Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 215 (manuscript at 6) (noting how
international tribunals are seen as imposing law on "others, who are assumed to be unable to impose it
on themselves" and the risks this poses to the idea of a community governing itself under lav). While
Rwanda was, fortuitously, represented on the Security Council at the time that the ICTR was
established, its vote and views were overridden by the rest of the Council. See supra note 101 and
accompanying text. By comparison, the Organic Law, supra note 140, was the product of extensive
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proceedings to Rwandan society even if those trials were more accessible to
Rwandan audiences.
260
There is, finally, the claim that whatever else it does, the ICTR affirms a
vision of justice that best comports with the Nuremberg-inspired goals held
by, and valuable to, the international community. Here again, there is the
initial question of media coverage. Contrary to the assumptions of
international lawyers, not all Nuremberg-styled proceedings get worldwide
attention. It has not yet been demonstrated that the ICTR's trials have received
greater press coverage than, for example, Rwanda's public executions of those
convicted of the 1994 genocide. Even the first trial conducted by these ad hoc
tribunals, the Tadic trial at the ICTY (billed as the "trial of the century" b~r
Court TV in the United States) suffered from dwindling press coverage.
2 °1
Indeed, as that case suggests, the very length of international proceedings
undercuts the prospects for securing and retaining media coverage.
But even assuming that ICTR trials and indictments are successful in
securing international attention, the message being conveyed to observers
around the world is problematic when one considers the limits of the ICTR's
reach and the anomalies that result from the joint operation of the ICTR and
Rwandan criminal processes.
Professor Madeline Morris has identified the "tugs of war" that have
emerged over competing claims to jurisdiction by the ICTR and Rwandan
courts, noting in particular the absence of criteria with which to resolve such
claims.262 Morris castigates the "anomalies of inversion" that result when the
ICTR attempts to exercise its jurisdictional primacy to demand custody over
the highest leaders of the Rwandan genocide. As Morris argues, it appears
highly unjust if high-level perpetrators receive the benefit of the elaborate due
process rights established before the ICTR, while more ordinary perpetrators
face expedited, imperfect justice within Rwandan courts. 263 Since the ICTR
public debate within Rwandan institutions. See, eg., Morris, supra note 12, at 357-61. Moreover, one
early draft of that law anticipated even more public participation in these trials. Under one version of the
Organic Law, the specialized trial chambers in charge of these prosecutions would have consisted of
three magistrates de carriere as well as two assessors, the latter to be appointed through random
selection from lists of individuals possessing demographic characteristics appropriate to particular
localities within Rwanda. See Organic Law, supra note 140, arts. 5-9. Although it was envisioned that
these assessors would not actually vote on cases, the draft articles anticipated that they would participate
in deliberations by the bench. See id. art. 12. As Madeline Moris's commentary to these draft provisions
indicates, the idea was to strike a balance between legal professionalism and community participation to
encourage social reconstruction and reconciliation. See Madeline Morris, Commentary to the Draft
Genocide Accountability Act of 1996, Mar. 1, 1996 (copy on file with author). While no such provisions
survived to the final form of Rwanda's Organic Law, they suggest the enormous potential for
participatory legitimacy in local judicial processes.
260. More generally, it suggests the need to devote more attention to "the permeability of
international law-based rules and ideas of accountability into the jurisprudence of national courts."
Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Lauren Gibson, The Developing Jurisprudence of Amnesty, 20 HuM. RTS. Q.
843, 845 (1998) (noting the paucity of serious work on the subject). Roht-Arriaza and Gibson canvass
the domestic implementation and the effects of amnesties in a number of countries.
261. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 187; SCHARF, supra note 5, at xii, 221; see also
supra note 208 (discussing the international media attention directed at Rwanda's executions).
262. See Morris, supra note 12, at 362-73.
263. See id.at371.
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will focus its own scarce resources on prosecuting select, high-level
perpetrators, most of those complicit in Rwandan mass atrocities, especially
those who were abroad or who acted prior to January 1, 1994 or after
December 31, 1994, will not face international prosecution. Despite concerns
that Tutsi-controlled Rwandan courts will not be willing to hear charges
against Tutsis accused of targeting Hutus for retaliation, the temporal
restrictions on the ICTR's jurisdiction mean that it is not available for
prosecuting most of these cases since most occurred after 1994 (and, in some
cases, outside Rwandan territory).2 4 In the end perhaps a few dozen of the
highest profile perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, those whom by the
international lawyers' own account are most culpable, will be accorded
extensive procedural rights while all others will face Rwandan justice or none
at all. To the extent the ICTR is defended on the basis of its symbolic
importance, these anomalies are part of the message conveyed.265 The signal
the ICTR is now sending to perpetrators everywhere is not that international
norms will be enforced against all those who violate them but that those most
responsible for the worst offenses will not be accountable directly to the
communities they butchered. Instead, they will receive relatively lenient
treatment, have their lives spared, and face, at most, some years in
confinement266 under conditions far better than any they could have ever
anticipated back home.267 Sending a message of preferential treatment to the
most culpable few seems a perverse way to affirm the international
community's interests in affirming the Nuremberg principles against all.
D. Primacy's Priorities
What about contentions that primacy is required: (1) by the need to
apply, and symbolically affirm, international law; (2) the greater expertise of
international judges in this respect; and (3) the greater likelihood that
264. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, U.N. Team Says Congo Army Killed Hutu, N.Y. TIMEs, July
1, 1998, at A6 (reporting on alleged massacres of Hutu by Congolese and Rwandan soldiers in the
Congo in 1996 and 1997).
265. See Morris, supra note 12, at 371.
266. The anomalies among those convicted by the ICTR are only exacerbated to the extent that
those convicted serve their sentences in a variety of states. Under the ICTR's rules, states in which
prisoners serve their sentences retain considerable discretion, subject to continued ICTR supervision,
over the conditions of confinement. See ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 98, arts.
124-26.
267. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 255 (noting the ironies in the privileges accorded
those detained by the ICTR). A comparable, and perhaps equally perverse, message was relayed by the
U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes, David Scheffer, to members of the former Khmer Rouge. On a visit
to Phnom Penh, Ambassador Scheffer reportedly urged Khmer Rouge leaders to surrender in the
following terms, "[w]e hope the senior Khmer Rouge leaders realize that their personal safety and the
opportunity to live out a natural life would be assured if an international criminal tribunal ultimately
gains custody of them." Philip Shenon, US. to Ask for a U.N. Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge,
N.Y. TwMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at A16. While it is obvious that Scheffer's intent was to encourage criminal
accountability for Cambodian victims and survivors, Scheffer's vision ofjustice might appear to be an
offer of sanctuary to those most culpable of the gravest crimes-an offer made by the same international
community that not only failed to halt the killing fields but permitted the main perpetrator, Pol Pot, to be
seated as the country's authorized U.N. representative for a time.
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international trials will do more for the progressive development of
international humanitarian law?
Arguments that ground the ICTR's primacy on the first contention, that
is, the need to brand these offenses as violations of international criminal law,
are overstated. Rwanda's Organic Law, as noted, permits "category one"
convictions for the "planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders
of the crime of genocide or of a crime against humanity., 268 Such national
convictions, even though brought under national law, would appear to have
the symbolic stigma that international lawyers seek. 269 While Rwandan courts
are not formally charging defendants with "genocide," for example, no one
charged with a category one offense under Rwanda's Organic Law can
possibly be mistaken for an ordinary murderer; it is clear to all what these
convictions are addressing. Further, a category one conviction under Rwandan
law may carry a potent symbolic message that no ICTR conviction is capable
of having-the death penalty. The seriousness of charges under the Organic
Law are clear to anyone. While it is true that a trial and conviction done under
U.N. auspices conveys, merely because of the status of the forum, a message
that these offenses are of interest to the world community, this does not mean
that it is impossible to convey the import of these crimes except through such
a forum. It might be argued that the enforcement of international criminal
norms by "real" national courts provides a better affirmation of the reality and
enforceability of international crimes. Under the circumstances, it is difficult
to make the case that only ICTR convictions can symbolically affirm the
significance or seriousness of these crimes. Moreover, to the extent Rwandan
law is inadequate and fails to cover some international crimes, such failings
268. Organic Law, supra note 140, art. 2. However, for reasons noted at supra notes 143-44
and accompanying text, Rwanda's Organic Law merges, in its categories one to four, persons accused of
international crimes with those accused of crimes under Rwandan law, including those guilty of
"intentional homicide," "serious assaults," and "offences against property." As this suggests, this may
give rise to difficulties for those who have to determine, as under ICTR Article 8, whether persons
charged under Rwandan law have been effectively charged with "international crimes" under the
ICTR's jurisdiction, or whether, as under Article 9(l), persons tried under Rwanda law can be tried
again at the ICTR. These provisions effectively put tremendous, and from Rwanda's perspective,
probably controversial, discretion in the hands of the ICTR's prosecutor. As noted, see supra note 99,
under Article 9 of the ICTR statute, Rwandan courts are precluded from prosecuting persons who have
been tried in the ICTR for "serious violations of international humanitarian law" but the ICTR can
nonetheless retry individuals who have been convicted of "ordinary crime[s]" in Rwandan courts. See
ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 9.
269. Cf Hanne Sophie Greve, "Do Not Interfere... ": Recording the Facts and the Truth, in
REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 31, at 245, 253 (discussing the potency of a charge of "genocide").
Indeed, Rwanda's imposition of the death penalty for such crimes, however odious that penalty may be
to some international lawyers, undoubtedly adds to the symbolic import of a national conviction. The
ICTR's rules barring an international trial for those convicted of relevant international crimes at the
national level, see supra note 99 and accompanying text, implicitly recognizes that international needs
can be met by the domestic application of international norms.
Ironically, partly as a result of the establishment of the two ad hoc war crimes tribunals, there are
an increasing number of instances in which national courts have applied international humanitarian law
in either a criminal or a civil context. See, e.g., In re G., Military Tribunal, Division 1, Lausanne,
Switzerland, Apr. 18, 1997 summarized in 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1998); Public Prosecutor v. Djajic, No.
20/96, excerpted in 1998 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 392, Supreme Court of Bavaria, 3d Strafsenat,
May 23, 1997; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995); R. Bartle and the Commissioner of
Police for the Metropolis and Others, Exparte Pinochet, House of Lords, Nov. 25, 1998 (under review).
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could be solved by affording the ICTR a subsidiary role, that is, by permitting
international trials to proceed (or according them primacy) only in such
instances.
270
Nor is the second argument, premised on the greater expertise and
impartiality of international judges, a strong basis for ICTR primacy. The
selection of individuals to serve as prosecutors and judges for these ad hoc
tribunals is highly political; choosing individuals adept in international
humanitarian law has not always been an important criterion.271 Further, as is
discussed fully below, it is not clear that either the international judges'
expertise in international law or their alleged neutrality advances, in all cases,
international goals.
272
The third assumption, that judges from diverse legal systems put in place
by U.N. political bodies will more credibly serve to "progressively develop"
international humanitarian law,273 needs to be more closely scrutinized.
Depending on what is meant, it too appears questionable, or at least needs
qualification.
It is undoubtedly true that the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR
has been accompanied by the promulgation of two jurisdictional statutes and
that these statutes have, on the whole, expanded the number of offenses
included as international crimes. Indeed, in this sense, the ICTR's statute was
more "progressive" than the ICTY's in that it expanded upon, for example, the
list of gender-specific crimes encompassed as "crimes against humanity.2 74
To the extent the ICTY's and the ICTR's respective statutes are ultimately
seen as attempts to codify international crimes for all members of the
community, the uniform development of international humanitarian law has
undoubtedly been advanced by the creation of these two tribunals.275 In
several instances, including in the landmark Akayesu judgment issued by the
ICTR, the international judges in these tribunals have broadly interpreted the
scope of applicable crimes. Most notably, the Akayesu judgment affirms that
"measures intended to prevent births within the group," and therefore
targeting women as members of an ethnic group, can constitute genocide.2 76
Judicial interpretation has, in the course of some of the ICTY and ICTR
judgments issued to date, expanded the category of offenses that, at least
270. See infra Part V.
271. Indeed, when Judge Gabriel Kirk MacDonald was approached by U.S. Legal Adviser to
the State Department Conrad Harper with a proposal to serve on the ICTY, Judge MacDonald noted,
"But I don't know anything about international war crimes." Harper reportedly responded, "That's not a
qualification. You'll learn." Kitty Felde, Judge Gaby: Work for Justice, Fight for Peace, MiNN.JST.
PAUL MAGAZINE (reproduced as part of Conference Materials for a Regional Meeting of the American
Society of International Law, Mar. 31 and Apr. 1, 1998, on file with The Yale Journal ofInternational
Law).
272. See infra notes 293-433 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley, Atrocity and Its Prosecution: The Ad Hoc Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 189, 211 (Timothy L.H.
McCormack & Gerry G. Simpson eds., 1997).
275. See supra note 46.
276. Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131, § 6.3.1.
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within the context of the Balkans and Rwanda, are now regarded as criminal
offenses.
277
It is also true that by holding trials and convicting defendants, these
tribunals have immeasurably "developed" the law through its routine
application.2 78 While it may appear as no surprise that the ICTR has now
determined that the 1994 killings in Rwanda did indeed constitute a
"genocide, ' 279 it is no small achievement that we now have a judicial decision
that, for the first time, determines in a concrete fact situation that systemic
killings targeting a group for extermination occurred.2 80 Indeed, Akayesu's
conviction for genocide appears to adopt a postmodem definition of "ethnic
group" that accepts that ethnicity "is to some extent a matter of choices and
perceptions rather than immutable features.2 81 Moreover, to the extent the
law can be said to be "developed" through a demonstration that it can be
effectively applied, this too has now been repeatedly affirmed by trials,
convictions, and sentences rendered by both ad hoe tribunals. Finally, it is also
clear that the establishment and operation of ad hoc tribunals has significantly
expanded the attention paid to international humanitarian law, not merely
among international lawyers but among international and national
policymakers.282 Even the Spanish judge who issued an indictment under
Spanish law against Agosto Pinochet acknowledged a debt to these tribunals
and it is doubtful whether a number of recent civil and criminal cases before
national courts would have been brought but for the establishment of these
277. See, e.g., Meron, War Crimes Law Comes OfAge, supra note 22; Darryl Robinson, Trials,
Tribulations, and Triumphs: Major Developments in 1997 at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 35 CAN. Y.B. INT'LL. 179 (1997).
278. Thus, Meron argues that the ad hoe tribunals have made what has been formerly been
mere rhetoric into the normative, and have transformed what has been the "merely normative" into the
"effectively criminalized." Meron, War Crimes Law Comes OfAge, supra note 22, at 468.
279. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131, § 6.3.1; see also Lori Fisler Damrosch, Genocide
and Ethnic Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CoNFLICr, supra note 82, at 265, 265-67
(discussing why the Rwandan killings constitute genocide).
280. As many commentators have noted, the requisites of the crime of genocide, including the
nature of the targeted groups, the level or scope of destruction, and the intent of the perpetrator, remain
ambiguous and subject to considerable judicial interpretation. See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note
23, at 24-44. There are even greater judicial challenges presented by the ICTR's jurisdiction over
"conspiracy to commit genocide," "direct and public incitement to genocide," "attempt to commit
genocide," and "complicity in genocide." ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 4(3); see also RATNER &
ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 118-19 (noting the interpretative problems presented by such crimes, given
the lack of uniformity among legal systems in defining such terms); cf. Akayesu Judgment, supra note
131, para. 484 (distinguishing between "aiding," defined as "giving assistance to someone," and
"abetting," defined as "facilitating the commission of the act by being sympathetic thereto").
281. See Damrosch, supra note 279, at 261. Thus, the Akayesu judges quote approvingly from
the definition given by one expert witness, Alison Desforges, who argues that the "primary criterion" for
defining an ethnic group is the "sense of belonging to that ethnic group," a sense that can "shift over
time" as definitions of relevant groups change. Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131, § 5.1 (factual
findings). This malleable view of ethnicity is likely to be attractive to those anxious to extend the scope
of the crime of genocide or who want to highlight the impact of government action that encourages
ethnic self-identification. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 279, at 262 (noting how ethnicity has
"historically been a matter not only of an individual's subjective decision to align with a group but also
of governmentally manipulated pressures").
282. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 33, passim; Meron, supra note 34,passim.
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two ad hoc tribunals. 28 3 In this sense as well international war crimes' ripple
effects are assisting the "progressive development" of international
humanitarian law. Yet the increasing likelihood that international
humanitarian law may now be the subject of civil or criminal actions in
national courts or other domestic fora should prompt reconsideration of the
premise that international judges will be free to interpret and develop the law
without constraint or with fewer constraints than those faced by local
judges.2 4
As has been repeatedly made clear in the course of cases heard by both
the ICTY and the ICTR, the interpretation and application of vaguely defined
international crimes leave considerable room for judicial interpretation. 285
Considerable political pressures may be brought to bear on how judges fill
these gaps. Whereas national judges have to be concerned about sustaining
their credibility among local constituencies, international judges need to worry
about the reactions of prominent patrons of these tribunals as well as the
international community, as represented, for example, on the Security
Council.
2 6
There are also tensions between the U.N. status and origins of these ad
hoc tribunals and the goal of impartial, objective development of international
humanitarian law. The U.N. has long purported to be "codifier, executor, and
subject" of this law with uneven success. 28 7 The political character of those
283. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Pinochet's Spanish Pursuer: Magistrate of Explosive Cases,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1998, at Al.
284. For discussion of the inherent tensions involved in the attempt to progressively develop
the law while applying it in the course of criminal trials, see Alvarez, supra note 87, at 2061-64. For the
purposes here, I am assuming that international lawyers are right to pursue the goal of progressive
development.
285. This is suggested, for example, by the differing views of the judges on the ICTY
concerning the scope and applicability of the defense of duress. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-
96-22-A (ICTY Oct. 7, 1997) (appeal) available at <http:llwww.un.orglCTY/erdemoviclappeall
sopinion-e>; Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-96-22 (ICTY Oct. 7, 1997) (Judgment) available at
<http:l/www.un.orglICTY/erdemovietrialcljudgementl8O3O5.ms)-e.htm> [hereinafter Erdemovic
Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-96-22-T (ICTY Nov. 29, 1996) (sentencing judgment)
available at <http:Ilwww.un.orgICTY/erdemovich/trialc/judgement> [hereinafter Erdemovic
Sentencing Judgment]; Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131, § 6.3.2 (defining "complicity"); Tadic
Judgment, supra note 58, paras. 694-710 (attempting to define persecution as a crime against
humanity); infra note 307 and accompanying text (discussing the ICTY's enumerated requisites for
crimes against humanity). For a more general overview of the many gaps and imperfections within
international crimes, see, for example, Bassiouni, supra note 4, passim (discussing the unresolved
ambiguities of uncodified crimes against humanity); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 24-103. See
also Ratner, supra note 24, at 251-56 (identifying gaps in international humanitarian law given the
needs of human rights law).
286. The views of prominent U.N. members, especially permanent members of the Council,
may prove influential most directly through tribunal rules for the presentation of amicus curiae. See
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 98, Rule 74; ICTR Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, supra note 98, Rule 74; Cassese, supra note 39, at 246 (discussing the U.S. amicus in the'
Tadic case). Even without such formal intervention, the political views of the U.N. Secretariat and of
powerful U.N. members continue to exert a powerful impact on the effectiveness of these tribunals, as is
clear with respect to the Council's unwillingness to impose sanctions on those governments who have to
date refused to cooperate with tribunal orders. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 96, at 409-I1 (discussing the
lack of enforcement by the Security Council in the context of the ICTY).
287. See, e.g., Ralph Zacklin, General Report, in TH9 UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 39, at 39,41.
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entities within the U.N. charged with legal codification, especially the General
Assembly, along with the organization's peacekeeping responsibilities, are not
always compatible with the U.N.'s role as objective codifier and interpreter."'
The potential for conflict has led some to consider the International Red Cross
as the more legitimate forum for the neutral elaboration of the norms of
international humanitarian law or at least to consider that nongovernmental
organization an "ombudsman" over U.N. activity in this field. 89 While
officials of the Red Cross extol the U.N.'s complementary role in this
respect,290 there have been instances in which the two organizations have been
at odds with respect to the meaning and interpretation of international
humanitarian law 291 and some of these may produce dilemmas for ICTR and
ICTY judges.292
Despite the trial chamber's considerable achievements in the Akayesu
case, these realities may undermine the prospects that other ICTR trials will
progressively develop, for example, the crime of genocide and crimes against
humanity in the ways most favored by international lawyers. Consider the
troublesome issue of the meaning and scope of the crime of incitement of
genocide. As noted, the Rwanda genocide was not a "spontaneous ethnic war"
but one that was deliberately incited by the primary voice and tool of the
genocide, Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM).293 Prior
attempts to murder government opponents (as in March 1992) had
demonstrated to Rwandan perpetrators the effectiveness of radio to reach large
numbers of potential assailants but, at the same time, international criticism of
such tactics helped to persuade the prior Rwandan government to privatize the
incitement to violence as well as its actual infliction. Months of virulent radio
288. For a survey of some of these areas of tension, see contributions by M. Georges Abi-Saab,
Conclusions, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 39, at 307;
Malmoush H. Arsanjani, Defending the Helmets: Protection of United Nations Personnel, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 39, at 115; Mario Bettati, Le
Principe de Libre Acc~s aux ictimes dans les Resolutions Humanitaires du Conseil de Sicuriti, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 39, at 285; Hans-Peter Gasser,
The International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Involvement in the
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 39, at 259; Frangoise Hampson, States' Military Operations
Authorized by the United Nations and International Humanitarian Law, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 39, at 371; and Daphna Shraga, The United Nations
as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 39, at 317; Zacklin, supra note 287, at 39-53.
289. See, e.g., Abi-Saab, supra note 288, at 312; Gasser, supra note 288, at 266; Zacklin, supra
note 287, at 43.
290. See, e.g., Abi-Saab, supra note 288, at 311; Gasser, supra note 288, at 282.
291. See, e.g., Gasser, supra note 288, at 275 (criticizing U.N.-authorized operations in the
Gulf War). Compare Theodor Meron, Conclusions, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 39, at 443-44 (disputing the U.N.'s position that U.N. operations need
only adhere to the "principles and spirit" of international humanitarian law), with Shraga, supra note
288, at 317, 440-41 (reiterating the U.N.'s position). For other examples of the tensions between neutral
application of international humanitarian law and its operations in the field, see Hampson, supra note
288, at 371.
292. See, e.g., Hampson, supra note 288, at 423 (questioning how international judges will
respond to demands that U.N. armed forces testify in ongoing trials); see also Akayesu Judgment, supra
note 131, § 6.5 (noting such an attempt in the course of the first full trial at the ICTR).
293. See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text
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broadcasts, directed against "alien" and "subhuman" Tutsis, helped to create
the climate in which those same radio broadcasts could mobilize private
294militias to seek out Tutsis for extermination. For the victims of the
Rwandan genocide, as well as for anyone interested in preserving an accurate
record of how that massacre developed and proceeded, there can be few
higher priorities than prosecuting those responsible for such incitements to
violence.295
The ICTR's likely difficulties in dealing with such perpetrators do not
stem merely from its temporal jurisdictional limitations, however.296 Whether,
and to what extent, incitement to ethnic violence can be considered
"genocide," "complicity in genocide," or the crime against humanity known
as "persecution," have long been contested issues within the international
community. From the Cold War to the present day, U.S. government officials
and members of Congress, for example, continue to express qualms that the
criminalization of "war propaganda" or "hate speech" might, in the hands of
totalitarian governments, provide a convenient cover for curtailing freedom of
information or individual rights to free expression.297 Thus, while many states
have defined such acts as criminal under their domestic law or pursuant to
their interpretation of international obligations, as under the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the
298 299Genocide Convention,298 an ideological divide is still apparent on this issue.
It is not yet clear how this controversy will be settled within the ICTR.
The ICTR's statute echoes the Genocide Convention and includes "direct and
public incitement" as a cognizable form of genocide.300 Indeed, in the Akayesu
judgment, the trial chamber affirmed that incitement can be implicit as well as
direct and convicted Akayesu of incitement to genocide, noting that such a
conviction can result from behavior that "plays skillfully on mob psychology
by casting suspicion on certain groups, by insinuating that they were
responsible for economic or other difficulties in order to create an atmosphere
favorable to the perpetration of the crime. ' '3° ' Perhaps most significantly, the
Akayesu judges found that public incitement to commit genocide "can be
punished even where such incitement was unsuccessful.0 02 Drawing from the
common law's notion of inchoate offenses, the Akayesu judges found that the
drafters of the Genocide Convention did not intend, by omission, to suggest
that unsuccessful incitement was not punishable.303 The trial chamber's judges
294. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 54, at 4-13.
295. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 152-184 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Stephanie Farrior, Moulding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical
Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 27-30 (1996).
For one attempt to reconcile convictions for incitement with the right of free expression, see NEIER,
supra note 15, at 206-09.
298. See Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. III(c); International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966,660 U.N.T.S. 195, art. 4.
299. See, e.g., Farrior, supra note 297, at 30-36.
300. See ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 2.
301. Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131, § 6.3.3.
302. Id.
303. See id.
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therefore affirmed that even incitement that fails to produce the results
intended by the perpetrator warrants punishment because of the high risks
such actions pose for society.'
°4
While such determination, if affirmed on appeal, will no doubt be
welcomed by international lawyers as "progressive developments," the fate of
the crime of incitement to genocide within the ICTR remains uncertain. No
one knows how the ICTR will, across a range of cases raising distinct fact
patterns, define the scope of such offenses. It is possible that international
judges, anxious to secure the continued cooperation and financial support of
important states such as the United States, will defer to those states' views and
insist, for example, that the specific intent requirements of genocide, as well
as the requirement that any incitement be "direct," require a clearly
established link of cause and effect between inciting words and subsequent
violent acts. At the extreme, a high standard of proof might require, for
example, evidence that a radio broadcast message targeting named persons for
death was immediately followed by the attempt or the completed killings of
these same individuals by perpetrators who can be shown to have heard the
particular broadcast. 30 5 While such a standard would deflect criticism by
advocates of freedom of expression, it would do so at the expense of the
expansion of this crime. Of course, such an approach could result in
controversial acquittals for at least some of those who instigated and helped
perpetuate the Rwandan genocide. As this example suggests, international
lawyers appear to be embracing the uniform progressive development of
international humanitarian law without regard to whether such uniformity
conflicts with other goals.3 °6
Nor are the prospects for successful convictions of the inciters of
genocide necessarily any better if pursued under the rubric of the crime
against humanity known as persecution.30 7 Despite the Akayesu judgment,
304. See id.
305. While the Rwandan genocide is likely to produce cases that would meet even this exacting
standard, the more usual case against a Rwandan radio broadcaster is likely to be far more general. For a
description of the systematic way in which the Rwandan genocide proceeded, see GOUREVrTcH, supra
note 1, at 85-131. While the standard suggested in the text would appear to exceed the Nuremberg
precedents on point, see Metzl, supra note 132, at 636-37, those precedents themselves establish a fairly
tough standard for bringing successful "incitement" cases and at least some Rwandan cases might
flounder if the ICTR strictly adhered to them. See id. (discussing the Striecher and Fritzsche cases).
306. Cf. Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, supra note 22, at 465 (praising the
"significant contribution to the elucidation of some general principles of criminal law, particular duress
and superior orders" of the ICTY). Not everyone would agree with the splintered ICTY judgments in the
Erdemovic case regarding the defense of duress, however. Cf. Robinson, supra note 277, at 203-06
(criticizing the Erdemovic case); see also infra notes 348-357 and accompanying text (discussing
Osiel's views on duress).
307. A trial chamber of the ICTY has indicated that proof of specific discriminatory intent is
also a significant component of crimes against humanity. According to the Tadic judgment's
interpretation of Article 5's "crimes against humanity," these crimes require, in addition, a showing: (1)
that at the time of the commission of the acts or omissions there was an ongoing widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population; (2) that the defendants' acts be undertaken on a
widespread or systematic basis and in furtherance of such a policy; (3) that all relevant acts be
undertaken on discriminatory grounds; and (4) that the perpetrator have knowledge of the wider context
of his actions. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 58, para. 626. That judgment determined that the need to
have actions "directed against a civilian population" requires a widespread course of conduct
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which also convicted that defendant of crimes against humanity, it is not
altogether clear how the requisites for that crime, all of which are likely to be
deemed applicable by the ICTR,3 °8 will apply, for example, to Rwandan
broadcasters of hate speech. Much depends on the quantity and type of
evidence ultimately demanded, as for proof of knowledge that a broadcaster's
statements were accompanied by the requisite discriminatory intent.
309
Quite apart from the amount of evidence required, the success or failure
of a prosecution against a Rwandan broadcaster of hate speech on a charge of
crimes against humanity will also be determined by how the ICTR applies the
ICTY's conclusion that there needs to be evidence that the defendant acted
with the requisite subjective discriminatory intent.310 This requirement has had
a long and checkered history. At one end stands the judgment of the Canadian
Supreme Court in the Finta case.31 While the Tadic case and the Canadian
Court construe the requisites of a crime against humanity in nearly identical
(suggesting a large number of victims) or systematic mass action (suggesting a pattern or methodical
plan) and not "isolated or random" acts. Id. para. 646. In addition, persons must be victimized "not
because of individual attributes but rather because of his membership [within] a targeted civilian
population." Id. para. 644. In deference to the Report of the Secretary-General that recommended that
the Security Council establish the ICTY, Tadic's judges affirmed that discriminatory intent is required
and must rest on "national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds." Id. para. 652 (citing Secretary-
General's Report, supra note 11). They also agreed that the acts must be part of a formally adopted or at
least consciously pursued policy directed against particular groups of people, whether or not pursued by
a state. See id. paras. 653-55. Further, the Tadic judges determined that the crime of persecution
requires a showing that:
the perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or constructive, that these acts were
occurring on a widespread or systematic basis and does not commit his act for purely
personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian population ....
Therefore the perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the civilian population,
know that his act fits in with the attack, and the act must not be taken for purely personal
reasons unrelated to the armed conflict.
Id. § VI.D.2(c). That ICTY trial chamber also discussed the requisite level of proof of the defendant's
mental state. It indicated that the requisite intent required for individual responsibility "can be inferred
from the circumstances" and need not require a "pre-arranged plan." Id. § VI.E.2(b)(i). Nonetheless, the
chamber also indicated that "mere presence at the scene of the crime without intent is not enough" to
show "direct contribution" to the crime. Id. § VI.E.2(b)(ii). Finally, the Tadic judges concluded that:
the accused will be found criminally liable for any conduct where it is determined that he
knowingly participated in the commission of an offence that violates international
humanitarian law and his participation directly and substantially affected the commission
of that offence through supporting the actual commission before, during, or after the
incident. He will also be responsible for all that naturally results from the commission of
the act in question.
Id. § VI.E.3.
308. The ICTY and ICTR share appellate chambers and, at least on these issues, identical
definitions of the crime of "persecution." See ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 3 (giving the tribunal
power to prosecute persons responsible for crimes "directed against any civilian population"); ICTY
Statute, supra note 53, art. 5 (same). This is intended to further the internationalists' goal of uniform
development of international humanitarian law. See infra note 326. Of course, international prosecutions
for any broadcasts that occurred before 1994 are not, as discussed, within the ICTR's jurisdiction.
309. See supra note 307.
310. See id.
311. Regina v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (upholding a jury acquittal on all counts of a former
Hungarian gendarme accused of confining, robbing, and deporting Jews to Auschwitz). The court
dismissed unanimously Finta's appeal challenging the constitutionality of legislation which had enabled
the Crown to proceed with its initial prosecution but split, four to three, concerning the Crown's appeal.
See id. at 705.
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ways,312 the Canadian majority opinion, by Justice Cory, concludes that the
requisite "mens rea" for crimes against humanity needs to be "subjective"
because
[T]he crime itself must be considered in context Such crimes are usually committed
during a time of war. Wars are concerned with death and destruction. Sweet reason is
often among the first victims. The manipulation of emotions, often by the dissemination
of false information and propaganda, is part and parcel of the terrible tapestry of war.
False information and slanted reporting is so predominant that it cannot be automatically
assumed that persons in units such as the Gendarmerie would really know that they were
part of a plot to exterminate an entire race of people.
31 3
That majority opinion cited a contemporaneous news report, an alarmist
account of the "acute" nature of the "Jewish threat," to indicate that the
(Hungarian) society of which Finta was a member was loyal to the Axis cause
and under great anxiety.314 It also noted that crimes against humanity cannot
be aimed at those -who killed in the heat of battle or in the defense of their
country. It is aimed at those who inflicted immense suffering with foresight
and calculated malevolence.315
While the majority opinion stated that it is "not necessary" to show that
the accused knew or believed that his actions were inhumane, it nonetheless
found that among the circumstances that gave an "air of reality" to the
defenses of mistake of fact and obedience to superior orders in this case was
the "general, publicly stated belief in newspapers in Hungary that the Jews
were subversive and disloyal to the war efforts of Hungary" as well as the
"universal public expression in the newspapers cited by one of the witnesses
of approval of the deportation of Hungarian Jews. 3 16
As Irwin Cotler and other critics of the controversial Finta decision have
argued, these portions of the Canadian Supreme Court's opinion threaten to
turn evidence of anti-Semitism or racism from an element of an international
crime into a defense.317 Pursued to its logical end, the result could be that "any
'lynch mob' atmosphere could arguably be pleaded as a defense.' 318
312. Like the Tadic judgment, Justice Cory's opinion states that the accused "must be aware of
or wilfully blind to the fact that he or she is inflicting untold misery on his victims." Finta [1994 1
S.C.R. at 816; see supra notes 304-310 and accompanying text.
313. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. at 816.
314. Id. at 816-17.
315. See id. at 817.
316. Id. at 847. Justice Cory states that this evidence "could have supported the defense of
mistaken belief that the orders to undertake the actions which gave rise to the charges against the
respondent were lawful." Id. at 848. However, Judge La Forest dissented on the grounds that the lower
courts had required an excessively high mens rea. See id. at 758-59 (La Forest, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 760 (warning against judging the accused's actions by "the moral values of the perpetrator of the
prohibited act, rather than the moral views of the international community that established the norm").
317. See, e.g., Irwin Cotler, International Decisions: Regina v. Finta, 90 Am. J. INT'L L. 460,
474 (1996). For other critiques of the four-to-three decision dismissing the Crown's appeal, and
especially of the opinion delivered by Justice Cory, see Blakesley, supra note 274, at 219; Sharon A.
Williams, Laudable Principles Lacking Application: The Prosecution of War Criminals in Canada, in
THE LAW OF WAR CRIMeS, supra note 274, at 151, 164-70. As might be expected, the court's majority
opinion also generated considerable heat in the press. See, e.g., Jules DeschEnes, Toward International
Criminal Justice, 5 CRIM. L.F. 249, 266 n.25 (1994).
318. Cotler, supra note 317, at 474. For these reasons, among others, Cotler warns of the need
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The Finta majority's approach to mens rea and applicable defenses finds
disturbing parallels in certain defenses that have been attempted (sometimes
successfully) to exculpate defendants accused in U.S. courts of lynching
African-Americans. Anthony V. Alfieri's account of the "lynching" defenses
of jury nullification, victim denigration, and diminished capacity is
instructive.3 19 The Canadian Supreme Court's approach, which essentially
licensed Finta's jury to acquit the defendant on the grounds of "mistake of
fact" or "superior orders," poses the troubling possibility that, as with jury
nullification in U.S. lynching cases, the jury is merely being invited to ignore
applicable law in deference to their own anti-Semitism or perhaps, in a case
like Finta's, out of a sense that, despite applicable Canadian and international
law clearly indicating that statute of limitations do not apply to such crimes,
such old crimes or wounds should not be reopened. Alternatively, the
Canadian Supreme Court's suggestion that racist propaganda gives an "air of
reality" to certain defenses might be seen as a sub-rosa form of the victim
denigration defense, where an acquittal emerges due to the invitation to
decision-makers to consider the racially subordinate status of the victim or
because they are invited to make invidious comparisons about the relative
worth of defendant and victim. Perhaps most clearly, the apparent license to
consider Finta's case one of "mistake of fact" seems but a thinly disguised
form of the diminished capacity defense-as where in some U.S. lynching
cases, a predominately white jury has been invited to see white lawbreakers as
helplessly caught up in emotion or as unwilling dues of a racially coercive
pathology that "negates" free will and responsibility.
Unlike the Canadian Supreme Court, the ICTY trial chamber in the
Tadic case did not fall into the trap of suggesting that the accused can be
exculpated on the basis of the discriminatory animus that motivated him. For
the Tadic bench, which operated in the absence of a jury, Serbian propaganda
directed at non-Serbs remained very much a part of the case against the
defendant. 321 Nonetheless, the trial judges in Tadic treated the exacerbation of
ethnic tensions in opstina Prijedor as a "mitigating factor" when it came time
to sentence the defendant.322 While Tadic's judges emphasized that they were
not condoning his actions, they indicated that "the virulent propaganda that
stoked the passions of the citizenry in opstina Prijedor was endemic and
contributed to the crimes committed in the conflict and, as such, has been
to guard against appeals to racism and the possibility that such trials may "internalize war crimes
revisionism at the expense of war crimes justice." Id. at 476.
319. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95
Mich. L. Rev. 1063 (1997) (claiming that only an understanding of the politics of identity will bring
racial subordination in law and ethics to the fore).
320. Cf id. at 1074-84 (discussing the diminished capacity defense).
321. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T (ICTY July 14, 1997) (sentencing judgment), para.
57 available at <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement-e/707145e2.htm> [hereinafter Tadic
Sentencing Judgment].
322. See id. paras. 67-72. Such a possibility was not entirely foreclosed by the Balkan
tribunal's statute or its rules. Although neither the Balkan nor Rwanda tribunal allows "superior orders"
as a defense, this can be a "mitigating factor" as when these orders are joined with circumstances
indicating a lack of moral choice. See, e.g., Blakesley, supra note 274, at 219-20; Secretary-General's
Report, supra note 11, para. 57.
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taken into account in the sentences imposed on Dusko Tadic. 323 On this issue
the Tadic judges appear to have used ethnic tensions as a justification for
giving Tadic a relatively lenient sentence 3 24 and did so on the basis of a
rationale that buttresses the international legal paradigm's premises that high-
level perpetrators are more culpable than a low-level culprit like Tadic.
325
In the end, it seems that the Tadic bench did not see greater culpability
in the fact that Tadic carried out with alacrity what the "Zeitgeist" demanded
of "loyal" Serbs. The Tadic sentencing decision, while an improvement over
the Finta court's respective conclusions, suggests that these ad hoe tribunals
could, particularly in cases involving defendants with less evident
governmental connections than proved to be the case with respect to Tadic or
Akayesu, fall more readily into the error committed by the judges in Finta. If
so, one defense to those who engaged in hate speech in Rwanda, as well as
many low-level perpetrators, might be that fears of Tutsis, as articulated in
RTLM broadcasts, were so pervasive or genuine that they gave an "air of
reality" to the Hutus' fears.
As these examples demonstrate, a number of factors could lead the
ICTR to narrow or conservative interpretations of the scope of criminal
liability. International prosecutions may flounder because of the absence of
proof concerning the knowledge that can be attributed to inciters of violence
or even because the perceived Tutsi "threat" was widely believed. While
alternative ways of characterizing "hate speech" as a cognizable international
crime would entail distinct prerequisites, it may well prove to be the case that
many instigators of violence will either be acquitted or will not even be
indicted simply because all that can be shown is that they advocated
racial/ethnic hostility or discrimination but it cannot be demonstrated to the
tribunal's satisfaction that they knowingly prompted others to commit specific
acts of violence or discrimination. Acquittals may result if international
judges, especially at the appellate level, cognizant of their forum's tenuous
legitimacy, err on the side of caution. Such acquittals, quite apart from
undermining support for the ICTR within Rwanda, could also prove
323. Tadic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 321, para. 72.
324. Tadic was sentenced to 20 years and is expected to serve 10. See Sentencing Judgment,
supra note 321, paras. 74-77.
325. See Akhavan, supra note 28, at 790 (praising this aspect of the sentencing decision
because it recognizes that "ordinary men are not wont to commit such heinous crimes absent the
direction and instigation of leaders").
326. Cf. supra note 316 and accompanying text (quoting the Finta case). At the very least, it
appears that this may be a mitigating factor for purposes of sentencing if the Tadic judgment is regarded
as the applicable precedent by the ICTR.
It is clear that the ICTR is likely to rely on the prior legal holdings of the ICTY (and vice versa).
See e.g., Virginia Morris, International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 66
(1998) (summarizing Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, No. ICTR-96-15-T, (ICTR, June 18, 1997) (decision on
jurisdiction)). Indeed, the establishment of a shared appellate chamber between the two tribunals, see
ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 12, was obviously intended to encourage consistency between the two
tribunals. See, e.g., John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions: Of Sovereignty,
Globalization, and Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 18 (1995-96) (describing Justice
Goldstone's explanation of consistency goals).
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detrimental to the progressive development of the underlying crimes of
genocide or crimes against humanity.
While neither the ICTY nor the ICTR has had enough cases to
demonstrate whether these fears are warranted, the two judgments issued to
date by these tribunals after full trial-the trial chambers' judgments in the
Tadic and Akayesu cases respectively-show that international judges do not
always opt for the expansive interpretations of existing international
humanitarian law that tribunal advocates seem to expect.327 Despite the urging
of international lawyers, tribunal judges may duck expansive holdings because
they operate in the shadow of Nuremberg and want to avoid accusations of
judicial legislation or the imposition of ex post facto criminal liability. 328 With
respect to Rwanda's incitement crimes, therefore, the prospects for
progressive development (along with successful convictions) may be greater
within local courts. 29 Nor is this likely to be an isolated example.330
Similarly, it is too early to say that the ad hoc tribunals present the best
prospects for the progressive development of gender-specific crimes. Despite
the Akayesu judgment's progressive approach to rape,331 problems may yet
arise with respect to charging perpetrators with gender-specific acts of
violence that are not, as such, enumerated in either the ICTR's or the ICTY's
respective statutes. 332 Expectations that international judges will more
327. Compare Tadic Judgment, supra note 58, paras. 588, 592-95, 929 (determining that Tadic
was not guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention because there was insufficient evidence of
international involvement in the conflict over the relevant period), with Theodor Meron, Classification
of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's Fallout, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 236 (criticizing
the "crazy quilt of norms" that could result if this aspect of the Tadic judgment is affirmed on appeal).
See also Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131, § 7.1 (finding the defendant not guilty of violations of
common Article II and Protocol II); Meron, supra note 34,passim (urging an expansive approach to the
definition of certain crimes within both ad hoc tribunals). In that instance, involving charges of
murder, cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity, the trial judges found, incredibly, that there
was insufficient evidence to connect the actions of the bourgmestre to those of the armed forces of his
country. This appears to undermine the well-established principle, which the trial chamber defends, see
Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131, § 6.4, that civilians can be guilty of war crimes.
328. See Cassese, supra note 39, at 230-32 (noting the "inherent ability of a U.N. body to
legislate").
329. But see infra notes 340-342 and accompanying text (noting possible adverse effects
caused by ICTR precedents).
330. International judges whose positions are due to the actions and the financial generosity of
powerful U.N. members are not likely, for example, to seize an opportunity to clarify the meaning of the
Genocide Convention's duty to "prevent" that crime. They are not likely to suggest, even in passing, that
prominent U.N. members' or the Security Council's own failures to prevent the Rwandan genocide
constitute a violation of the Genocide Convention or of customary international law. Nor are they likely
to suggest, even in dicta, that complicity in genocide includes passive acquiescence in genocidal actions
committed by others. Cf. GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 152-53 (noting the U.S. government's hesitation
in branding the Rwandan killings "genocide" for fear of promoting legal arguments about the scope of
duties to prevent and to punish); PRUNIER, supra note 10, at 274-75 (noting similar hesitations by major
U.N. patrons with respect to Rwanda for similar reasons).
331. See supra notes 274-277 and accompanying text. Note, however, that even in Akayesu,
the rape and sexual violence charges were not included in the prosecutor's original indictment but were
the result of an amended indictment completed only after witness J testified, in response to questioning
by a female judge on the ICTR, that she had heard that young girls were raped at the bureau communal.
See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131, para. 416. This raises some doubts about the sensitivity or the
thoroughness with which gender violence is investigated within the ICTR.
332. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 87, at 2073; Ray, supra note 65; see also HUMAN RIGHTS
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recognize the victimization of women than traditional Rwandan courts
burdened by decades of sexism and scarce resources remain premature.
333
Such optimism is as yet unwarranted, given international criminal law's oft-
noted slighting of gender, as well as the political pressures faced by
international prosecutors. 34 Although the Akayesu judgment presents reason
for optimism in this respect, the first judgment rendered by either tribunal, the
Tadic judgment, presents a less positive example. At the end of Tadic's trial,
female victims disappeared from the tribunal's historical account once rape
charges were dropped against the defendant.335 Thus, the first judicially
rendered account of Balkan ethnic cleansing became misleadingly gender-
neutral, despite the harrowing accounts of gender-specific violence provided
by organizations such as Human Rights Watch.336 The Tadic trial stands as a
warning that many of the ICTR's indictments and verdicts may also fail to
address what it meant to Tutsi victims to be targeted simply because they were
female and Tutsi, as opposed to being political opponents of the Hutu.
Despite the Akayesu judgment, it is possible that the most progressive
and innovative interpretations of gendered violence as an international crime
will occur not in the indictments or judgments issued by the ICTR or the
ICTY but in national courts, including in the United States.337 If the judges or
prosecutors in Rwanda prove to be accountable to the population of Rwanda,
there is reason to hope that in a country that is presently seventy percent
female (with perhaps fifty percent of households headed by women)33
8
political pressures may eventually force the Rwandan criminal process to be
more sensitive to gender issues than international judges who remain captive
to international law's gendered limitations.339 As this suggests, the view that
WATCH, supra note 64, at 94-96 (discussing the ICTR's difficulties with gender-based crimes).
333. See, e.g., HumAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64, at 19-24; cf Goldstone, supra note 32,
at 231 (praising the ICTY's treatment of gender-specific crimes).
334. For farther discussion of the difficulties faced by these tribunals with respect to dealing
with gendered violence, see Alvarez, supra note 87, at 2070-73 (discussing the treatment of gender-
specific crimes within the ICTY). For a contemporary example of the difficulties posed by international
politics in this regard, see Alessandra Stanley, Semantics Stalls Pact Labeling Rape a War Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 1998, at A3 (discussing the difficulties in securing agreement to include "forced
pregnancy" within the statute of the new international criminal court). Although that effort was
ultimately successful, see Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(g), it remains to be seen whether that new
court will be any more successful in handling gendered violence than the ICTY has been to date.
335. For a thorough critique of the Tadic case in this respect, see William M. Walker, Making
Rapists Pay: Lessonsfrom the Bosnian Civil War, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 449 (1997).
336. See, e.g., HumAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64. Nor is the Tadic trial the only example
emerging from the ICTY's early proceedings. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Landmark Bosnia Rape Trial.
A Legal Morass, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1998, at A3 (discussing the problems emerging in the course of
that tribunal's first attempt to try a defendant for rape as a war crime).
337. See supra notes 201-202,206 and accompanying text.
338. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64, at 2.
339. Indeed, the Rwandan provision that encompasses heinous murderers and sexual torturers
as "category one" perpetrators seems, at least formally, responsive to survivors' demands that such
individuals should face the maximum penalty because they would have done so under preexisting
ordinary criminal laws in Rwanda-whether or not their acts qualify as violations of "clearly
established" international humanitarian law. Revealingly, it was the Rwandan legislature which added
"sexual torture" to category one offenses within Rwanda's Organic Law. Conversation with Madeline
Morris (Apr. 30, 1998); Cf Stanley, supra note 334 (reporting that international consensus was proving
difficult within the ongoing negotiations for a permanent international criminal court on including
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international judges are more likely to develop progressively the rules of
international law to provide for greater criminal accountability for
international crimes fails to take into account the political context in which
those judges act. It also fails to consider the possible benefits of using national
courts as experimental, risk-taking laboratories for the interpretation of
international norms.
340
The impact of constricted interpretations of international crimes may not
be limited to the international level. There is a risk that current provisions of
the ICTR's statute will fetter some attempts by Rwandan courts to
progressively develop international norms. If, for example, an attempt to
prosecute Rwandan broadcasters for hate speech occurs first within the ICTR
where it flounders due to the judges' interpretation of existing international
crimes or their evidentiary requisites, that tribunal's rules would appear to
prohibit a subsequent trial by Rwanda's courts, even pursuant to national laws
that specifically purport to punish hate speech as within category one crimes
of genocide or crimes against humanity.34 1 Even where this does not occur
with respect to a particular individual, decisions by the ICTR (or even the
ICTY) that cast doubt on the viability of proceeding against those who engage
in hate speech, for example, could cast a pall over attempts to proceed against
such individuals within Rwanda's courts (and possibly even within other
jurisdictions). Particularly under a scheme in which international courts enjoy
jurisdictional primacy, the ICTR's legal and factual findings could
delegitimize any national convictions, and possibly civil verdicts, that are at
odds with the international judges' views of applicable law, even if such
municipal judgments are more expansive than international ones. For these
reasons, it is premature to suggest that ICTR judgments will invariably
produce a positive "synergy" with respect to the progressive development of
international humanitarian law by national courts.
342
For all these reasons, it is premature to justify primacy for international
tribunals on the basis of what they are likely to do to further the progressive
criminalization of violations of fundamental human rights. For the past fifty
years, with no international tribunals in place, the progressive development of
international criminal law, including interational humanitarian law, has
enforced pregnancy and other gender-specific crimes within that tribunal's jurisdiction).
To date actual indictments and investigations both within Rwanda and the ICTR have not been
particularly sensitive to the needs of victims of gender-specific violence. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 64, at 88-97. According to Human Rights Watch, apart from problems stemming
from lack of resources, problems at the ICTR include a lack of political will to investigate rape and
related crimes, a feeling that since the crimes in Rwanda do not mirror those in the Balkans (where there
were claims of forced impregnation) there is less of a need to investigate and prosecute them, mistaken
assumptions that Rwandan women will not come forward to talk, insensitive interviewing techniques,
and inadequate or nonexistent victim and witness protection guarantees. See id. at 94-97. Whether the
high number of females in post-genocide Rwanda and the growing numbers ofwomen's organizations,
see id. at 71, will force changes either at the local or international level remains to be seen.
340. Cf Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 440, 454-461 (1963) (White, J.,
dissenting) (castigating the majority for falling to seize the opportunity to interpret and apply
international law).
341. See supra note 99 (discussing Article 9 of the ICTR Statute).
342. Cf Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, supra note 22, at 464.
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occurred through piecemeal efforts in a variety of fora, including within
national courts. As occurs with respect to many areas of domestic law in
federal systems, it may be that the development of international humanitarian
law should preferably be left to development in many competing venues
without the imposition of hierarchy that favors international tribunals or the
norms developed therein. 3"
How progressive development of international humanitarian law occurs
is also important. As international lawyers acknowledge, the growth and
interpretation of international criminal norms must be reconciled with the fair
treatment of defendants, including the prohibition on ex post facto criminal
liability.345 The tension between the goals of progressive development and
adherence to the nullen crimen principle is exacerbated to the extent one relies
on the politically expedient device of creating ad hoe tribunals by mere
Security Council fiat. That tension is also heightened to the extent one relies
on judicial legislation in the course of pending trials to nudge the law in new
directions or to fill its gaps.346 These realities should prompt reconsideration
of whether it is preferable that progressive development occur through
international tribunals instead of domestic prosecutions.347 Ironically, it may
343. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 4,passim.
344. Moreover, to the extent one accepts the critique that the current definition of international
crimes privileges the views of powerful states, see Jochnick & Normand, supra note 91, this may
suggest additional rationales for preferring to leave the development of international humanitarian law to
diverse fora, including the national courts of less powerful states. The "constructive legal reform" of
international humanitarian law that authors Jochnick and Normand recommend probably will not
emerge from tribunals authorized by, and ultimately reliant on, the Security Council. Cf. Chris af
Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35
HARV. INT'L L.J. 387,414-16 (1994).
345. Such protections are no less important even in contexts such as these, involving
perpetrators charged with horrendous deeds. Indeed, such traditional protections are perhaps all the more
necessary precisely because of the risks to apolitical adjudication posed by the facts in these cases.
Consider, in this regard, the first conviction for crimes against humanity before the ICTY: the case of
Drazen Erdemovic, an ethnic Croat who had, in order to protect himself and his family against harm and
with great reluctance, participated in mass killings as a member of the Bosnian Serb Army and who,
with grave remorse, turned himself in to the ICTY authorities. Many have criticized Erdemovic's initial
conviction, sentence, and even the decision to indict. See, e.g., Yee, supra note 231. Erdemovic's case
bitterly divided the judges on the ICTY with respect to the defense of duress. See supra note 285; see
also Akhavan, supra note 27, at 791-93 (discussing the Erdemovic case).
346. The tension is recognized explicitly in Article 22 of the Rome Statute for the proposed
ICC. The Article instructs ICC judges that the "definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall
not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the
person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted." Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 22(2); see
Alvarez, supra note 87, at 2061-64 (identifying tensions with the nullum crimen sine lege principle in
the course of the Tadic case); Zacklin, supra note 287, at 47-48 (discussing role of international
tribunals in the progressive development ofinternational criminal law). For this reason, among others,
even the foremost advocates of international war crimes tribunals have urged that areas of international
criminal law that are particularly in need of clarification or development, such as crimes against
humanity, be made the subject of a specialized convention. See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 493-94.
Others have responded that tribunal innovations may reflect "genuine developments" elsewhere. See M.
Dietrich Schindler, Debats, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra
note 39, at 193, 198-99 (comments ofTheodor Meron). Whether particular tribunal holdings will result
in later genuine developments in state practice remains to be seen. Of course, from the perspective of a
defendant convicted on the basis of an innovative interpretation of the law by a tribunal, the prospect
that this innovation is later confirmed by genuine developments provides small comfort.
347. For a pungent general critique of the legitimacy of progressive development of the law by
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be desirable to leave the development of international crimes such as
persecution to understaffed, overburdened, and presumably less expert
Rwandan judges, precisely because such judges can more readily and more
legitimately fill in gaps in international criminal law through resort to
established domestic criminal law.348 While this risks a certain lack of
uniformity with respect to the application and the progressive development of
international humanitarian law, the potential for lack of uniformity already
exists and appears to be increasing due to the greater willingness of some
national courts to wrestle with these issues in either civil suits or criminal
trials. There may be a tradeoff between less uniform progressive development
and more effective progressive development. Over time, reliance on national
courts and domestic laws by international tribunals may produce more
legitimate, and therefore more genuinely long-lasting, progressive
developments in international criminal law.
Mark Osiel's reevaluation of existing approaches to the "following
orders" defense suggests additional reasons to be cautious about the top-down
approach to progressive development of international humanitarian norms
assumed by the international legal paradigm. 349 As Osiel argues, general
international law has given us relatively little precise guidance on the
availability and scope of the superior orders defense.350 While the ad hoc
tribunals disallow superior orders as a defense and permit its use only in
mitigation, it is difficult to say precisely how this rule will be applied,
particularly with respect to the soldier of lesser rank.351 For the most part,
national courts have turned to municipal law to fill these gaps and have
emerged with a variety of answers with respect to such issues as burdens of
proof:
the judges of the ICJ, see Michael Reisman, Metamorphoses: Judge Shigeru Oda and the International
Court of Justice, 1995 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 185. But see Case of C.R. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 58 (1995) (approving a U.K. court's judicial abandonment of marital immunity as a
permissible example of "gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial
interpretation from case to case").
348. For a plea that in instances where there is a gap in existing international humanitarian law
international judges should have recourse "as a last resort--to the national jurisdiction of the accused,
rather than to moral considerations or policy-oriented principles," see Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-
96-22-A, para. 49 (ICTY Oct. 7, 1997) (judgment) (Cassese, J. dissenting), available at
<www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/sopinion-e/71007jt3.htm>. For one attempt to turn to national rules
of criminal procedure and evidence to determine the proper scope of cross examination before the ICTY,
see Ilias Bantekas, Study on the Minimum Rules of Conduct in Cross Examination to be Applied by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 50 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 205 (1997). One difficulty with this approach, however, is that international judges may
get national law wrong. See, e.g., Remarks of Madeline Morris, supra note 192 (arguing that the ICTR
judges got Rwandan law wrong throughout the Akayesu case and noting the difficulties of finding
applicable Rwandan law). This may suggest one more reason for including judges from Rwanda within
the ICTR. See infra notes 424-433 and accompanying text.
349. See Mark Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86
CAL. L. REV. 939 (1998).
350. See id. at 950 & n.20. This is also suggested by the split decision in the Erdemovic case.
See supra note 285; see also supra note 322 (discussing Tadic's sentencing).
351. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 53, art. 6; Osiel, supra note 349, at 949.
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Some states, seeking to maximize compliance with official directives, offer the soldier a
complete excuse when he obeys unlawful orders, regardless of whether he can establish
that he mistakenly believed the order to be lawful or whether it contributed to a situation
of duress.... Other states will excuse the soldier only if his obedience resulted from an
honest belief that the order was lawful. Still others, such as the United States and
Germany, additionally insist that the soldier's error must have been reasonable (or
"unavoidable," in the civil law terminology).
352
Osiel suggests that one reason that some African states have favored the
first approach stems from the need to fashion loyalty to the state in contexts
where "most people owe competing, often stronger loyalties to tribe, clan, or
religious faith."3 3 In such contexts, where internal conflict threatens the
creation of strong unified armies vital for nation-building, there are
understandable reasons why some states find it difficult to completely
dispense with the superior orders defense.
354
Whether or not one agrees with Osiel's specific recommendations for
reform of the rule,355 his work is only one example of how the precise scope
of the rules of warfare arises from, and needs to respond to, particular social
contexts. Osiel's analysis of the background of the superior orders defense
makes it easy to understand why Rwandan authorities, operating in the context
of a highly polarized state, might resist attempts by international judges to
reduce the scope of this defense should the issue arise (as it undoubtedly will)
in the course of the work of the ICTR.35 6 While presumptive Rwandan
concerns about the unity and effectiveness of its army need not deter
international lawyers from seeking to eliminate the superior orders defense,
these issues should prompt reconsideration of how this can best be
accomplished. Even if international lawyers are right to insist that superior
orders ought never, in any context, to be a permissible defense and that this
rule should apply uniformly to all states, it seems naive to assume that such
uniformity can be imposed either on the world as a whole or on Rwanda alone
simply because a few international judges so determine in the course of a
particular criminal case. Issues of such significance, at the heart of national
sovereignty and capable of having a tremendous impact on the way a nation's
soldiers are organized before and during combat,357 are ill-suited to
progressive gap-filling by international judicial fiat. Such attempts are likely
to meet with resistance.
358
352. Osiel, supra note 349, at 950. As this suggests, the current international legal rule
regarding duress and superior orders (such as it is) has always relied on highly selective borrowing from
particular national legal traditions.
353. Id. at 983.
354. See id. at 982-83.
355. See id. at 1089-1121.
356. The splintered decisions of the ICTY judges in the Erdemovic case regarding the defense
of duress, see supra note 285, should also suggest skepticism about the ease with which international
judges will be able to credibly bridge the divides between judges from common law and civil law
jurisdictions regarding such issues. See Robinson, supra note 277, at 203-05. Decisions such as the one
in Erdemovic, at both the trial and appellate levels, also raise doubts about the extent to which
international judges can achieve what the international legal paradigm apparently demands, namely that
judges totally remove themselves from their own national legal traditions.
357. See Osiel, supra note 349, at 1028.
358. See generally Kenneth Anderson, First in the Field, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT
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International lawyers should be wary of confident assertions that
international tribunals charged with the interpretation of international crimes
better promote the international rule of law and ought to be given hierarchical
supremacy with respect to its interpretation. The concerns raised here with
respect to how progressive development can best be accomplished in a way
that has tangible and real world effects need to be balanced against the
powerful symbolic benefits of having international judges pass on these
issues.
IV. THE HAZARDS OF ETHNIC NEUTRALITY
International lawyers presume that international prosecutions will
generate closure among relevant audiences, especially among victims and
their families. 35 9 The international legal paradigm assumes that the
international criminal process, like the domestic criminal process for ordinary
crimes, permits Durkeheimian veneration over moral fundamentals-that is,
that trials help put the past to rest, defuse ethnic tensions, and avoid collective
guilt, while safely channeling communal anger and desires for retribution.360
Although international lawyers usually avoid speculation about the general
underlying causes for ethnic tensions or about the kind of governmental
structures that would be best to construct to contain these in the future, their
approach implies that what is needed is a criminal process untainted by the
ethnocentric tensions that gave rise to the offenses under scrutiny.
Like those whom Gary Peller has labeled "integrationists" within the
U.S. civil rights community, international legalists presume that the ethnic and
other forms of stereotyping pursued by groups such as the Serbs and the Hutus
are the product of irrational myths that will give way in the face of
knowledge. They hope that, as the culprits stand exposed for the villains that
they are, and their victims, given faces and names, are shown, in their
individuality, to be innocent, fully-contributing members of society and not
part of a depersonalized group threat, stereotyped violence will decline.361 The
international legalist approach is premised on faith in the eventual victory of
rational tolerance over the dark forces of irrational prejudice or
"primordialism. 362 Advocates of these international tribunals hope that the
mythologies of stereotype, whether tribal, ethnic, or religious, will eventually
(London), July 31, 1998, at 3 (criticizing an international culture of legality that relies on international
norms as a "deus ex machina"' instead of close attention to developing and influencing the "culture of
the professional honour of soldiers"). Anderson's arguments raise larger questions about whether the
international legal paradigm relies on the wrong epistemic community, or at least ignores other potential
allies in the struggle to affect military tactics on the ground.
359. See Alvarez, supra note 87, at 2033-42; Osiel, supra note 151, at 487-88.
360. See infra notes 508-511 and accompanying text. For general critiques of such views, see
Alvarez, supra note 87; Osiel, supra note 151.
361. Cf. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758. To this end, defenders of the
international legal paradigm argue that there is a clear choice to be made between an "instrumentalist"
and a "primordialist" view of ethnicity. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (discussing
Akhavan's views).
362. Compare supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (discussing Akhavan's views), with
Anderson, supra note 75,passim (critiquing these views).
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give way when confronted with irrefutable truths at trial by judges who share
none of these biases. They trust that once the extent of persecution stands
revealed in its full irrational ferocity, observers of good faith, without respect
to ethnic origin or religious affiliation, will be appalled, the convicted duly
shamed, and closure will result for all-as the educative engine of an
ethnically neutral international criminal process works its magic. 363 It is
assumed that exposing the crimes committed in the name of ethnic/religious
purity will delegitimize ethnocentric nationalism and win converts for the
demonstrably fair application of politically neutral rules of law in accordance
with fair process. When international lawyers say that international trials are
consistent with the goal of affirming both the international and the national
rule of law, what is meant is that observers of the international criminal
process within the regions where the crimes occurred will draw lessons from
the application of international law by these international bodies and that, as a
result, the ambit of the rule of law and equality of treatment will be emulated
and extended by national courts throughout Rwanda and the Balkans.
364
What "national reconciliation" means or requires under the international
legal paradigm is not altogether clear. It appears to mean governments that
zealously seek to transcend racial or ethnic consciousness in favor of legal
rules requiring equal protection regardless of status.3 65 To the extent that the
nature of national reconciliation is discussed at all, advocates of these
tribunals express hope for societies that are not merely characterized by the
absence of genocidal acts but are real, functioning pluralistic civil
societies-ideally, democracies on the model of a United States or Canada.
This is certainly the hope of those who see criminal prosecutions, at both the
international and national levels, as facilitating a smoother transition to
democratic nations that, over time, will be free of the ethnic, religious, racial,
or cultural divides that gave rise to massacre. 366 And even those who are less
sanguine hope that, whether or not truly democratic transitions occur or are
encouraged, the example set by these international criminal prosecutions will
at least encourage the adoption and effective implementation of national equal
protection legal guarantees on behalf of all individuals.367 It appears that
international lawyers aspire for future governments in regions devastated by
mass atrocities that are as committed to promoting ethnically neutral
363. Cf. W. Michael Reisman, Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Reflections on the Ideology
and Practice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary World Politics, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5,49
(1998) (criticizing the belief in war crimes tribunals as a "'nagic-bullet" technique for making peace).
364. Cf. LIJBAN, supra note 152, at 345 (noting comparable efforts to use the Nuremberg trial
to teach Germans what the "role of law is all about by exemplifying it in the trial itself").
365. This is most clearly implied by the international legal paradigm's insistence on the need to
avoid a "dangerous culture of collective guilt." See, e.g., Kritz, supra note 241, at 128; supra note 39
and accompanying text; see also Wippman, supra note 82, at 6 (discussing the impact of liberalism on
international law).
366. This is suggested, for example, by arguments for international criminal prosecutions based
on the need to facilitate transitions to democratic governance. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 231, arts. 2,20.
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government actions as are the international judges who try the region's war
crimes. 3
68
Whether or not one accepts an integrationist agenda within states like the
United States, 369 such a vision of the future, as applied to the former
Yugoslavia or to Rwanda, is subject to considerable doubt, and not merely
because of strenuous disagreements about the viability of the states that have
emerged from the Dayton Agreements or about the viability of "failed states"
such as Rwanda.370 In other contexts, Western lawyers' faith in the export of
ethnically neutral solutions has been dismissed as the product of cultural
hubris or worse. Thus, the law and development movement, involving private
foundations as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development
particularly in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, was severely critiqued
because it, too, evinced a naive faith in the transformative power of law and in
the power of universally applicable Western liberal legal institutions to
promote equal treatment for all citizens.371 Further, as Professor Amy Chua
has argued, at least in societies torn by ethnic conflicts along socioeconomic
lines, the internationalist goals of trade liberalization and democratization may
conflict.
37 2
Assuming that the international lawyers' integrationist goals are feasible,
however, how should we construct systems of criminal accountability that
advance such goals? In other ethnically charged contexts, Chua has argued
that building sustainable democracies may require the pursuit of ethnically
conscious government measures.373 Others contend that a government's
conciliatory actions, intended to defuse tensions and to build trust in the wake
of ethnic conflicts, require close attention to ethnic symbols to assuage each
group's perceptions of threat.374 As this literature suggests, we ought not
368. See CARLOS SANTIAGo NINo, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996) (discussing the role of such
trials in the transition towards democracy); supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text; see also Richard
Falk Meeting the Challenge of Genocide in Bosnia: Reconciling Moral Imperatives with Political
Constraints, in GENOCIDE, WAR, AND HUMAN SURVIVAL, supra note 28, at 125, 133 (arguing for the
need to counter exclusivist images of identity premised on ethnicity or religion).
369. Cf. Peller, supra note 361, at 763-83 (discussing "integrationism" within the United
States).
370. For doubts about the viability of the post-Dayton Balkan states, see generally SUSAN L.
WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY (1995). Foi the (in)famous piece identifying methods to save "failed
states," see Gerald B. Heliman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1992-
93, at 3. For a critique of the latter and its implications, see Ruth E. Gordan, Some Legal Problems with
Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.. 301 (1995).
371. See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1072,
1074. For further accounts of the law and development movement and its flaws, see JAMES GARDNER,
LEGAL IMPERIALISM (1980); Jos6 E. Alvarez, Promoting the "Rule of Law" in Latin America: Problems
and Prospects, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'LL. & ECON. 281 (1991); and David M. Trubek, Toward a Social
Theory of Law: An Essay of the Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1 (1972). Gardner
characterized these efforts at exporting U.S. law and institutions as a "rather awkward mixture of
goodwill, optimism, self-interest, arrogance, ethnocentricity, and simple lack of understanding."
Gardner, supra, at 4.
372. See Chua, supra note 67,passim.
373. See id. at 62-63.
374. See Tamara Cofinan Wittes, Resolving Ethnic Conflicts: The Role of Ethnic Symbols in
Provoking and Assuaging Ethnic Identity (Mar. 18, 1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with The Yale
blithely to assume that ethnically neutral judicial approaches and structures
are the only, or best, way to achieve neutral or impartial verdicts.
One pragmatic consequence of the international legal paradigm's fears
of "primordialism" is its insistence on a "denationalized" judiciary-namely a
judicial bench that (1) reflects the diversity of the world's legal systems and is
therefore representative of the international community but (2) does not
consist of individuals from the regions where atrocities occurred and is
therefore ethnically neutral.375 This insistence emerges not merely because of
unexamined premises about the best way to promote the perception of judicial
impartiality, but results from the crimes of state perspective and, more
particularly, because of the Chapter VII origins of the ad hoe tribunals.
Establishment of these tribunals is, to international lawyers, necessarily on a
continuum with other modes of U.N. enforcement action that also require
ethnic neutrality.376 Ethnic neutrality is regarded as all the more necessary if
one sees the Council's establishment of these tribunals as yet another method,
in addition to peacekeeping, by which the organization develops neutral
international humanitarian norms.377
But, as has been the case with respect to peacekeeping, maintaining the
appearance of ethnic neutrality with respect to these tribunals is difficult.
378
Internationalization is not synonymous with denationalization. Trials before
the ICTR and ICTY are international in the sense that they result from treaty-
based international processes and are conducted by judges from a variety of
U.N. member states, but there is no assurance that these processes or the
judges selected do not reflect national or other biases or will not be perceived
to reflect such prejudices.
Although the judges of the ad hoc tribunals do not have a direct stake in
the regions where atrocities were committed, they come from nations that
have direct and indirect interests. The ICTR judges are not lifelong civil
servants nor stateless individuals, but persons elected by the joint effort of the
Security Council and the General Assembly, who serve for limited terms and
whose selection turned, in part, on their nationalities.379 While the judges are
Journal of International Law). Wittes writes that "symbols are the arenas in which ethnic conflicts are
so often manifested because symbols are the heart of ethnic identity." Id. at 14. Her study indicates that
ethnic leaders use symbols as benchmarks in judging their group's security and relative success and give
events or goals with symbolic significance at least as much weight, and sometimes greater weight, than
events with purely strategic significance. Wittes argues that ethnic fears can, therefore, be assuaged by
symbolic actions. Id. at 36.
375. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 227, at 74 (identifying
the relative strengths of an independent international tribunal over national courts since the latter cannot
"dissociate themselves" from the underlying ethnic conflict).
376. Cf. Arsanjani, supra note 288, at 127 (discussing the neutrality of U.N. peacekeeping
operations).
377. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
378. Cf. Arsanjani, supra note 288, at 119-20 (discussing challenges to the perceived neutrality
ofU.N. peacekeeping operations).
379. See ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 12 (requiring geographical diversity, representation
of the "principal legal systems of the world," and requiring that no two judges be of the same
nationality); ICTY Statute, supra note 53, art. 13 (same).
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required to be "independent" under the tribunals' respective statutes, 380 they
are no more and no less independent than judges in any comparable
international body. They include individuals from states with national interests
in the respective regions, including judges from the United States, Russia,
Europe, and China.381 The U.N.'s efforts to strike a balance among the
national interests represented on the tribunals' bench, regardless of those
judges' vaunted independence, is itself an admission that denationalization has
not been realized.
In addition, both tribunals remain creatures of the Security Council, a
highly politicized entity whose continuing hold over both tribunals remains
unresolved and whose political sensitivities must remain of concern to the
judges themselves. 8 2 For these reasons, it is not clear that such tribunals will
produce verdicts that will be universally regarded as legitimate without
respect to ethnicity, religion, or race. This is particularly true to the extent that
these judges come from nations that are themselves complicit in the 1994
Rwandan genocide.
As the short history in Section III.A suggests, the West's complicity in
the 1994 killings in Rwanda is a discomforting fact. The scale and seriousness
of that complicity take various forms. At one level, certain European powers,
namely the colonizers of Rwanda who imported their racist notions of
"superior races" to Rwanda, need to accept their responsibility for creating the
"tribalism without tribes" 383 that helped make genocide possible and continues
to characterize Rwanda today. Much greater blame can be attributed to those,
like the French, who, in the 1990s and through the 1994 killings themselves,
continued to befriend and arm the Habyarimana government. 384 But the circle
of blame extends much wider and includes Kofi Annan, who ignored
warnings of the impeding genocide; all members of the U.N., and particularly
the Security Council, who, in the wake of the fiasco of Somalia, failed to send
the 5000 troops that, it is estimated, might have prevented the vast majority of
the killings; and the international community as a whole, which, in the wake
of the emergence of a new government in Rwanda after the genocide, ignored
that new government's pleas for assistance but came to the aid of the Hutu
380. ICTY Statute, supra note 53, art. 12; ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 11. The judges are
also required to be impartial. See ICTY Statute, supra note 53, art. 13; ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art.
12.
381. See, e.g., SCHARF, supra note 5, at 64 (discussing the credibility problems presented by
both the absence of a Muslim member of the bench and the fact that four of the eleven judges of the
ICTY at the time of the Tadic case came from predominantly Muslim countries). Similarly, the
circumstances surrounding the Rwandan genocide suggest that considerable skepticism is likely to arise,
at least among Rwandan audiences, with respect to the participation of French or Belgian judges. See
supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
382. For the foreseeable future, international prosecutions are tainted with the suspicion that
they are being used to favor someone's political agenda. Cf Ruth Wedgwood, The Pitfalls of Global
Justice, N.Y. TIMEs, June 10, 1998, at A29 (arguing that an independent prosecutor not subject to a
Security Council check could be used to check U.S. political power).
383. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
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killers in exile while failing to prevent their ongoing incursions into Rwanda
to continue the genocide.385
For all their attention to the attribution of individual blame for these
crimes, international lawyers have not been attentive to these wider circles of
guilt. In surreal fashion, international lawyers have argued that judges from
some of the very countries that are regarded as partly "to blame" for these
crimes will be readily accepted as neutral arbitrators simply because they do
not come from Rwanda. Blind to the colonial-era racism that helped to make
the Rwandan genocide possible, and equally blind to the continuing
insensitivities of the U.N. and its patrons since the genocide, international
lawyers pin their hopes for verdicts that will be accepted as impartial on a
U.N.-approved bench, simply because it does not contain a Hutu or a Tutsi.
This seems a slim reed on which to rely. To the extent that the U.N., as an
organization, was itself derelict in enforcing international humanitarian law,
that fact is surely detrimental to the credibility of the ICTR's judgments.386
As Gourevitch argues, we should not continue to deny "the particularity
of the peoples who are making history, and the possibility that they might
have politics. '38 7 Knowledge of what led to the Rwandan killings as well as
who is to blame in this wider sense strengthens the very premise that
individuals must be held responsible.388 In addition, sensitivity to colonial-era
racism and what has occurred in its wake prompts scrutiny of the policies now
being touted by the U.N.'s Security Council with respect to Rwanda.
European racism in the pre-independence period, French anglophobia, and the
United States's lack of political will were all contributing factors in possibly
800,000 deaths. This situation encourages skepticism about the international
solutions promoted by those same powers and with their prominent
participation-especially when these are imposed on the victims of the
atrocities. Those who were blind once to the important consequences of acting
on the basis of ethnic prejudices could be wrong a second time when they
insist that international trials should proceed as if the prejudices they helped to
instill can be ignored.389
385. See supra notes 118-123, 128-130 and accompanying text.
386. See supra text accompanying note 131. Quite apart from whether such criticisms are
merited, it is clear that the U.N. suffers from an image problem with respect to such issues, and not
merely within Rwanda. See, e.g., Arsanjani, supra note 288, at 119-20; James C. McKinley, Jr., Annan
Given Cold Shoulder by Officials in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1998, at A9; James C. McKinley, Jr.,
Ugly Reality in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1998, at A4.
387. GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 182.
388. Compare Turton, supra note 72, who argues that:
The failure (or unwillingness) of the leaders of the international community to appreciate
the extent to which Tutsi and Hutu ethnicities were a reaction to the experience of
colonialism made it easier for them to portray the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as an
eruption of ancient and irrational tribal antagonisms, rather than as the carefully planned,
deliberately executed-and therefore preventable-operation it was.
Id. at 7.
389. Glsard Prunier argues that the 'most likely" outcome of the ICTR's efforts will be:
poorly prepared and endless court sessions in Amsha, with former ministers of the
Habyarimana regime turning the trial into a political tribune, allegations of "double
genocide"; inconclusive evidence, long speeches on the inherently democratic nature of
"Hutu Power" since the Hutu make up 85% of the population; [and] Belgian NGO
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Knowledge of the West's complicity should make us skeptical of a
scheme that would deny to the Rwandan government what each Western state
has for centuries enjoyed-namely the right to try its own war criminals. How
would the United States government have responded if, on the eve of a
national trial for someone like William Calley, charged with Vietnam's My
Lai massacre, an international prosecutor had tried to make the same pleas for
the primacy of international jurisdiction that Goldstone made to the Rwandan
government in the case of Bagasora?390 Undoubtedly, the United States would
not have been as compliant as the Rwandan officials were.39' Many states
have traditionally reserved the right to deny an extradition request for their
own nationals and international law has long presumed that states retain an
interest in the fate of even those nationals they agree to extradite. 39 2 If we
assume that the United States would have rejected an extradition request for
someone like Calley, this surely would have had something to do with both
the nationality of Calley and the fact that his prosecution reverberates with
prominent domestic constituencies and has significant national import (as
would a national trial of Bagasora). There is more than a hint of racist
condescension when the Security Council, dominated by Western powers,
ignores the wishes of the present government of Rwanda with respect to the
creation and subsequent operation of the ICTR or when it insists that ICTR
trials take priority over that government's desire to try its own major
perpetrators.393 The history of prominent powers' involvement in Rwanda also
Rwanda "experts," with warm support from the French, testifying to the fundamental
good sense of this line of argument.
PRUNIER, supra note 10, at 344. Although Prunier's fears may prove overstated, interesting challenges
would indeed be presented for the ICTR should defendants attempt to turn their trials, especially any
ultimately appealed to an appellate chamber presided over by a French judge, into a trial of competing
versions of history. Cf. Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of
Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J 1321 (1989) (discussing how Barbie's defense team attempted to put recent
French history on trial).
390. See supra notes 185-189 and accompanying text.
391. Indeed, the recent action of a U.S. magistrate in Texas refusing to transfer Elizaphan
Ntakirutimana, a Rwandan Hutu living in Texas accused of organizing the slaughter of 5,000 to 10,000
ethnic Tutsis in Mugonero, Rwanda, to the ICTR is suggestive of the types of feelings such requests
inspire even with respect to foreigners present in the United States. In that instance, the magistrate
expressed doubts about whether the ICTR would protect the defendant's constitutionally protected
liberties in the course of ruling that the federal law requiring U.S. courts to surrender suspects to the
ICTR was unconstitutional. See In re Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, 988 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D.
Tex. 1997); see also Brown, supra note 96, at 411-12.
The likely attitude of the U.S. government towards such requests should it involve a U.S. citizen
is also suggested by the U.S. government's position in recent negotiations for a permanent international
criminal court. See Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Dissents, but AccordIs Reached on War-Crime Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 1998 at A3; see also Wedgwood, supra note 382 (supporting the U.S. government's
opposition to an unfettered prosecutor capable of demanding custody of a U.S. individual without prior
U.S. government consent).
392. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 477 (1987).
393. While some might argue that there is no racism involved since the Council did the same
with respect to the states of the former Yugoslavia in the heart of Europe, there are three counters to this.
First, the fact remains that the Council has seen fit to impose international primacy only with respect to
two situations out of many potential recent candidates for war crimes prosecutions around the world.
That one of the two situations in which it did so is a small, powerless nation in the heart of Africa should
raise some doubts in this regard. A second argument would involve distinguishing the case of Rwanda
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raises disturbing questions about the motivations of prominent powers within
the Security Council today. Continued French support for the ICTR may
partly hinge on its belief that keeping Rwandan prosecutions "in check" is
consistent with French interests. On the other hand, are allegations that the
U.N. has, from the start, dealt with the ICTR as if it were the "poor cousin" of
the "more important" ICTY true, and if so, is this due to lingeriig racism
within the Security Council? 394 To what extent will French views that what
has occurred (and is occurring) in Rwanda constitutes a "double genocide" for
which all sides are equally guilty prevail within the ICTR's proceedings?
395
Given such concerns, international lawyers cannot presume that the
international processes that they have established will be readily perceived as
impartial merely because they are international.
Attention to the ethnic divisions that underlie the 1994 genocide and the
continuing violence in that country should make us skeptical as well about
how the ICTR handles evidentiary issues. The difficulties in this regard have
been raised most clearly in the ICTY's Tadic case. As is likely to be true with
respect to prosecutions within the ICTR, the vast bulk of the evidence in the
Tadic case came not in the form of physical evidence, such as
contemporaneous written records of atrocities (as at Nuremberg), but rather
through the oral testimony of self-interested, live witnesses who replicated
inside the courtroom the ethnic divides of the society at large. In the Tadic
case, there were only Serbian witnesses for the defense, while the prosecution
relied entirely on non-Serbs (mostly Muslim victims). 396 For Tadic's judges,
the situation posed considerable difficulties. How does a tribunal generate
confidence in its neutral conclusions when the primary source for these must
be conflicting testimony that is subject to the challenge that Muslim witnesses
will say anything against those who they believe are at war with them and that
Serbian witnesses will do the same against non-Serbs? How does a tribunal's
from the former Yugoslavia. In the case of Rwanda, the complete turnover of government after the
genocide of 1994 made national prosecutions against the perpetrators of that genocide a real prospect.
The government of Rwanda was, to this extent, in a position that remains more comparable to that of the
victors of World War II. Finally, racist condescension is suggested by the altogether different provisions
regarding the concurrent jurisdiction of national courts now being contemplated for the permanent
international criminal court. See infra note 550 and accompanying text. As the statute for that court
shows, some of the strongest proponents of primacy in the case of Rwanda are reluctant to apply the
concept to themselves. See id.
394. See, e.g., Van Lierop, supra note 150, at 901-02 (suggesting, among other things, that if
the international community is serious about international trials for Rwanda, it is time that it permit the
ICTR to have a full time prosecutor and not merely one who is shared with the ICTY).
395. Cf. supra note 389 (discussing Prunier's fears about the tribunal process). These fears
extend beyond France's involvement with the ICTR. Skepticism about the good faith or the wisdom of
many of those governments that have led the charge for ad hoc tribunals is also prompted by knowledge
of many of those governments' prior records with respect to criminal accountability for mass atrocities.
Cf. Irwin Cotier, National Prosecutions, International Lessons: Bringing Nazi War Criminals in Canada
to Justice, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 31, at 161, 171-72 (identifying many examples of willful
failure to prosecute war criminals, including by Canada and Great Britain).
396. At Nuremberg, the prosecution submitted some seven million pages of meticulously kept
Nazi documents. See SCHARF, supra note 5, at 117; see also Louis B. Sohn, From Nazi Germany and
Japan to Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Similarities and Differences, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 209, 213-15
(1997) (contrasting the available evidence at Nuremberg with that available to the ICTR and ICTY).
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treatment of the inevitable conflict between the biases of Serb and non-Serb
witnesses avoid replicating among trial observers in the region the prevalent
ethnic and religious tensions that gave rise to the Balkan conflict in the first
place?
397
Tadic's judges reacted to these challenges in the time-honored fashion of
judges in liberal states-they pretended such strains did not exist. Thus, the
Tadic bench gave short shrift to defense arguments that it consider the
relevance of witnesses' ethnic or religious affiliations and the judges deftly
avoided nearly all reference to such affiliations when stating reasons for
determining the credibility of witnesses. The Tadic judges' curt response to
the politically explosive defense claim that all the Muslim witnesses were
inherently biased because they would say anything against their perceived
oppressors, is revealing:
The reliability of witnesses, including any motive they may have to give false testimony,
is an estimation that must be made in the case of each individual witness. It is neither
appropriate, nor correct, to conclude that a witness is deemed to be inherently unreliable
solely because he was the victim of a crime committed by a person of the same [sic]
creed, ethnic group, armed force or any other characteristic of the accused. That is not to
say that ethnic hatred, even without the exacerbating influences of violent conflict
between ethnic groups, can never be a ground for doubting the reliability of any
particular witness. Such a conclusion can only be made, however, in the light of the
circumstances of each individual witness, his individual testimony, and such concerns as
the Defence may substantiate either in cross-examination or through its own evidence-in
chief.
398
Similarly, that chamber generally avoided casting aspersions on the
veracity of defense witnesses due to their pro-Serb sympathies. Occasionally,
however, the judgment indicates, without comment, certain background facts
with respect to such witnesses, presumably letting these speak for
themselves. 399 The Tadic chamber papered over these difficult issues
presumably to elicit confidence in the ICTY's neutrality.
397. For a detailed account of some of the difficulties such oral testimony produced, see
SCHARF, supra note 5, at 111-205, 212.
398. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 58, para. 541. The judges also summarily dismissed the
defense's attempt to besmirch the testimony of all of the prosecution witnesses on the ground of the
notorious testimony of witness L whose testimony at trial had been discredited (forcing the prosecutor to
disclaim reliance on it). The defense argued that the incident was "but one instance of a quite general
failure by the Prosecution to test adequately the truthfulness of the evidence to be presented against the
accused, instead simply accepting as true the evidence given against a single Serb accused by a whole
array of Muslim witnesses." Id. para. 553. The judges countered that the particular witness was the only
one who had been proffered by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that there was no evidence
of a lack of prosecutorial diligence in that or other instances. See id. para. 554; see SCHARF, supra note
5, at 199-200.
399. For instance, the judgment implicitly disparaged the credibility of the defense's alibi
witnesses U and W by indicating, among other things, that witness U "lives in a house belonging to a
Muslim which was assigned to him by a commission on which the accused used to sit" while witness W
had in the past threatened Muslims with violence and had uttered anti-Muslim epithets. Tadic Judgment,
supra note 58, para. 333. Even in this instance, however, the judges may not be intending to suggest that
the testimony of U and W is made less credible merely because of their general pro-Serb sympathies.
The implication of the background facts to which the judges refer seem to be that U is an "interested"
witness and that W may be less credible because of his demonstrable personal bias.
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Did the Tadic judges' efforts to generate confidence in their verdict
succeed among significant segments of local communities within the former
Yugoslavia? While it is difficult to judge success in this regard and impossible
to predict how perceptions of success are likely to change over time, there is
reason for skepticism. The immediate reaction to the Tadic judgment
remained strongly divided along ethnic lines within the former Yugoslavia.400
Local governments in the Balkans remain highly suspicious, incredulous,
skeptical, or, in some cases, even hostile towards international trials.
40 1
Despite international lawyers' assumptions, the legitimacy of the
international criminal process and its verdicts remains very much a contested
issue in both Rwanda and the Balkans. While there are many reasons for this,
not a few of them stem from the ethnic nature of the offenses committed in
both regions. Even if virulent inter-ethnic hostilities are a relatively recent and
"constructed" phenomenon in both regions, no one disputes that these
tensions, in the wake of mass atrocities, are now palpable and genuine. By
now, years of propaganda and violence have reinforced ethnic self-
identification on all sides.402
Whatever its merits are within liberal states, the appeal to ethnic
neutrality has a limited audience within places as ethnically polarized as
present day Rwanda. Ordinary trials, even Nuremberg's, are not conducted in
the midst of ongoing hostilities between the parties where witnesses, both
before and after giving their testimony, return to separate enclaves to continue
their verbal (and sometimes physical) combat.40 3 In such contexts a Hutu or
Tutsi witness, only temporarily in Arusha for trial, faces enormous pressures
to give testimony favorable to his/her ethnic community. Although, as
indicated, the Tadic chamber attempted to avoid any accusations that any
witness, Serb or non-Serb, was lying,404 in most cases it found credible the
testimony of Muslim victims in the face of an incomplete alibi testimony by
(Serbian) defense witnesses, including Tadic's wife. Regardless of what those
judges chose to acknowledge, it seems that they decided that certain defense
testimony, as by those who adamantly testified that Tadic could not have been
physically present in prison camps, was not credible because it was self-
serving.4°5 In most cases, they refused to accept comparable defense claims
that Muslim victims were biased in the same way.
400. The official Serbian reaction has been that the Tadic proceedings and verdict constitute
further evidence that the ICTY is a "fraud" perpetrated by hostile "foreign" interests pursuing political
"show trials" to undermine the Serbian nationalist cause. See Alvarez, supra note 87, at 2053 & n.78.
401. See id.
402. See, e.g., Damir Mirkovi6, Ethnic Conflict and Genocide: Reflections on Ethnic Cleansing
in the Former Yugoslavia, 548 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 191, 198 (1996).
403. See generally Michael J. Keegan, The Preparation of Cases for the ICTY, 7 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 120 (1997) (noting the difficulties such circumstances present for trial
participants).
404. See supra notes at 397-398 and accompanying text.
405. The testimony of at least some of those witnesses was on some issues so unequivocal that
it appears that the tribunal found them not credible sub silentio. Thus, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that the judges simply chose not to believe one defense witness who testified that the Serbian-run
"checkpoints" in which Tadic served were established not to confirm ethnic identify but merely to check
for stolen cars. See ScHARF, supra note 5, at 184; cf. supra notes 397-398 and accompanying text
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Such credibility determinations, based on subjective factors such as
demeanor while testifring, routine to trials in liberal states, assume
problematic proportions in the Tadic trial because surrounding circumstances
have made many, including some in the West, suspicious of the inherent anti-
Serb bias of that tribunal. There is little reservoir of good will upon which
the ICTY can draw. Given the high state of mutual suspicions in the Balkans,
that tribunal ideally needed to generate societal consensus in its findings of
fact, "smoking gun" physical evidence and not merely its own subjective
determinations of testimonial credibility. In the absence of abundant physical
evidence, it becomes easier for critics of the ICTY to suggest that "not one
shred of evidence" connected Tadic to these crimes, that the evidence against
him was "fraudulent," or that the judges' credibility determinations merely
demonstrated "anti-Serb bias." Coming from Serbian sources, such arguments
are tantamount to saying what the defense implied at trial-that only the
evidence of a large number of Muslims should be treated, consistent with the
presumption of innocence, as equal to the testimony of one Serb defense
witness. 40 7 Countering these arguments, within a paradigm that seeks to avoid
dwelling on ethnic issues, is not easy.
These problems apply with equal vigor to both Rwandan local
prosecutions as well as to ICTR trials, given ongoing Hutu/Tutsi suspicions
and killings. The liberal appeal to ethnically neutral handling of oral evidence
may simply not work well unless it is being used in a (liberal) state already
enjoying ethnic peace instead of one just emerging from (or worse still, still in
the grips of) ethnic violence. While the goal of reaching an impartial verdict is
worth pursuing, it may be that in such contexts this goal has to be achieved in
a different fashion.
A second problem with invoking ethnic neutrality with respect to
evidentiary issues is that the attempt is subject to misunderstandings or may
not appear evenhanded. Compare how Tadic's judges dealt with witnesses to
how they dealt with the defendant himself. While those judges argued that
each witness must be judged individually and not by his or her affiliations,40 8
when it came to proving the substantive case against the defendant, the judges
found Tadic guilty in substantial part because of his political, religious, and
ethnic affiliations. The defendant's institutional and personal affiliations were
a vital link in helping to prove, to the tribunal's satisfaction, that he was a
loyal Serb pursuing the agenda of a "Greater Serbia," and this, in turn, was a
vital link in proving, to the judges' satisfaction, the basic elements of the
substantive crimes charged.4 °9
(describing the judges' approach in the Tadic case).
406. See, e.g., RuBIN, supra note 90, at 41; Dugan Cotid, Introduction, 5 CiM. L.F. 223 (1994)
(introducing issue entitled A Critical Study of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia);
Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 91, at 736-42; Cedric Thomberry, Saving the War Crimes
Tribunal, FORIGN POL'Y, Fall 1996, at 72.
407. See supra notes 397-398 and accompanying text.
408. See supra note 397 and accompanying text.
409. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 58, paras. 180-92 (describing Tadic's background).
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The unstated reasons for the disjuncture between the treatment of
witnesses and the treatment of Tadic are, to a lawyer, obvious: the judges
determined that absent specific grounds for believing that a particular witness
is lying because of his or her affiliations or group status, these matters are not
of themselves relevant to credibility determinations, but they found group
affiliations to be relevant with respect to the defendant under the substantive
requirements of the crimes charged.410 Yet even assuming that the chamber's
analysis of the substantive law was impeccable and the judges were legally
correct in giving weight to Tadic's associative status, outside observers,
particularly those without legal training, are more likely to focus on the fact
that the defendant, who is entitled to the presumption of innocence, was
convicted in part because he was shown to be a sympathizer of Greater Serbia
while comparable evidence as to the political sympathies or biases of
(Muslim) witnesses were curtly dismissed even though those witnesses had
considerably less at stake. The chamber's references to Tadic's political and
ethnic affiliations are all the more likely to prove controversial given lingering
sensitivities that Nuremberg's judges overreached when they convicted some
individuals for mere membership in criminal organizations.411  Such
evidentiary decisions are also troublesome given the emphasis, under
international legalists' insistence on ethnic neutrality, in judging an individual
and not the community of which he/she is a part.412 Particularly for non-
lawyers, it may appear strange, and perhaps unjust, that Tadic was convicted
at least partly because he was affiliated with pro-Serbian organizations while
the similarly ethnically based affiliations of the witnesses against him were
considered irrelevant.
Similar dilemmas will bedevil judges on the ICTR. It seems likely, for
example, that to the extent a broadcaster for RTLM is found guilty of
incitement to genocide, such a conviction will necessarily be based on the
broadcaster's political affiliations and ethnic sympathies.413 These same
affiliations and sympathies, however, cannot, as such, be used to discredit the
testimony of any witness-not if the tribunal is trying to be ethnically neutral
in its handling of ethnically loaded evidence.
410. See id. paras. 180-192, 693 (stating the legal findings as to count one).
411. For discussions of the problematic aspects of Nuremberg's concepts of group criminality,
see, for example LUBAN, supra note 152, at 368-72. For related criticisms of Nuremberg's charges of
conspiracy or "common plan," see Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperative: Applying the Lessons of
Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 57, 72-73 (1995).
412. Given these sensitivities, the chamber could have done more to justify its treatment of
Tadic's affiliations, particularly since it refused to consider the associative status of witnesses against
him. It might have argued, for example, that defense arguments with respect to witnesses were premised
purely on their ethnic or religious status and not, as with Tadfc, on evidence of illegal associative
activity. Even these arguments, however, may prove troublesome from the standpoint of the tribunal's
refusal to provide for organizational criminality in its statute and in light of internationally and
nationally recognized concepts of freedom of association and free speech. See supra note 297 and
accompanying text; see also Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community
in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (1996) (discussing the emerging norm of individual "self-
determination").
413. See supra note 307 and accompanying text (discussing requisites of "persecution").
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The Tadic bench pursued its own vision of neutral justice based on its
view of the requirements of the law and its own sense of the kinds of
rationales that would enhance its credibility. Presumably, Tadic's judges
believed that public acceptance of their verdict would not be enhanced if they
openly wrestled with the contentious and politically explosive credibility
issues suggested in the course of that trial by the prosecution and the defense.
The Tadic judgment deftly avoids any allusion to the ethnic sympathies of any
witnesses despite the salient importance of these background facts. The judges
may have feared that any such discussions would only play into the hands of
those who continue to argue that the ICTY was established by and is doing the
bidding of the "enemies of Serbia." Regardless of whether or not those judges
followed the right path, it seems clear that the ICTY's tenuous hold on
legitimacy played a role in how Tadic's judges chose to portray ethnic issues
in their judgment-a point that would scarcely surprise critical race scholars
in the United States but one that casts doubt on the assumptions of many
international lawyers that international trials only reflect truth but do not
construct it.
4 14
As Gary Peller has argued, there are more general reasons for doubts
about the viability of an approach that seeks to produce integrative results
premised on ethnic neutrality.415 Peller's scholarship is itself an exemplar of
postmodern challenges to law's ability to fashion objective solutions based on
neutral principles or to tell anything other than politically predetermined
stories.4f6 Whether or not one agrees with such critical perspectives, their
prevalence poses grave challenges to the notion that judges can credibly rely
on ethnically neutral principles for legitimacy. Even within the United States,
courts now operate amid pervasive doubts about whether all are really equal
before the law. The prospect that the international community, with all of its
divisions, can render neutral justice in instances involving thousands of
defendants inflamed by religious or ethnic hatred exacerbated by nationalist
414. But see Akhavan, supra note 27, at 774-77 (acknowledging that ICTY prosecutors and
judges construct an "optimal" truth). Legitimacy concerns are also likely to play an important role with
respect to which cases are brought before the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals. Both. 1ribunals are
undoubtedly sensitive to the charges that each was established to pursue particular types of
cases-against Serbs with respect to the ICTY, and against Hutu in the case of the ICTR---and each will
probably attempt to bring other types of cases in order to show its evenhandedness. See id. at 781-82
(discussing the impact of the demand for ethnic parity for prosecutorial discretion). This probably
explains why the ICTY is now, in its second set of trials, going after Croat and Muslim defendants.
Indeed, there is a hope (and an attendant risk) that both tribunals' respective desires to purchase
legitimacy among all sides may eventually lead to "evenhanded" trials among the respective ethnic or
religious groups. The ICTY may attempt to strike a balance among trials of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats,
even if, as appears likely, the bulk of the most serious offenses (especially genocide) were committed by
Serbs. For its part, the ICTR may attempt, even within its constricted one year mandate, to pursue at
least some trials against Tutsi, even though the majority of the most serious offenses (especially
genocide) appear to have been committed by the Hutu (especially through 1994). To the extent that
these tribunals pursue this course of action, their legitimacy might be purchased at the expense of an
accurate portrayal of either Balkan "ethnic cleansing" or the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
415. See Peller, supra note 361, at 791-811 (using black nationalism as a starting point for a
critique of universalism).
416. See id. See generally Heidi Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MicH. L. Rv.
1187 (1994) (addressing the postmodem critique of legal objectivity).
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aspirations seems dramatically more quixotic than the possibility that a white
jury in Orange County, California could have rendered colorblind justice in
the case charging white police officers with the beating of Rodney King. The
international legalist model, as applied to Rwanda and the Balkans, asks us to
believe that under infinitely more divisive circumstances, where mass
atrocities have resulted from ethnic/religious conflicts, a case like the King
case can and should have been expected to generate societal consensus and
not ethnic conflict. In the Balkans and Rwanda there are enormous hurdles for
anyone who evinces faith in the irrelevancy of ethnicity to the veracity of
defendants or witnesses or the neutrality of judges and law. In the midst of
such skepticism (if not cynicism) about the prospects for judicial neutrality,
judges, both international and national, may need to be more candid about the
ethnic and other tensions in their courtrooms than were the judges in the Tadic
case if they wish to generate confidence in their efforts at truth-telling.
The international legal paradigm's insistence on ethnic neutrality also
threatens internationalist aspirations with respect to the preservation of
collective memory. As noted, under the paradigm, judicialized truth-telling
should downplay the significance of ethnicity, for fear of playing into the
hands of the "primordialists." A judicial bench of outsiders, applying an
ethnically neutral approach to the evidence, will, it is hoped, produce a
"higher" truth that "transcends" ethnic divisions.417 The ICTY's judgment in
the Tadic case is again instructive. Despite the attention lavished on
describing the society-wide discriminations of which Tadic's actions were a
part, that judgment, as might be expected, does not attempt to distinguish what
it means to target individuals for violence on the basis of religious preference,
ethnic origin, or gender-as opposed to politics. Since international crimes
against humanity require only a demonstration that the underlying acts were
improperly motivated by politics, race, ethnicity, or religion, no one at
Tadic's trial attempted to parse these components. All of Tadic's convictions
for persecution were based on the proposition that discrimination on the
grounds of political beliefs is indistinguishable from discrimination on the
grounds of race, ethnicity, or religion.
Throughout, Tadic's judges dealt with all of the evidence that the
defendant had discriminatory intent in indistinguishable fashion-as if the
defendant's reputed desire to name his child after Slobodan Milosevic or his
statements on behalf of a Greater Serbia were equally worthy of note as was
the defendant's (and others') use of ethnic slurs. While this is, as noted,
understandable given the applicable law's failure to distinguish discrimination
based on politics from discrimination based on ethnicity, the result is not
likely to be satisfactory to those who are sensitive to the very real differences,
to both culprit and victim, of violence and other acts that are motivated by
417. See Akhavan, supra note 27, at 771. As the ICTY's sentencing judgment in Erdemovic put
it, only such a truth "cleanses the ethnic and religious hatreds and begins the healing process."
Erdemovic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 285, para. 21.
418. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 58, para. 652; cf. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art.
II (requiring proof of intent directed at the elimination of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as
such).
1999]
450 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24: 365
differences in political beliefs as opposed to status-based characteristics such
as ethnicity. For these reasons, judgments that strive for ethnic neutrality in
this respect are less likely to prove satisfactory to victims who want official
acknowledgment of their ethnically based victimization.
Verdicts that are cleansed of ethnic concerns will fail to satisfy those
looking for judicialized collective memory that is sensitive to such.
differences.419 Indeed, critical race scholars would undoubtedly wince at the
unintended moral equivalence suggested by Tadic's judges between these two
very different types of discrimination but for the context: the tribunal's
treatment of the defendant's mixed political/ethnic motives is palatable
because the judges undoubtedly assumed that most will understand that the
defendant's political affiliations and beliefs were objectionable precisely
because they were based on a desire to do harm to certain groups based on
their immutable characteristics. 42 Still, it would have helped if the chamber
hearing Tadic's case had said as much-that is, if Tadic's judges had not
simply presumed that persecution on the grounds of immutable characteristics
is particularly egregious but had indicated why this was so.
421
Like the victims of Rwanda's genocide, Tadic's victims are entitled to
recognition that they suffered because of no fault of their own, simply because
of who they were, and not merely because they were opponents of a political
cause. While it is possible that in the future international judges will become
more sensitive to the need to deal with the nature of defendants'
discriminatory animus, the precedent of the Nuremberg trials compared to, for
example, Israel's prosecution of Eichmann, suggests that national courts,
whatever their other flaws, because they are more closely attuned to local
constituencies' needs for a clear recognition of the nature of their victimhood,
sometimes do a better job of accommodating this concern.422 The judgment in
Tadic suggests that there is a risk that international prosecutions will fail to
give judicial legitimation to these aspects of the Balkan and Rwandan
conflicts and that these proceedings will obscure these aspects as much as the
homophobic and anti-Semitic nature of the Holocaust was obscured by the
Nuremberg trials-to the detriment of the goals of collective memory and
victim mollification.
The flaws in ethnic neutrality enumerated here do not stem from the
jurisdictional primacy of the ICTR, although that is part of the problem.
Assuming that both Rwandan proceedings and international processes proceed
419. Cf. supra notes 152-156 and accompanying text (noting Nuremberg's flaws with respect
to portraying the real horrors of the Holocaust).
420. As the Tadic chamber's decision indicates at great length, to be an advocate of "Greater
Serbia" in the time period addressed by the Tadic case was tantamount to being an advocate of ethnic
and gender-specific cleansing. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 58, paras. 85-126, 182-192. To accuse
Tadic of being a Milosevic sympathizer is not the equivalent of accusing someone in the United States
of being a Republican.
421. Indeed, the difference seems vital to those who, like Destexhe, believe the killings in
Rwanda in 1994 constitute one of the three real genocides of the 20th century. See DESTEXHE, supra
note 10, at 21-35.
422. See generally Osiel, supra note 151, at 15-17 (discussing the prosecutorial goals in the
Eichmann case).
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apace, it may be that we need to take seriously the lessons of the law and
development movement, as well as the counsel of Chua and Wittes,423 and that
we should consider applying an ethnically sensitive, instead of an ethnically
neutral, approach to accountability in order to reach verdicts that are more
likely to be regarded as "fair" to all sides. One way that this could be achieved
would be through joint ICTR/Rwandan investigations or trials, combined with
an approach that would give the ICTR subsidiary jurisdiction.424
A more controversial alternative would involve restructuring the ICTR's
judicial bench. Consider the impact, on both perceptions and results, if the
ICTR were to include a Hutu and a Tutsi judge.425 The presence of such
judges in the courtroom as well as during deliberations could encourage a
more thorough venting of difficult issues such as those surrounding the
credibility of witnesses (and the role of ethnicity in such determinations),
including through dissenting or separate concurring opinions. 426 Their
presence and views could also generate more nuanced accounts of what it
means to be targeted for violence on the basis of ethnicity. Such judges would
also provide the tribunal with valuable insights as to Rwandan law.
427
Depending on how such a bench is configured, a more "representative" bench
could also be much more symbolically appealing to both sides in the Rwandan
conflict and would give Rwandans a greater sense of proprietorship in the
ICTR.428 For Hutus who have been subject to a constant barrage of
propaganda portraying Tutsis as a threat to their livelihood or existence, such
inclusion would help mitigate fears and distrust. The same might be said for
Tutsis, who, for the reasons indicated, 429 have many fears to overcome with
respect to the good faith of the international community. Having Rwandan
423. See supra notes 373-374 and accompanying text.
424. For recommendations along the lines of those suggested here, see Todd Howland &
William Calathes, The UN's International Criminal Tribunal, Is it Justice or Jingoism for Rwanda? A
Call for Transformation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 135 (1998) (recommending, among other things, a major
role for Rwandans in the ICTR's prosecutorial decisions and other "joint projects").
425. While it seems clear that the current U.N. approach to "representation" issues on the
ICTR's bench is to include as many judges as possible from the region, that is, Africa, it is questionable
whether Africans who are not from Rwanda itself truly understand the particularities of Tutsi/Hutu
relations in that country. Cf. GOUREVlTCH, supra note 1, at 178 (reporting on the misunderstandings
generated by Archbishop Tutu's 1995 visit to Rwanda).
426. As noted, see supra note 331, the Akayesu judgment's far-reaching conclusions with
respect to gender-specific violence arose most directly from allegations raised by a witness. As noted in
an editorial in the New York Times, that particular line of questioning was initiated and elaborated by
Judge Navanethem Pillay, a South African who was at the time the ICTR's sole female judge. See When
Rape Becomes Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1998, at A10. As noted in the Times, it may well be that
but for the presence of a female judge on the ICTR, along with the subsequent pressures by women's
groups, "this cruel aspect of the Rwandan genocide might never have been addressed." Id. Is it such a
stretch to suggest that the presence of judges familiar with local conditions, local customs, and local
dialects might also enhance the quality ofjudicial truth?
427. Cf. supra note 348 and accompanying text (discussing the alleged ICTR problems in this
respect, along with linguistic/cultural difficulties).
428. Given the complexities of Hutu versus Tutsi sympathies, as well as the fact that many
Hutus were regarded as sympathetic to Tutsis, appointing a Hutu to the bench, either on a case-by-case
basis or more permanently, need not mean that such an individual would invariably refuse to convict a
fellow Hutu. Indeed, individuals with extremist political sentiments would probably refuse to serve on
the ICTR.
429. See, e.g., supra notes 118-130 and accompanying text.
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representatives on the ICTR could encourage closer coordination between that
entity and local Rwandan courts. For reasons that will be further addressed in
Part VI, an ethnically representative judicial bench could also enhance the
prospects for national reconciliation.
430
While a more ethnically representative ICTR bench does not ensure
greater ethnic sensitivity, we ought not to dismiss the value of insiders'
insights nor underestimate the difficulty outsiders have in discovering the
truth under ethnically charged circumstances. 431 We should not blithely
discard Michael Ignatieff's profound insight that only an insider can
appreciate the moral significance of facts or that truths, if they are to be
believed, "must be authored by those who have suffered its consequences."
432
While international lawyers have tended to see "instrumentalism" and
"primordialism" as dichotomous categories that point in opposite directions
on the issue of criminal accountability,433 a more promising route to finding a
truly "shared truth,"434 as.well as credible verdicts, may lie in building bridges
across ethnic divides. It may be that such bridges cannot be built unless the
profound ethnic cleavages that exist in the wake of ethnic violence are not
ignored but recognized. Even if the institutional reforms suggested here are
rejected, we ought to acknowledge the potential costs, as well as potential
benefits, 435 of our current attempts to deploy ethnic neutrality.
V. THE RISKS OF EXCEPTIONALISM
Support for establishing international war crimes tribunals is premised
on the aberrational nature of these crimes.436 To international lawyers, these
offenses are exceptional in two senses: (1) few governments encourage or
undertake war crimes as a matter of state policy and (2) even within such
rogue states, only some individuals, and not communities as a whole, are
complicit.437
430. See infra notes 500-504 and accompanying text.
431. Cf Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Sept./Oct. 1996, reprinted
in HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1997, at 15, 16. ("The very fact of being an outsider discredits rather than
reinforces one's legitimacy. For there is always a truth that can be known only by those on the inside.").
432. Id. But see Akhavan, supra note 27, at 771 ("But surely this is buying into the divisive
falsehood that is the instrument of power for the unscrupulous politician. To reduce Serb and Croatian
identity to such base stereotypes is to give credence to the notion of primordial tribal hatreds.').
433. See supra notes 81-88, 431 and accompanying text.
434. Cf Akhavan, supra note 27, at 771 (arguing that "shared truth" can only be established if
we share a "common humanity" and that attention to ethnicity is destructive to such a goal).
435. Presumably one of these potential benefits lies in refusing to legitimize ethnic cleavages
through judicial action at the international level. Cf Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive
Harms, "Bizarre Districts, " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993) (noting "expressive harms" of certain judicial actions).
436. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Exceptionalism seems a necessity to the extent
Chapter VII action is the trigger for securing international criminal accountability as well as for
compliance with tribunal orders. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
437. Both of these justifications were repeatedly offered during the main Nuremberg trials of
high-level former Nazi officials; the Nazis were portrayed as the rare rogue aggressor nation and the 22
defendants in the dock as primarily responsible for offenses that ordinary Germans would have found
reprehensible. See, e.g., SA'ADAH, supra note 152, at 156. As noted, the Nuremberg precedent is
routinely cited for the need to use individualized guilt to avoid "laying guilt upon a whole people." See,
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Exceptionalism serves a multitude of purposes. Convicting someone like
Akayesu of an aberrational crime such as genocide serves a didactic purpose
that is not met by a mere conviction for murder.438 Exceptional condemnation
is appropriate for exceptional crimes. Exceptionalism is also a convenient
response to those who ask why it is appropriate to establish ad hoc
international tribunals in the cases of Rwanda and the Balkans but not in other
comparable cases involving mass atrocity.439 Exceptionalism also deflects
objections to these tribunals premised on the threat to sovereignty. Limiting
the jurisdiction of international tribunals with primacy over national courts to
a relatively small number of offenses that most governments do not see
themselves as likely to commit is less threatening and more readily acceptable
to other governments. 440
Exceptionalism is also grounded in other logistical and philosophical
concerns. The need to attribute direct criminal responsibility and, under
international human rights law, to pursue individualized trials means that it is
not possible to attribute responsibility to too many people. Individual trials for
dozens or possibly hundreds of persons are feasible; trials for thousands are
more difficult; and for millions, inconceivable. Beyond these practical
difficulties, the imputation of criminal liability for entire communities raises
profound moral dilemmas and risks delegitimizing the effort to punish
perpetrators. 441
The ostensible aberrational quality of war crimes has consequences,
however. The idea that only the rare government and its elites engage in such
conduct tends to discourage wider inquiries as to whether others are culpable
or complicit.442 There are competing virtues to a broader, more honest
appraisal of who is responsible for mass atrocities. Scholars who have gone
outside the international legal paradigm to ask who, other than those who gave
the orders to kill or who actually wielded the weapons, is to blame, have
emerged with disturbing (if inconsistent) answers with respect to both the
Balkan and Rwandan atrocities.443 One researcher has argued that the United
States's and its allies' foreign policies toward the Balkan region aggravated
e.g., Goldstone, supra note 32, at 229.
438. See Regina v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 714, 814-15.
439. See, e.g., Goldstone, Justice as a Tool, supra note 41, at 493-96 (suggesting that these
offenses are graver than those committed during apartheid in South Africa and therefore merit
international prosecutions and not merely truth commission-type efforts as in South Africa today).
440. As Pope Pius XHI diplomatically put it, the international community can only reach
exceptionally serious crimes because "it is only for such crimes that it is possible to establish a uniform
penal code between states." His Holiness Pope Pius XII, supra note 212, at 15.
441. See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 159-61.
442. With respect to Rwanda, international lawyers and U.N. diplomats have a clear interest in
keeping the focus on the culpability of elites in Rwanda, and not on, for example, the individuals or
governments who armed them from abroad or on the thousands of ordinary Rwandan citizens who
avidly sought out ethnic enemies to kill.
443. Complicity for genocide is rarely, if ever, a matter involving a few individuals. As Tacitus
wrote of the murder of Galba centuries ago, "A shocking crime was committed on the unscrupulous
initiative of a few individuals, with the blessing of more, and amid the passive acquiescence of all." See
NEIER, supra note 15, at 225 (quoting Tacitus).
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ethnic violence in the Balkans.444 This account otherwise favors causal factors
involving international change and interdependence, factors not unique to the
Balkans.445 Others have pointed the finger directly at the United Nations itself,
and particularly permanent members of the Security Council, contending that,
for example, the U.N. arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia only assisted
Serbian extermination policies and prolonged the Balkan conflict. 6 And, as
is suggested by the account of the Rwandan genocide in Section III.A., it is
relatively easy to portray Western nations, including the governments most
vocally in support of these tribunals, as informed, complacent bystanders to
genocide that were only peripherally engaged because their strategic interests
were not threatened. 447
Although exceptionalism is consistent with international lawyers' claim
that war crimes trials exonerate those who are not prosecuted," 8 neither
exceptionalism nor the attempt at collective exoneration is consistent with
judicial truth-telling. By elevating people like Bagasora or Akayesu to the
status of a Goering, judges render less visible the fact that those defendants'
desires to persecute "the other" were probably no different than those of
perhaps millions of their comrades who will never be charged. Further, it
deflects attention from the reality that such defendants shared the sentiments
of millions around the world who face no prospect of a criminal indictment,
let alone a conviction under international law (and only rarely under national
law).449 To the extent judges adhere to the Nuremberg precedent and portray
international defendants as aberrational monsters unrepresentative of their
societies, they elevate the goal of absolving those who are not criminally
indicted over the goal of telling the truth about the extent of collective
complicity in such crimes within those societies.
450
To the extent collective exoneration is successful, it spares observers the
discomfort of critically examining their own attitudes towards "the other." To
the extent atrocities in Rwanda and the Balkans are portrayed as exceptional
444. See WOODWARD, supra note 370, at 146-98.
445. See id. at 374-400.
446. See also MALCOLM, supra note 158, at 234-52; C.G. Schoenfeld, Psychoanalytic
Dimensions of the West's Involvement in the Third Balkan War, in GENOCIDE AFTER EMOTION, supra
note 62, at 158, 168-69.
447. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 368, at 125 ("[T]here is a fearsome normalcy about genocide
that makes efforts to portray its occurrence as abnormal deviance profoundly misleading, but worse,
more easily evaded as a challenge to complacency."). Falk argues that the ICTY was established "in an
atmosphere of overall ambivalence." Id. at 133.
448. See supra notes-39 & 77 and accompanying text.
449. Cf. Eric Markusen, Genocide and Warfare, in GENOCIDE, WAR, AND HUMAN SURVIVAL,
supra note 28, at 83 (arguing that modem war-making and genocide share "similar psychological and
social facilitating factors" and contending that the capacity for genocide is not limited to obvious
monstrous villains but is "widely shared").
450. For critiques of the concept of closure, see Osiel, supra note 151. The argument here is
that, even if closure is not attainable, the attempt to exonerate the collective is not consistent with the
goal of telling the unvarnished truth about the nature of mass atrocities. Moreover, it is not always clear
that those who have experienced atrocities first hand will agree with prosecutorial priorities at the
international level. Cf. Howland & Calathes, supra note 424, at 158-59 (questioning, from the
Rwandans' perspective, the ICTR's decision to proceed against Akayesu as the first defendant to face a
full trial).
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crimes of state, observers outside the affected regions (including within the
state that has been most supportive of these tribunals, namely the United
States) are encouraged to view the underlying offenses as alien tragedies
unrelated to events in their countries and in which their governments have no
complicity.451 Consideration of the extent to which Western countries share
blame for recent atrocities in Rwanda has direct policy implications. It is one
thing to suggest that the United States and other Western states need to
contribute to both national and international efforts to prosecute perpetrators
because due regard to the fate of fellow human beings requires such
kindheartedness. It is quite another to argue that such involvement is owed by
at least some Western states because their action or inaction contributed to
these tragedies. How Western involvement is cast-disinterested gift or debt
owed-is likely to prove important to whether attempts to arrest and try
culprits at the international level will continue over the long term; to whether
those efforts, as well as initiatives to assist Rwandan local prosecutions, prove
serious; or even to whether the international community will attempt to
provide funds for reparations to Rwandan victims.452 The attempt to exonerate
the collective is admittedly valuable to Western government elites, including
U.S. members of Congress, as it implies that any assistance rendered by
Western governments to these tribunals, along with related efforts, such as the
costs of maintaining a NATO-led force in the Balkans, are purely disinterested
ex gratia gestures that can be easily withdrawn.
This distancing becomes more problematic if emphasis is put on the
prevalent origins of such atrocities. The more these foreign conflicts are seen
as variations (albeit extreme) on appeals to the discriminatory animus
periodically made within all countries, the more probable it becomes that such
events will draw the attention of domestic constituency groups in the West
beyond those concerned with foreign affairs. To the extent that what has
occurred in Rwanda (and in the Balkans) is portrayed as examples of
gynocide, 453 for example, such an account resonates with women's groups in
the West and many other Western audiences and not merely organizations like
the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations. Accounts that stress the
discriminatory animus that Bagasora and Akayesu probably shared with
millions of others who aspire to an "ethnically pure" nation is more likely to
resonate within minority groups in the United States. Accounts that identify
the commonalities between some of the goals articulated and means followed
by those advocating a Rwanda or a Serbia cleansed of the offending "other"
451. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 1,passim; Sells, supra note 72,passim.
452. Cf. supra note 204 (discussing how international lawyers do not seriously consider
international reparations). In this light, one of the critiques made of local Rwandan procedures for civil
damages alongside criminal proceedings, namely that no such funds exist within the Rwandan treasury,
has a ready response: provide foreign assistance precisely for this purpose. Cf. Drumbl, supra note 146,
at 597-99 (discussing problems with Rwandan procedures for civil liability, including the possibility of
successful recovery).
453. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. SELLS, THE BRIDGE BETRAYED: RELIGION AND GENOCIDE IN
BOSNIA 21-24 (1996) (arguing that the organized rapes of Bosnian women constituted a deliberate
attack on women as childbearers).
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and certain groups within the United States454 sustain interest in those regions
within diverse U.S. constituencies, among groups that could exert pressures
on government policies, including with respect to the persons the U.S.
government supports to serve as judges on these tribunals.4 55 Such groups are
more readily motivated to push their own governments to act if they are
encouraged to see interconnections between the actions of their governments
(to whom they pay taxes) and the otherwise inexplicable, "savage" actions of
456foreigners.
Another difficulty with exceptionalism is that the claim has been
inconsistently made since Nuremberg. The same international lawyers who
insist that these crimes are aberrational also stress the universal lessons of war
crimes prosecutions. Thus, the Holocaust is simultaneously portrayed as
aberrational and endemic to the history of humankind; uniquely horrific, even
abnormal, but also atemporal and universal.457 Since the same international
lawyers who helped to establish the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the
Balkans are usually strong proponents of a permanent international criminal
court, most are anxious to draw universal lessons from ongoing prosecutions
in Arusha and the Hague. Thus, most of the accounts of the Rwandan and
Balkan massacres, by international lawyers, as by others, tend to reflect
Konrad Lorenz's insight that "[mlilitant enthusiasm can be elicited with the
predictability of a reflex."
458
Whether they are primarily sociological accounts that stress ethnic or
cultural factors or analyses that stress nationalist yearning for cleansed
territory, whether they emphasize psychological factors based on perceptions
454. According to one sociologist's description of the nature of "ethnic cleansing," what is
intended is the purification of an ethnic group (characterized by specific cultural traditions, a language, a
sense of identity, and sometimes a religion) by eliminating "foreign elements" defined as people whose
cultural or other characteristics are different. Ethnic cleansing "pertains to overt behavior and actions
together with discrimination" and, short of mass killings, can take the many forms that have been seen in
recent years within the former Yugoslavia, including the suppression or destruction of the other culture
through division of the population into first and second class citizens, differential treatment for jobs,
firing from government jobs, bans on assembly, and prohibitions on the use of language or religious
practices. See Mirkovi6, supra note 402, at 191, 196-97; see also infra note 461 and accompanying text
(discussing the Spanish Inquisition).
455. See, e.g., BARRY CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 23 (1989) (arguing that
economic sanctions against South Africa served to educate the U.S. public about apartheid, thereby
generating greater opposition to it within the United States). For a general survey of the impact of
minorities on U.S. foreign policy, see HOLLIE I. WEST, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, IN THE
NATIONAL INTEREST: DOES DIVERSITY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? (1997).
456. As Martin Luther King, Jr. acknowledged when he linked the civil rights movement in the
United States to the Johnson Administration's "arrogance" in Vietnam. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR., A Time to Break Silence, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. 231 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986) [hereinafter A TESTAMENT OF HOPE]. While some
have criticized domestic groups' efforts to "exploit" these tragedies, see, e.g., Anderson, supra note 75,
at 397 & n.39 (criticizing Western feminists), it is not clear why rediscovering commonalities between
the virulent forms of intolerance seen in the Balkans and in Rwanda and its far less virulent forms in the
United States (whether in the form of racism, sexism, or militarism) should be regarded, in and of itself,
as illegitimate. See generally Markusen, supra note 449, at 75-86 (suggesting parallels between
genocidal acts and aspects of modem warfare).
457. See Osiel, supra note 151, at 567-87; Gerry J. Simpson, War Crimes: A Critical
Introduction, in THE LAw OF WAR CRIMES, supra note 274, at 21.
458. KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 272 (1963).
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of victimhood grounded in historic grievances or more political narratives that
stress economic dislocations or other internal or external governmental
missteps, most of the explanations for what befell Rwanda and the Balkans
suggest fundamental agreement with Lorenz's four requisites for triggering
aggression. Lorenz argued, after all, that what was needed was: (1) the
creation or existence of a social unit with which the subject identifies himself
whose values appear to be threatened by some danger from outside; (2) the
presence of a hated enemy from whom the threat to the values emanates; (3)
the action of an inspiring leader figure or figures; and (4) the presence of
many other individuals all of whom can be agitated by the same emotion.
459
To the extent international lawyers aspire that international prosecutions
will lead to universal insights, they should not ignore those aspects of the
Rwandan genocide that make those killings crimes of hate. Both the
possibility of general deterrence and the promise of universal lessons rely on
the proposition that recent horrors in the Balkans, as in Rwanda, far from
being historical aberrations, have a great deal in common with ubiquitous
appeals to man's 460 discriminatory animus. The goals of the international legal
paradigm themselves suggest that comparable appeals extend, in the modem
era, in a virtually unbroken line from the Spanish Inquisition to modem
nations that have defined their status in ethnically or religiously homogenous
terms, and even to the World War II victors that now advocate modem
international prosecutions for war crimes. 4 6 1 Facile politically motivated
generalizations aside,462 even international lawyers ought to be interested in
the possible lessons and risks of government policies that are premised on
"ahistorical assumptions of unimpeachable singularities.,
463
The international legal paradigm's underlying ambivalence towards
exceptionalism is also rooted in its need for progressive development of
international criminal law. Exceptionalism is difficult to reconcile with
international accountability for offenses that involve a large number of non-
state actors, that occur in the course of internal civil conflicts, or that have
only indirect transborder effects.464 As Professor Steven R. Ratner has argued,
there are "schisms" in international criminal law-between wartime and
peacetime atrocities, interstate and civil conflicts, and between different types
of criminality among peacetime offenses-that are made only more difficult
to bridge because of international law's state-centricity and its related
459. See id. at 272-73. For an international lawyer's attempts to draw comparable lessons from
the ICTY's Tadic case, see SCHARF, supra note 5, at 217.
460. Given the extent to which such violence has targeted women, use of the male term here,
while undoubtedly less than fully accurate, seems appropriate.
461. Thus, a history of the Spanish Inquisition, originally published in 1937, includes a preface
warning that it was ,not intended as a satire on present-day conditions." CECIL ROTH, THE SPANISH
INQUISITION iii (W.W. Norton & Co. 1996) (1937). Present-day readers of Roth's volume would, alas,
need a similar warning, as the similarities between the religious bigotry and the tactics/pattern of terror
that he describes and recent events in Rwanda and the Balkans are striking.
462. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
463. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Nationalism and Self-Determination: The Bosnian Tragedy, in
RELIGION AND JUSTICE IN THE WAR OVER BOSNIA, supra note 72, at 45, 52.
464. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 arguably fits all three of these descriptions. See, e.g.,
PRUNI.R, supra note 10, at 213-73.
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concepts, including principles of state responsibility and non-intervention in
domestic jurisdiction.465 Seeing offenses in places like Rwanda as primarily or
exclusively crimes of state makes it more difficult to criminalize abuses
committed by state actors against that state's own citizens or by millions of
private citizens against each other. To this extent, exceptionalism's state-
centric focus impedes the attempt to criminalize, for example, many
peacetime atrocities or human rights abuses.
466
Exceptionalism also presents interesting dilemmas with respect to
sentencing. As the difference between the sentences imposed on low-level
perpetrators like Tadic and high-level defendants like Kambanda and Akayesu
indicates, under the international legal paradigm, exceptional perpetrators
require and deserve greater punishment.467 There is some room to doubt,
however, whether this view accurately reflects the views of those who were
Tadic's direct victims; it is not clear why, morally or legally, Tadic's relative
unimportance should mitigate his punishment, any more so than the fact that
he shared his discriminatory animus with so many others around him.
468
Moreover, even if one were to agree that high government officials' actions,
given their greater cumulative impact, merit graver punishment, this message
is compromised, as are so many others attempted under the international legal
paradigm, by contemporaneous sentences being handed down by Rwandan
courts. The anomalies previously noted between the punishments inflicted at
the international and national levels469 blunt the symbolic or deterrent value
that exceptionalism seeks to achieve.
VI. LESSONS FROM RWANDA
A. Specific Lessons
Lesson 1: International efforts to prevent the continuation of genocidal
acts and other acts of violence must precede attempts at criminal
accountability.
Drawing lessons from the 1994 Rwandan genocide five years after it
occurred is treacherous. At this writing Hutu guerrilla attacks along Rwanda's
border continue to generate Tutsi retaliations and civilian casualties; amidst
465. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 24, at 241; see also Mark R. von Steinberg, Yugoslavian War
Crimes and the Search for a New Humanitarian Order: The Case of Dusko Tadic, 12 ST. JoHN's J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 351 (1997) (discussing the ICTY from the perspective of a shift towards a human
rights paradigm).
466. See Ratner, supra note 24, at 252-54. For these reasons, exceptionalism may pose
difficulties for international judges attempting to progressively develop the criminalization of gender-
specific offenses. See supra notes 330-336 and accompanying text.
467. Thus, Tadic's "relative unimportance" was considered a mitigating factor with respect to
his sentencing by the ICTY. See Tadic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 321, para. 60 (1997). By
comparison, the life sentences imposed on Akayesu, a mayor, and Kambanda, Rwanda's prime minister,
reflected the ICTR's view of these individuals' respective positions. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, supra
note 220, para. 44; Akayesu Judgment, supra note 131, para. 12.
468. See supra notes 321-325 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 262-267 and accompanying text.
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such renewals of ethnic violence, Rwandan prosecutions appear to many to
mock justice.470 While some might suggest that no "victor" is capable of fairly
bringing to trial both members of the current government as well as those of
the former regime, drawing such a lesson threatens the prospect for any
criminal accountability since it would preempt the primary method by which
this would occur.471 In addition, such a conclusion would ignore the many
intervening variables that help to explain the Rwandan government's current
difficulties as well as its own recent resorts to violence.
As international lawyers themselves acknowledge, the possibility of
international or national criminal accountability is undermined from the outset
to the extent atrocities are permitted to continue.4 72 If there is a lesson that can
be fairly drawn from Rwanda's experience, it is that international or national
attempts to use the criminal law to achieve the goals of Nuremberg are
severely compromised from the outset if Hutus continue to target Tutsis and if
Tutsi-led forces are permitted to retaliate.473 So long as violence continues to
perpetuate and exacerbate ethnic tensions, international lawyers need to
identify more precisely which one of their goals-from deterrence to national
reconciliation-is truly being furthered by international trials. They need to
answer the skepticism of those inside Rwanda for whom there does not appear
to be much point in conducting international trials in the midst of ongoing
atrocities the international community fails to prevent by other means,
including the use of force.474
Lesson 2: Assuming that the violence has generally ceased, the
international community should encourage attempts to prosecute
perpetrators at the national level unless such attempts are wholly
implausible (as where, for example, a genocidal regime remains in power)
470. See, e.g., McKinley, Searching in Vain for Rwanda's Moral High Ground, supra note 63.
471. Indeed, if recent history is any indication, it is quite common for states in which mass
atrocities occurred to suffer a change in government with the new emerging regime consisting wholly or
principally of members of the former resistance movement, including the former regime's victims.
Indeed, the issue of criminal accountability is only likely to be raised once this occurs. See NINo, supra
note 368, at 107-34.
472. See, e.g., The Genocide Convention After Fifty Years: Contemporary Strategies for
Combating a Crime Against Humanity, supra note 206, at 13 (1998) (remarks by Payam Akhavan)
(arguing that absent prevention of ongoing violence "it is difficult to view ad hoc courts as anything but
a pretense of justice by the powerful"); Omar, supra note 174, at 14 (noting that in South Africa, ending
the violence as well as the "culture of violence" was a priority); see also Reisman, supra note 92, at 75
(expressing skepticism about "judicial romanticism').
473. See, eg., McKinley, Searching in Vain for Rwanda 's Moral High Ground, supra note 63.
474. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 250-55, 340. By contrast, some have sought to
establish ad hoc war crimes tribunals as a way to stop ongoing violence or as an attempt to pressure
warring parties to proceed to a peace agreement. But see, e.g., Reisman, supra note 363, at 47-50
(criticizing this view on the basis that there is no evidence! that courts "create the minimum political
order that is necessary for their operation").
In one civil case conducted directly on behalf of victims of mass atrocity, however, the first
demand made by those claimants is that ongoing violence cease. See supra note 201 (discussing
MacKinnon's suit against Karadzie and the demand for an injunction). One wonders whether, even if the
ICTR had been given authority to issue injunctions to states, it would ever have dared to demand, for
instance, that the government of Zaire patrol its borders to prevent the reentry of genocidaires into
Rwanda.
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since local criminal processes may make valuable contributions to the
preservation of collective memory, victim mollification, and the national
and international rule of law.
The second lesson emerges from the difficult standard international
lawyers appear to apply with respect to encouraging national prosecutions
within states that have suffered mass atrocities. Ratner and Abrams argue that
attempts at providing local criminal accountability have a "detrimental
impact" unless four fundamental conditions for a "fair and effective judiciary"
exist, namely:
a workable legal framework through well-crafted statutes of criminal law and procedure;
a trained cadre of judges, prosecutors, defenders, and investigators; adequate
infrastructure, such as courtroom facilities, investigative offices, record-keeping
capabilities, and detention and prison facilities; and, most important, a culture of respect
for the fairness and impartiality of the process and the rights of the accused. 475
As these authors acknowledge, however, these conditions tend to be
"woefully lacking" precisely in those places, like Rwanda, just emerging from
a period of grave mass atrocities.4 76 The application of such a strict standard,
particularly in the absence of any ongoing efforts to assist local judiciaries,
readily leads to the conclusion that, in instances such as Rwanda's, its
judiciary should not attempt to prosecute perpetrators and the international
community should not assist or encourage such attempts, but should instead
establish international forms of accountability ideally at some psychological
and physical distance from contaminating local influences. As is demonstrated
by the Rwanda case, such a conclusion is untenable given the obvious need to
render some kind of justice to thousands incarcerated and the very real
prospect that absent local prosecutions, mass violence may reemerge.
Moreover, the high bar set for national prosecutions fails to acknowledge that
the alternative in instances where the four enumerated fundamentals are not in
place, namely an international criminal forum, since it needs to be
constructed, does not itself fulfill the enumerated conditions.
In 1994, at the end of the Rwanda genocide, Ratner and Abrams's four
fundamental preconditions for successful criminal proceedings were
undoubtedly not fulfilled within Rwanda, but they were not met at the
international level either, where there was no judiciary of any kind. A
workable legal framework for the ICTR with well-crafted criminal law
statutes and procedures had to be adapted from the very different context of
the ICTY; an entire cadre of judges, prosecutors, defenders, and investigators
had to be found, and a necessary bureaucratic infrastructure had to be built. It
was not evident in 1994 and is arguably not even clear today whether the
resulting tribunal enjoys the needed "culture of respect" for fairness and
impartiality. Indeed, as Parts III to V suggest, doubts remain about whether
475. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 159.
476. Id. at 159-60 (noting the singular importance for countries like Rwanda and Ethiopia of
foreign assistance for these purposes).
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today, four years later, the ICTR's proceedings have generated the requisite
perceptions of legitimacy among either local Rwandan audiences or the
international community as a whole.
The four part feasibility test, built on the premises of the international
legal paradigm, is obviously intended to be applied only to local criminal
prosecutions. The test assumes that international proceedings are
presumptively desirable and preferable to local trials that fall short on any of
the four criteria. Rwanda's case suggests, to the contrary, that the standard for
determining the feasibility and desirability of national trials should be
considerably lower.
The international community should ask not whether a fair and effective
national judiciary exists when atrocities end, but whether, given all possible
resources, national efforts for criminal accountability are plausible in the
relative near term and whether international efforts can further that goal.477
This alternative formulation of the question would put the burden on the
international community to justify why it is desirable to allocate the level of
resources and effort that it takes to construct an entirely separate international
forum if national forums are, given at least comparable resources, within
reach. At a minimum it would suggest that greater consideration be given to
joint international/national efforts, including joint investigations or trials. In
an instance such as Rwanda, where a new government has replaced the prior
regime, we need to ask whether this test for feasibility would have been met
when the new regime came into power in 1994. Despite a devastated judicial
system and scarce resources at every level, the new Rwandan government was
able to cobble together an approach to criminal accountability that, at least
through 1996, led one wary international human rights group to conclude that
"even with enormous logistical weaknesses and shortages of trained
personnel, Rwanda can provide trials that meet or approach minimum
guarantees of fairness and due process." 478 What would have occurred if, from
mid-1994 through 1996, instead of generally ignoring local efforts, the
international community had been willing to accord Rwanda the millions of
dollars and intellectual resources it allocated to the ICTR during that period
and had tied those resources to securing the necessary assurances of fairness
to defendants?
Local adjudications having resort to local law should not be seen as
merely necessary concessions to realpolitik or as necessary stop-gaps when
international enforcement efforts fail.479 A government's reluctance to hand
over perpetrators to international processes ought not be automatically seen as
a wrong-headed, unenlightened, and parochial attempt to protect national
sovereignty.480 "Sovereign concerns" need not be regarded as automatically
477. See Kritz, supra note 241, at 151 (giving examples of how and when the international
community should supplement national courts).
478. LAWYERS COMMITI'EE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 62.
479. Cf. Cassese, supra note 39, at 241-42 (suggesting that national courts have a vital role
because of the volume of likely defendants and because international courts need to focus on high-level
perpetrators).
480. Compare Brown, supra note 96, at 398 (suggesting that such resistance stems from
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antithetical to providing accountability for war criminals. Local prosecutions
for mass atrocity may advance many of the Nuremberg-inspired goals
international lawyers have. With respeqct to the goal of collective memory,
such local prosecutions, particularly when they have available a large number
of defendants as in Rwanda, or are capable of reaching further into the past
than international fora, may more authoritatively convey the scope of
complicity and the particular horrors of ethnically motivated violence.
48 1
Local trials are far more likely to be responsive to victim mollification and
vindication since local justice is more accessible, more compatible with
community expectations, and, depending on local procedures, may present
greater opportunities for control over both criminal and civil proceedings.
4 8 2
With respect to affirming the national rule of law, such processes present clear
advantages given their impact on greater numbers of people and local
institutions, greater representational legitimacy, and greater responsiveness to
local audiences in terms of both substantive and procedural law.483 And even
with respect to affirming and progressively developing the international rule
of law, where local prosecutions pursue offenses that are, de facto if not de
jure, international crimes (as under Rwanda's Organic Law), local
indictments, plea bargains, trials, and sentences may stigmatize perpetrators at
least as much as any international tribunal. Moreover, in such cases, local
judges may be less politically constrained innovators of international law and
more familiar with domestic criminal law that might usefully fill gaps in
international humanitarian law. In particular instances, resort to national law
to fill the numerous gaps in international criminal law may be the best way to
further effective progressive development, even if at the expense of
uniformity of the law.4 84 Indeed, this last possibility suggests that international
tribunals that share concurrent jurisdiction with national courts for
international crimes, such as the ICTR, may need to be empowered to apply
relevant domestic criminal law, especially where this is not clearly
inconsistent with international law.48 5
sovereignty concerns), with Hazel Fox, The Objections to Transfer of Criminal Jurisdiction to the UN
Tribunal, 46 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 434, 436-42 (1997) (objecting to the transfer of U.K.-based
defendants to the ICTY based on absence of safeguards for them).
481. See supra notes 157-185 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 195-230 and accompanying text.
483. See supra notes 231-261 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 348-352 and accompanying text (discussing examples of gap-filling
through resort to national law).
485. Cf. ICTR Statute, supra note 53, art. 23 (authorizing resort to the "general practice
regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda"). Since all offenses over which the ICTR has
jurisdiction transpired in Rwanda and in all likelihood involve Rwandan nationals, there would be
considerable merits to such an amendment of the ICTR's statute given ordinary choice of law principles.
Whether international lawyers would be willing to compromise to this extent on their insistence that
such offenses be prosecuted as violations of international law remains to be seen. Such an amendment
would also undermine, to some extent, international lawyers' hopes for internationally uniform
international precedents (reflected in the present arrangement under Article 12(2) of the ICTR's statute,
under which the ICTR and ICTY share a common appellate chamber). See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS,
supra note 23, at 175. Of course, to the extent international tribunals have jurisdiction over offenses
committed in more than one state, they may need to be authorized to apply the criminal law of more than
one state.
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Lesson 3: Assuming that reasonable efforts at local prosecutions as well
as international proceedings are to be pursued simultaneously,
international proceedings should be truly complementary to national
processes that are pursued in good faith. Indeed, such national
proceedings may need to be accorded jurisdictional primacy, except with
respect to particular cases presenting due process concerns. Generally,
the jurisdictional limits, procedures, and sentences of international
processes should avoid conflicts with and enhance the effectiveness of
concurrent national efforts.
The third lesson that emerges from Rwanda, however, is that the
possibility of local prosecutions ought not to discourage attempts to establish
truly complementary international fora for criminal accountability. At times,
as is true with respect to much of the former Yugoslavia, and perhaps with
respect to some individual Rwandan perpetrators, international tribunals
present the only opportunity for criminal accountability.486 And, despite the
Rwandan government's ultimate dissatisfactions with the ICTR, we should
not ignore that this government very much sought an international
tribunal 4 87 to secure universal condemnation of the 1994 genocide, to
buttress the political legitimacy of its regime, and to obtain the assistance of
international authorities with respect to the arrest of suspects and the gathering
of evidence (particularly where these were located abroad).488 As. this
suggests, while the international legal paradigm's claimed advantages for
489international processes appear wildly exaggerated, properly constructed,
and with due attention to the idiosyncratic needs of particular situations, such
fora may more easily deal with the interstate dimensions of mass atrocities
and may assist domestic prosecutions. 490 International courts have the
potential to consider the culpability of actors who are outside the reach of the
country in which the atrocities occurred or who committed offenses abroad
and these courts may be better able to secure the cooperation of foreign states
486. Cf. Cotler, supra note 395, at 174 (warning that complementarity should not be used to
preempt international jurisdiction where international trials are necessary).
487. See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
488. See Arbour, supra note 94, at 534-35. Indeed, in some cases, new governments may favor
international trials rather than risk alienating powerful domestic groups.
489. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
490. This approach seems generally consistent with using international law and its fora to
"mediate" periods of domestic transition. See Teitel, supra note 42, at 2028-29 (noting how in periods
of democratic transition, international law posits institutions and processes that "transcend domestic law
and politics" and "mediates" the rule of law dilemma by incorporating values of justice associated with
natural law). While much of this Article has emphasized the need to bring insiders into international
processes, outsider perspectives and assistance may be vital to maintaining the credibility of internal
mechanisms. Cf. Habermas, supra note 175, at 263-72 (noting outsiders' effects on Germans' view of
their own history); Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Modell Bundesrepublik: National History, Democracy, and
Internationalization in Germany, in UNWILLING GERMANS? THE GOLDHAGEN DEBATE, supra note 40, at
275, 278-80 (contending that the internationalization of German national history, including pressure
from outsiders, has helped to create a pluralized national history).
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where witnesses, evidence, or suspects may be located.491 International courts
also may be needed to prosecute those who are found abroad in countries that
refuse to extradite them to any forum except an international body.492 Under
such circumstances and if they fulfill such needs, international indictments
might have greater international credibility and therefore have a favorable
impact on other international processes (such as multilateral diplomatic
negotiations at Dayton with respect to the Balkans). 93 In addition, such
tribunals might be necessary to try persons who are either likely to be unfairly
treated in local courts or who face little probability of local prosecution.
494
Beyond such practical concerns, international courts and verdicts have
undeniable symbolic import.495
These possible advantages imply, however, a very different mandate for
international tribunals than that suggested by the international legal paradigm
or that is manifest in the ICTR's current operation. Since local courts,
particularly those in states with successor regimes, would, under Lesson Two,
be the preferred and primary fora for trying high-level perpetrators associated
with the former regime, international fora would focus their efforts on trying
those perpetrators, high or low, for whom local trials are impossible or unfair.
Whereas the ICTR's reach now delimits the reach of Rwandan prosecutions,
under this alternative the temporal and geographic reach of international
tribunals would depend on the reach and capacities of local courts. This
implies that in a case like Rwanda's, the ICTR's jurisdiction would preferably
extend to offenses occurring after 1994 and to offenses committed outside
Rwandan territory-to better capture those cases least likely to be reached by
Rwandan courts-but at the same time, in all instances, the ICTR would defer
to Rwandan courts if those courts were available, unless in a particular case
there was a grave risk of unfairness to a defendant. While it might appear
unusual for an international court to "sit in judgment" of a domestic court, this
is exactly what the ICTR's statute already authorizes, since it anticipates a
second trial at the ICTR where national courts demonstrate "lack of
491. As noted, see supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text, this potential was not wholly
realized in the context of the ICTR since that tribunal's jurisdictional limits did not take advantage of its
international status to reach to perpetrators, including non-Rwandans, who may have committed
offenses outside Rwanda.
492. States may refuse to extradite a particular individual, as to Rwanda, for fear of violating
the non-refoulement provision in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, see Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, art. 33; Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, because of opposition to
Rwanda's death penalty, or for other reasons.
493. Cf. Goldstone, supra note 32, at 233 (contending that the ICTY's indictments had a direct
impact on the Dayton process).
494. This potential has not been fully realized in the ICTR since that tribunal is precluded from
reaching the vast majority of Tutsi retaliation killings to the extent these occurred after 1994. In
addition, as discussed at supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text, the ICTR has not attempted to
identify, on a case-by-case basis, instances where Rwandan justice is likely to be or has been inadequate.
495. See supra notes 48, 282-283 and accompanying text. Of course, there are other ways to
symbolically affimn the international rule of law or to apply "global censure" against violators. See, e.g.,
NEIER, supra note 15, at 227 (discussing the merits of international economic sanctions and the sports
boycott of South Africa).
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impartiality., 496 Deference to domestic processes would also suggest that
international tribunals would attempt to emulate, to the extent possible,
features of domestic processes for the sake of uniform treatment of
perpetrators involved in the same mass atrocities. In the context of the ICTR
and Rwanda, this would call for changes to the ICTR's statute and rules, for
example, to encourage apologies to victims as well as to accord greater access
to civil penalties, since both of these are (at least in principle) available under
Rwandan law.4 97 The lesson is simple: domestic courts, not international ones,
need to be accorded jurisdictional primacy subject to due process limits, and
international tribunals, not national courts, need to retain residual
jurisdiction.498
While limiting international tribunals' jurisdictional reach to those cases
in which they enjoy a clear advantage requires reaching an accommodation
with the government in which the atrocities occurred, there are distinct
reasons why governments might be induced to cooperate. Rwandan
authorities, for example, might have been willing to forego prosecuting certain
individuals whose trials prompt due process concerns if the quid pro quo for
such forbearance had included significant foreign assistance to rebuild their
judicial system along with the assistance of international prosecutors in
gathering evidence and other suspects located abroad.
Restricting an international tribunal to a residual role vis-A-vis local
courts considerably reduces the potential for destructive anomalies of
inversion with respect to the sentencing and treatment of high-level
perpetrators. 499 Since an international tribunal would no longer be the primary
forum for trying high-level perpetrators, the discrepancies between its
applicable penalties and those enforced under local law would be lessened °.
496. See ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 98, Rule 9(ii). The lack of
impartiality language was imported from the Balkan context, however, and appears more suited to
instances in which there is a suspicion that municipal courts will be reluctant to prosecute perpetrators or
will fail to do so diligently. It is not entirely clear whether the rule, as written, would be interpreted to
cover the more likely scenario before Rwandan courts, that is, a particular instance in which a local
court, it is feared, would be biased against a defendant. Cf. LAwYERs COMMrrrEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTs,
supra note 227, at 71 (contending that the comparable provision in the ICTY statute does not cover
situations where national trials might be expected to be unfairly severe against defendants).
497. See supra notes 200-201, 219 and accompanying text. Real complementarity might even
entail granting Rwandan courts the power to sentence those convicted by the ICTR, provided there was
sufficient confidence in Rwandan sentencing procedures. In instances in which the perpetrator had not
been transferred to the ICTR by a state on condition that the death penalty not be imposed, this could
even include the infliction of the death penalty.
498. Cf. Avocats Sans Fronti&es, Open letter regarding the need to expand the jurisdiction of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, available at <http://www.asfibe/asf/uk/letter/lettertpir-uk.html>
(advocating substantive changes to the ICTR's jurisdiction similar to those proposed here but without
mentioning the respective role of Rwandan courts).
499. See supra notes 262-267 and accompanying text.
500. Cf. supra Part III.B. This assumes that political realities, resource constraints, as well as
perceptions of fairness to defendants would bar a second trial, at either the international or the domestic
level, for the same underlying offense for someone who has already been tried for an international
crime. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing the ICTR's rules). This need not bar
consideration of more innovative approaches, such as joint international/domestic investigations
followed by national trials with a significant international presence in its bench and bar. It also does not
bar two-track approaches, such as convictions at the international level paired with domestic fora for
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Real and effective complementarity between national and international
prosecutions would no longer imply that those who are most culpable will
receive the most lenient treatment. In addition, such a reconfiguration of the
respective roles of both types of forum would vastly increase the potential to
use criminal accountability as a tool to buttress and affirm the rule of law
where it matters most-in those communities in which prior mass atrocities
have devastated it.
That Rwandan courts are, at present, free to pursue perpetrators who are
not sought by the ICTR does not mean that those courts are unhindered by the
ICTR or that the Rwandan criminal justice system is not affected by the
ICTR's operation. International and domestic processes directed at pursuing
criminal accountability arising from the same events do not and cannot remain
insulated from one another. That high-level perpetrators can be and often are
directed to a foreign court may undermine the credibility of Rwandan plea
bargains and sentences, local courts' attempts to render an accurate historical
account, and Rwandan judges' efforts to progressively develop the law. Each
time the Rwandan legal system is denied the right to put on trial a prominent
member of the former regime, the international community is sending an
implicit (if perhaps intended) message that Rwandan institutions cannot be
trusted or that its judiciary is not ready to implement the rule of law. Each
time someone at the level of a Bagasora is sent to Tanzania for trial instead of
a local court somewhere in Rwanda, Rwandan victims are denied the benefit
of seeing justice done. And given the scarcity of international resources, one
suspects that each dollar spent by the international community on the ICTR is
one less dollar available for assistance to Rwandan courts-and it is certainly
one dollar that is not spent on establishing the joint tribunal on Rwandan soil
that Rwanda's post-genocide government originally sought.
Lesson 4: Avoid ethnically neutral approaches if these threaten rather
than advance the legitimacy of international processes.
At present, criminal processes in Arusha and within Rwanda are likely
to generate radically different reactions along ethnic lines. For many Hutus,
both international and national criminal processes appear skewed against them
since the ICTR's temporal limits mean that its indictments and trials will
focus on offenses committed by Hutus and ignore most violence committed
by Tutsis,501 while Rwanda's present courts are more likely to be unfair to
Hutu defendants and less likely to pursue charges against Tutsi offenders. For
many Tutsis, on the other hand, Rwandan courts pose fewer problems
compared to the ICTR's unaccountable foreign process, judges, and
judgments.0 2 Under the circumstances, international lawyers are correct to
sentencing. See supra note 497. As these possibilities suggest, this may require establishing highly
adaptable international processes, as opposed to a fixed permanent international criminal court or a
series ofad hoe tribunals fashioned on the model of the ICTY and the ICTR.
501. Cf. supra note 264 (noting Tutsi killings).
502. See supra Section III.B.
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worry about the perceived biases in these respective fora, but their solution to
date, which relies on benign neglect of Rwandan courts and on an ostensibly
ethnically neutral international bench charged with the rendering of ethnically
neutral judgments, is not sufficiently responsive to the depth of the problem.
International lawyers and judges should not continue to act as if ethnic
tensions that have given rise to mass violence will no longer matter if judges
refuse to recognize them in their judgments. Ethnic identities, along with their
symbols, retain significance long after ethnic violence ends. In the wake of
ethnic atrocities, it is doubtful that an ethnically neutral approach to criminal
accountability will generate confidence in judicial verdicts. Moreover, we
need to acknowledge that there is no universal confidence in the impartiality
of international judges given the political agendas and the prior or continuing
derelictions of countries represented on the international bench.50 3 On the
contrary, the tenuous legitimacy of ad hoc international tribunals, along with
the difficulties of constructing ethnically neutral judgments for ethnically
loaded cases,504 may require a more ethnically sensitive approach at the
international level. This could consist of joint investigations and trials or
greater use of international observers within national trials or, at the
international level, a bench that is ethnically representative from the
perspective of the primary audience for its verdicts and that is less apt to
dissemble with respect to such issues. Such a bench may, paradoxically,
produce verdicts that are more likely to be regarded, over time, as fair and
impartial.50 5 However accomplished, a more ethnically sensitive international
approach may enhance the credibility of the lessons sought to be conveyed to
both the national and international communities. In addition, international
trials with more genuine legitimacy among both Hutus and Tutsis are more
likely to put pressure on Rwandan courts to improve their own procedures and
impartiality.
Lesson 5: Both international and domestic procedures need to
acknowledge that massive atrocities usually involve massive complicity by
large numbers of perpetrators, at all levels of domestic and international
society, and not merely by a select group of government elites.
The case of Rwanda also casts doubt on the premise that individual
criminal accountability pursued against a select few will "exonerate" the
collective. When one percent of a country's population is under arrest for such
offenses, amid credible charges that millions were involved in atrocities,50 6 an
attempt to dissemble- on the scope of likely collective complicity is likely to
fail. In addition, the attempt at exceptionalism deflects self-examination by
those outside the regions directly affected; discourages their involvement and
503. By contrast, the international legal paradigm assumes widespread agreement that the ad
hoc tribunals are "above political pressures." See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 39, at 241.
504. See supra Part IV.
505. See also infra notes 508-536 and accompanying text.
506. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 244-45 (quoting Rwandan officials who suggest
that perhaps a million or more Rwandans were complicit or actively engaged in the 1994 genocide).
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assistance; and diminishes the prospects for universalist lessons and for wider
searches for the culpable.
50 7
In any case, such dissembling is inconsistent with the goal of preserving
and establishing an exhaustive rendering of the truth. Judicialized truth-telling
calls for many trials, not a selective few, and of many types of perpetrators, at
all levels of society, not merely elites. Since such thoroughgoing efforts to
provide individualized trials would overwhelm judicial resources for virtually
any legal system, and most especially for those in societies recovering from
mass atrocity, this is yet one more reason in favor of crafting innovative
procedures, including Rwandan-style plea bargains capable of striking a
balance between the rights of victims and the rights of defendants. Absent
special circumstances, such as instances in which third-party states are willing
to turn over only high-level perpetrators to international processes, this may
justify directing at least some international resources to trying different kinds
of individuals and not only high-level perpetrators. In this sense as well,
international processes need to be complementary to domestic proceedings.
Both national and international proceedings ought to be striving to tell the
truth about mass atrocities, however uncomfortable that truth may prove to be.
B. Larger Lessons
International lawyers have not devoted much systematic thinking to
what Balint calls "international criminology."50 8 There is little in the legal
literature that purports to explain exactly how trying the perpetrators of mass
atrocities can be expected to help achieve national reconciliation or the
prevention of further violence. Perhaps because it has proven to be,
historically, such a daunting struggle to get war criminals to the dock,
international lawyers have had little time to consider what is achieved by
getting to the dock, beyond locking up the guilty.
As Mark Osiel has demonstrated, to the extent the issue has been
addressed at all there appears to have been, at least since Nuremberg, an
unstated assumption that criminal accountability will promote peace by
terminating contentious debates among adversaries, that is, through an
emotional appeal for closure. 50 9 But the assumption that once accusations are
leveled and indictments and judgments are issued, all will come to
acknowledge the barbarous evils committed by genocidaires, does not
comport with what we are hearing from observers inside Rwanda. The
majority of the thousands detained inside Rwanda's jails today report, and
perhaps genuinely feel, that "they have done nothing wrong" and are being
victimized merely because they were on the "wrong side of a war."51 While
507. See supra notes 441-469 and accompanying text.
508. See Balint, supra note 215, at 113 (noting that most have not gone beyond rebutting the
realists' argument that punishment is inconsistent with peace). But see supra notes 40-43, 77 and
accompanying text (raising relevant arguments of Cassese and others).
509. See supra notes 359-360 and accompanying text.
510. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 146, at 605-07. Nor is this lack of closure necessarily
limited to instances in which criminal prosecutions have been the focus of attention. Cf. Omar, supra
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many of those detained within Rwanda on the basis of mere denunciations
may indeed be innocent, observers report similar reactions even among those
against which there is considerable evidence since almost all prisoners have
little faith in the government that imprisoned them or in the Rwandan judicial
system.511 Indeed, the pervasive sense of "moral ambiguity" among Rwanda's
prisoners, the flaws in Rwandan criminal proceedings, and that sense that
these are being used by the RPF regime in Rwanda to perpetuate "collective
Hutu guilt," has led one Western observer to conclude that criminal
prosecutions under the circumstances do more harm than good since they only
deepen wounds rather than reconcile them.512 This conclusion would appear to
stem, at least in part, from misplaced faith in the prospects for judicially
inspired closure.
As Mark Osiel has argued, the attempt to justify criminal accountability
for mass atrocity on the basis of closure is untenable since fractured societies,
including postwar Germany, do not reach closure on exceptionally contentious
matters involving rival perceptions of history and ethnic identity; he argues
instead that criminal trials can nonetheless serve as relatively peaceful forums
for channeling and encouraging a constructive discourse about such issues.
513
Elsewhere, I have applied Osiel's alternative justification for criminal
prosecutions, which he dubbed "civil dissensus," to recent conflicts in the
514Balkans and in Rwanda. I have argued that this alternative model of civil
dissensus provides a better justification for both national and international
prosecutions. 515 Under this view, trials are needed to promote the deliberation
of contentious questions, including the constructed nature of judicial truth, the
scope and nature of collective complicity or guilt, the tensions between
progressive development of the law and the principle of nullum crimen, and
the legitimacy of selective enforcement of the norms of international
humanitarian law.516 The point of properly conducted criminal trials, at both
the national and international levels, is precisely to provoke socially desirable,
if contentious, conversations in the hope that through honest discourse the
guilty will eventually come to recognize that brutal killings are not morally
ambiguous.
Unlike the international legal paradigm, civil dissensus does not assume
that trial participants or observers share common integrationist values. Civil
dissensus does not assume that persons emerging from ethnic violence are
ready to accept the irrationality of judgments premised on ethnicity. It does
not assume that judges will be able to elicit a settled consensus on the need to
note 174, at 8 (noting that the South African reconciliation attempt will not produce a "fairy tale ending"
but involves a "long struggle" requiring the "transformation of our country"); Suzanne Daley, South
African Panel's Report Arrives in Swirl of Bitterness, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998, at Al (discussing the
acrimonious reception greeting the issuance of the final report from the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission).
511. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 146, at 606.
512. Seeid. at625.
513. See Osiel, supra note 151, at 240-92.
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respect the equal dignity of all persons despite ethnic or religious
differences-however fundamental notions of equal protection may be within
liberal Western nations. It does not presume that prosecuting particular high-
level perpetrators will exonerate those who are accused or that it will
exculpate either the Security Council or particular governments for their
(in)actions with respect to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. It does not assume
that criminal judgments will secure closure with respect to such divisive,
difficult issues. Civil dissensus is premised instead on the idea that
deliberation itself, as channeled by the constraints of the law into reasoned
exchanges not wholly driven by emotion, can eventually generate a measure
of trust across ethnic differences without resolving them.
The discursive justification for criminal accountability postulates that
honest judicial consideration of contentious issues is worthwhile, perhaps
even vital, for fractured societies. It assumes that such trials are most useful
when they prevent attempts to bury such issues through premature closure.
Under this rationale, however, the best forms of accountability are those that
truly resonate with relevant audiences and establish conections with their
concerns, including the ethnic divides that may have led to the atrocities and
continue to pose immense challenges to national unity. The suggestions for
joint international/domestic trials or for a more ethnically representative bench
are attempts to promote such deliberative processes. Securing greater
Rwandan inclusion within international processes for accountability is
important not merely becaus6 of the obvious symbolism and greater
representative legitimacy thereby generated. For the reasons enumerated here,
joint international/local trials or an international bench that includes both a
Hutu and a Tutsi are not likely to produce judgments as bereft of ethnic
context as the judgment in Tadic5 17 or as wrong with respect to Rwandan law
as was the judgment in Akayesu s18 Those judges' questions from the bench
and separate or concurring opinions would be valuable components of the
discursive process.
Although international lawyers, stung by Justice Pal's dissent in the
Tokyo trials,s19 are understandably wary about the possibility that an
international judge may challenge the legitimacy of the international process,
they ought to be more concerned if such criticisms are left to be raised and
addressed outside of the processes they establish. It is ultimately better if
competing perspectives-as to what is relevant to judging the credibility of
witnesses, for example-are openly aired within an international tribunal
517. See supra notes 422-448 and accompanying text.
518. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
519. See generally Elizabeth S. Kopelman, Ideology and International Law. The Dissent of the
Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 373 (1991) (analyzing the
implications of Justice Rahadbinod Pal's dissent from the majority judgment of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East). It would, of course, be wrong to assume that a Tutsi judge would not
convict a Tutsi defendant or that a Hutu judge would not do the same with respect to a Hutu defendant.
The 1994 Rwandan genocide was filled with examples of "moderate" individuals on both sides of the
ethnic divide who refused to go along with the incitement to violence. The selection of appropriate
Rwandans to serve on the ICTR would legitimately focus on persons whose views would not preclude
their ability to judge cases fairly, regardless of their ethnicity.
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itself. It speaks volumes for the credibility of international processes if
criticisms come from within the process itself. Moreover, internal critiques are
more likely to be taken seriously.520
Similar premises underlie the recommendation, made above, that both
national and international trials frankly acknowledge the complexities of
collective complicity. Keeping alive the question of who else was "to blame"
may be vital to eventual national reconciliation. Trials that candidly concede
that government leaders were not the only persons culpable, and may not have
been necessarily the most egregious offenders, are more promising venues for
truth-telling than select trials of an elite intended to exonerate the collective.
Trials that accurately reflect the wide variety of people complicit in atrocities,
because they are more honest about the scope of real complicity, are also more
promising venues for channeling debates away from unproductive, unlawyerly
notions of guilt by association. 521 International processes that acknowledge
that states outside Rwanda were partly responsible for Rwandan atrocities or
for failing to halt or prevent them are also far more likely to win the respect of
Rwandans.
The five lessons enumerated above, intended to encourage contentious
judicial exchanges at both the national and international levels, assume that
civil disagreements, channeled by the law, may, over time, generate respect
among adversaries, even perhaps the kind of solidarity that Martin Luther
King, Jr. attributed to "agape." King's vision for reconciliation through
nonviolent action was premised on the need to secure mutual recognition that
all life is interrelated, that there is a community of common humanity, and a
kind of civil respect, even love, amongst enemies. 52 2 While much of King's
references to this kind of respect or agape drew on religious imagery, King
also acknowledged that the law played a role. He frequently asserted that
while "the law may not change the heart... it can restrain the heartless.
523
While he accepted that "morality cannot be legislated," he argued that
"behavior can be regulated," implying that the law could help promote or
elicit agape.524 Despite the recent claims by some, King's notion of agape was
520. These arguments are not novel. They were successfully made to ensure that women were
appointed to the ICTY's bench. Thus, Madeline Albright at the time that the ICTY was established
declared the United States's determination "to see that women jurists sit on the Tribunal and that women
prosecutors bring war criminals to justice." See Statement by the United States at the Security Council,
supra note 41, at 14; see also supra note 426 (noting that gender-specific violence in the aftermath of
the Akayesu case would not have been addressed but for female judges). The arguments for an ethnically
sensitive bench evoke some of the justifications underlying traditional international rules requiring
exhaustion of local remedies and choice of law rules. See Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.) 1959 I.C.J. 6,
26-27 (Mar. 21); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 713
reporter's note 5 (1987).
521. See Alvarez, supra note 87, at 2086-88.
522. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., An Experiment in Love, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra
note 456, at 16, 19-20 (particularizing the ancient concept of "agape").
523. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., The Case Against "Tokenism", in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE,
supra note 456, at 106, 107.
524. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., The Ethical Demands for Integration, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE, supra note 456, at 117, 124; see also MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Facing the Challenge of a New
Age, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 456, at 135, 142. Indeed, some have noted that many of the
rules of international humanitarian law that are being enforced by the ICTR and ICTY are themselves
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not premised on the need for the law or its institutions to apply ethnically
neutral approaches.525
It remains to be seen whether ICTR proceedings, Rwandan prosecutions,
or other forms of accountability will successfully generate respect among
adversaries or King's concept of "agape." The substantial literature dealing
with the civic virtues that characterize societies that are least prone to violent
ethno-religious conflicts supports the conclusion that one route to national
reconciliation lies in generating respect among adversaries and that such
respect may hold together societies divided along ethnic lines. Many have
concluded that societies in transition, such as those emerging from
communism, require changes in the mind-set of their peoples. 26 Others,
especially political scientists, have distinguished among different types of
ethnic identity (historical, cultural, linguistic) and have examined the
complex, symbiotic relationships between these and different types of
governmental structures.527 Those who turn to criminal prosecutions for mass
atrocities to promote the rule of law and national reconciliation may
ultimately find that they are relying, perhaps optimistically but hopefully not
futilely, on faith in the law's capacity to generate civil dissensus. If so, they
may need to draw upon the insight that these are crimes of hate in order to
best inspire Martin Luther King Jr.'s concept of "love."
Faith in the possibility of judicially-created civil dissensus also
underscores another common element in the lessons enumerated above:
acknowledgment of the local. As some international lawyers are beginning to
recognize, since people everywhere, including in Rwanda, experience
violence and its aftermath within their own communities, local enforcement
should be a priority of international enforcement itself. 529 This calls for
melding the concepts of crimes of state and crimes of hate in an effort to use
international law and processes to mediate national attempts at
accountability.530 It is important to recognize, as the international legal
paradigm does, that crimes of state violate the enduring values of the
premised on notions that appear nearly identical to King's notion of "agape." Thus, one commentator
has argued that the rules for noncombatant immunity, as well as their absolute nature, are based in part
on the "Christian ethical requirement of love of neighbor, which is known both directly by Christians
and indirectly as a requirement of justice by non-Christians." James Turner Johnson, Warfor Cities and
Noncombatant Immunity in the Bosnian Conflict, in RELIGION AND JUSTICE IN THE WAR OVER BOSNIA,
supra note 72, at 63, 68 (citing Paul Ramsey).
525. See, e.g., Ronald Turner, The Dangers of Misappropriation: Misusing Martin Luther
King, Jr. 's Legacy to Prove the Colorblind Thesis, 2 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 101 (1996).
526. See, e.g., Karol Edward Soltan, Agape, Civil Society and the Task of Social
Reconstruction, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 237, 241-42 (1996).
527. See, e.g., G. Ausenda, Postscript: Current Issues in the Study ofEthniity, Ethnic Conflict
and Humanitarian Intervention, and Questionsfor Future Research, in VAR AND ETHNICITY, supra note
67, at 217.
528. But see Reisman, supra note 363, at 49 (criticizing the use of tribunals as a "magic
bullet").
529. See, e.g., Cotler, supra note 395, at 174; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity: Some
Thoughts on the Way Forward, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 93, 98 (urging international
bodies to pay closer attention to local efforts).
530. Cf. supra note 490 (discussing Teitel's concept of using international law to "mediate"
governmental transitions).
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international community and that this community has a duty to assist.
However, it is also vital to identify the need to promote recognition, by both
perpetrators and victims, that these crimes of hate violate local values and
need to be put right as much as possible by their own community.
While the international legal paradigm emphasizes the need for
reconciliation between government elites and between those elites and the
international community, 531  broader social reconciliation requires
acknowledging that comparable needs exist between all individuals harmed
and all those that did them harm.532 Effective social reconciliation requires
justice to be furthered between those who survived and individual killers,
torturers, and rapists-and not just between the "international community"
writ large and select government elites who gave the impersonal order to kill,
torture, or rape.533 As Naomi Roht-Arriaza puts it, "reconciliation may be a
process that must take place above all at the local level, the village or
township, in order to take root. It may involve expressions of contrition and
apology from perpetrators or those who were both perpetrators and victims, as
much as simply finding facts. 534
Under civil dissensus, national reconciliation is encouraged to the extent
criminal prosecutions constitute and promote a continuous and shared social
drama among all those affected.535 Such shared experiences are best promoted
through proximity to where the crimes were committed. Irrespective of where
trials occur, they require generating a sense of genuine participation with the
judicial institutions involved since such participation is more likely to
generate shared conversations. Just as local civil society needs to be involved
in the composition and mandate of truth commissions, if these are to
531. Critics of the ad hoc tribunals are therefore not far off the mark when they contend that
these are elitest exercises. For these reasons, as well as the substantive scope of some international
crimes, it may be that international lawyers find it easier to deal with situations in which nationals of one
state are killed by the military of another, rather than cases like Rwanda, involving internal genocide. Cf.
Balint, supra note 215, at 109 (noting that traditional human rights law finds it easier to resolve
difficulties when the issue involves the military of one nation acting against nationals of another).
532. Cf. id at 114 (observing that broader social reconciliation, extending beyond political
elites and state agents, may be needed).
533. For a powerful literary interpretation of the need for victims to confront these individuals,
see ARIEL DORFMAN, DEATH AND THE MAIDEN (1992).
534. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth Commissions as Part of a Social Process: Possible
Guidelines, in REINING IN IMPuNITY, supra note 31, at 279, 283.
For a thoughtful analysis of the distinct ways that Germany and Japan have come to terms with
each countries' responsibilities for atrocities during World War II, see IAN BURUMA, THE WAGES OF
GUILT: MEMORIES OF WAR IN GERMANY AND JAPAN (1994). Buruma contends that to the extent
Germans have, as a nation, engaged in greater self-reflection on their own culpability than have the
Japanese, this is due not to the major Nuremberg trials conducted by the Allies but primarily as a result
of later developments, including trials and other proceedings conducted by the Germans themselves. See
id. at 137-58. Similarly, Burma argues that the Tokyo trials had minimal resonance within Japan and
may even have been counterproductive since these proceedings were disparaged within Japan as anti-
Japanese propaganda. See id. at 159-76.
535. Cf. Osiel, supra note 151, at 473 (describing trials as "social dramas"); see also Berman,
supra note 175, at 292-93, 314 (discussing the role of trials as a genre of "public discourse and story-
telling" that is valuable to a society's own internal evolution).
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contribute to genuine reconciliation,5 36 local civil society needs to be involved
when it comes to local and international courts.
There are clear connections between the lessons enumerated here and
the work of U.S. critical race scholars. Clearly, the divide between the
internationalist epistemic community and those who address issues of race and
ethnicity needs to be bridged. International humanitarian law experts, as well
as those who judge, prosecute, or defend these international crimes, must
consider the questions raised by critical race theorists. Given the international
legal paradigm's implicit reliance on liberalism,537 there is much to learn from
analyses of U.S. municipal law that demonstrates how liberal judicial
processes, and the substantive legal rules they apply, render issues of ethnicity
less visible than they ought to be.538 Critical race storytelling shows us how
important it is for the law to "look to the bottom" to determine whether such
procedures and rules are fair to the least empowered as well as perceived as
such.539 Certainly the voices and perspectives of those who remain within
Rwanda appear to have been "suppressed, devalued, and abnormalized" no
less than those of the "outgroups" that are the subject of critical race
analyses.540 Much of the effort here can be seen as demonstrating the gulf that
separates the international legal paradigm's implicit account of the Rwandan
genocide and its aftermath from the "counterstory" 541 told by journalists like
Gourevitch. 542 As with respect to such critical race literature as Patricia
Williams's well-known Benetton story,543 Gourevitch's account "kindle[s]
conscience and awaken[s] sympathy.",544 Gourevitch's view from the bottom,
particularly its emphasis on the West's complicity, needs to be considered by
international lawyers who need to become more aware of how their solutions
are perceived by, and have effects on, both alleged perpetrators and genocide
survivors inside Rwanda.
536. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
537. See supra notes 361-368 and accompanying text.
538. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE pts. I, XII (Richard Delgado
ed., 1995) (describing characteristics of critical race scholarship) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY].
539. See, e.g., Mar Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324 (1987); cf. supra note 205 (noting how most international lawyers
promptly dismiss the notion of international reparations to Rwandan victims of genocide).
540. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, Critical Race Theory: Past, Present, and Future, in 51
CuRRET LEGAL PROBLEMS 467,482 (M.D.A. Freeman ed., 1998).
541. Many critical race theorists attempt to demonstrate how the "the law can prevent a people
from expressing their own voice and worldview by imposing rigid categories and ways of speaking."
Part Hf: Storytelling, Counter-Storytelling and "Naming One's Own Reality", in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, supra note 538, at 37-97. Their oppositional storytelling, or "counterstories," seeks to alter
how we construct legal reality. See id.
542. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 182-83 (stressing the need to counter an account of the
Rwandan genocide that implies that these killings were not the West's problem and were a "free-for-all"
among equally culpable ethnic tribes).
543. See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing
as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 127, 127-28 (1987) (describing how the author,
as an African-American woman, was refused entry into a store).
544. Cf. Delgado & Stefanie, supra note 540, at 475 (describing the intent of much critical race
scholarship).
Lessons from Rwanda
As is true of much of the work of U.S. critical race scholars, this Article
has a reformist agenda. As do many critical scholars with respect to U.S. law,
I suggest that we be skeptical of liberal solutions to ethnic conflicts.
International lawyers need to be leery of internationalist approaches that, at
least to date, have avoided listening to genocide's victims and very likely
perpetuate racism that did not abruptly cease with the end of colonial rule. As
with many critical race critiques, some of what I suggest here, as with respect
to the possible effects of the ICTR's "progressive development" of
international humanitarian law given that tribunal's jurisdictional primacy,
stems from misgivings that present processes may advance legal
interpretations that serve the interests of the powerful. Further, as does critical
race theorists' notion of "intersectionality," 45 the analysis here encourages a
move beyond the dichotomous (instrumentalist/primordialist) views of
ethnicity to force consideration of how the categories of "Hutu" and "Tutsi,"
as well as male and female members of such groups, are affected by
international processes. 546 Clearly, critical race theorists need to do more to go
beyond the water's edge to consider the implications of their approaches to the
actions of the United States government when it helps to establish, staffs, and
funds international courts to adjudicate crimes of hate.547
Rwanda presents ample lessons for those now engaged in efforts to
establish a permanent international criminal court (ICC) and for the
international community should it ever again be tempted to create additional
ad hoc war crimes tribunals.548 The case of Rwanda should stand as a warning
against turning the hope for enforceable international criminal law into a
religious crusade for an international criminal court, or a series of them, while
ignoring other routes to justice, deterrence, and accountability.
The new Rome Statute for an ICC constitutes, in some respects, an
improvement over the ICTR. That statute contains many more detailed
provisions with respect to the substantive crimes covered, therefore leaving
considerably less room for judicial "gap-filling." 549 In addition, the ICC's
545. See, e.g., id. at 474 (discussing critical race theorists' work at the intersection of racial,
ethnic, and gender categories).
546. Others may want to go beyond the subjects addressed here to explore, for example,
whether international humanitarian norms, as presently constructed and interpreted, construct unhelpful
categories of race. See id. at 475-80.
547. U.S. critical race theorists have only begun to address international law, see id. at 487-88,
and even fewer have addressed mass violence and its consequences; for one rare example of the latter,
see Adrien Wing, Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture: Spirit Injury from Bosnia to Black America, 25 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1 (1993).
548. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, BeUing Refuses to Go Along with Creation of Pol Pot
Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1997, at A6 (discussing proposals for an ad hoc tribunal for Cambodia).
549. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, arts. 22-33 (discussing "general principles of criminal
law"). Further, it is anticipated that yet more gaps in international criminal law will be filled through the
ICC's (yet to be drafted) rules of procedure and evidence. See id. art. 21(1)(a). This attempt to
"progressively develop" the law through international agreement may generate greater legitimacy in the
final product and may reflect more genuinely the views of the international community as a whole as
compared to comparable attempts through "judicial legislation" in the course of ongoing trials in the
ICTY and the ICTR. Of course, even this attempt may ultimately shortchange less powerful states
during the course of the negotiations and the final product will almost certainly fall short of establishing
a comprehensive criminal code. Even the ICC's judges will be faced with the need to fill in gaps.
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jurisdiction, although not retrospective in application, does not contain the
temporal and geographic constraints reflected in the ICTR.550 Perhaps most
significantly for our purposes, the ICC's jurisdiction is premised on
"complementarity" and not jurisdictional primacy.551 The ICC will only have
jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute in instances where national authorities
are "unwilling" or "unable" to do so.
552
But it is not clear whether the ICC's drafters have truly responded to, or
learned from, the Rwandan experience. First, there is no evidence, on the face
of the ICC statute, that anything has been learned with respect to the need to
prevent ongoing violence or that the failure to prevent such violence
dramatically affects the viability of attempts to make perpetrators accountable,
at both the international and local levels. As with the ICTR and the ICTY,
there is no attempt to connect states' (or the Security Council's) duty to
prevent genocide with the regime for prosecuting genocide to be established.
Such matters are left, as at present, to be handled under separate treaty
regimes.553 While it is unrealistic to expect that the drafters of the ICC could
have revisited the duties of the Security Council under the U.N. Charter, it
would have been desirable to reaffirm that states have a duty to prevent
genocide under the ICC treaty, and some consideration ought to have been
given to the discretion to prosecute in cases of ongoing genocide. Absent
some demonstrated capacity to protect witnesses, proceeding with trials in
such cases, as we have seen with respect to Rwanda, may be tantamount to
encouraging retaliation against them.
A second difficulty is that the ICC's complementarity may not truly
complement local proceedings. It does not appear that the ICC's drafters
550. See id. arts. 5-21 (discussing crimes within the jurisdiction of the court) & arts. 12-13
(discussing the court's exercise of jurisdiction in states that are party to the statute). But see id. art. I 1
(limiting the ICC's jurisdiction to offenses committed after the Rome Statute enters into force).
Although some states' consent to jurisdiction will be required before the ICC can pursue a case, see id.
art. 12, once that consent is given the ICC will not be examining, as is the ICTR, offenses committed
only during a particular time.
551. See id. arts. 17-19. A trial by the ICC for conduct covered by its jurisdictional provisions
(namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) would preclude a later trial by any other
court (and vice versa); see id. art. 20 (discussing ne bis in idem).
552. See id. art. 17(1)(a)-(b). The ICC's prosecutor may defer to a state's initiation of an
investigation but may reassert his/her authority if a state shows an unwillingness or inability to proceed.
See id. art. 18(3). Prior to commencement of trial within the ICC, states can seek to block the ICC from
proceeding by challenging admissibility. See id. arts. 17-19. Except in "exceptional circumstances," a
category left to be defined by and applied by the ICC's judges, a state may challenge the admissibility of
a case only once and only prior to commencement of trial within the ICC. See id. art. 19(4).
553. See U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 3. Although the proposed ICC is intended to be an
independent body that does not rely on the Security Council to the same extent as the present ad hoe
tribunals, action by the ICC is made explicitly subject to the Council in a few crucial respects. See Rome
Statute, supra note 13, art. 13 (permitting the Council to refer a situation to the ICC's prosecutor); id.
art. 16 (permitting the Council to seek deferral of an investigation or prosecution). At least to this extent
the ICC's legitimacy and independence may be compromised. The attempt to limit the role of the
Security Council in the proposed ICC implicitly concedes that the ad hoe tribunals' reliance on the
Council undermines those tribunals' credibility.
554. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 45-46 (noting the
ICTR's difficulties in establishing an effective witness protection program and noting that in the first
month and a half of 1997 alone, 54 genocide survivors or people linked to them had been killed).
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accepted complementarity because of enlightened notions concerning the
relative merits of national proceedings or due to a realization of primacy's
problems. On the contrary, the principal actors involved in the ICC effort,
particularly the powerful human rights community that has been so influential
in promoting the idea of a permanent court, appear to regard complementarity
as the maximum that could be achieved under the present circumstances; that
is, as a reluctant concession to realpolitik and parochial notions of state
sovereignty.555 Despite the complementarity built into its statute, it is not clear
how the future ICC would respond in a future case similar to that of
Rwanda's.
The Rome Treaty's recipe for permitting an international prosecution
could lead to a preference for international venues even in a situation like
Rwanda's, that is, where, in the immediate wake of mass atrocities, local
investigations and trials are not immediately possible not because of lack of
political will by a new government but because of serious resource
constraints.556 Much will depend on the discretion exercised by the ICC's
prosecutor (and its judges) in such instances. In the hands of people who
subscribe to the international legal paradigm's preference for international
fora, the ICC's proposed complementarity could become, in the worst case
scenario, a race to the courthouse between international and local prosecutors,
with the first to emerge with a plausible trial precluding the attempt by the
other.55 7 Nor is it clear how ICC prosecutors and judges will approach local
procedures, like Rwanda's under its Organic Law, that result in reduced
sentences based on plea bargains without trial,558 or, as in South Africa, grant
amnesties upon full confession under threat of criminal sanction for failure to
come forward.559 It is not clear whether either of these compromises on
individualized trials would be regarded by ICC authorities as intended to
shield defendants from criminal prosecution, thereby entitling the ICC to
555. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN TnE DRAFT STATUTE 13 (1996) (discussing how
complementarity makes the ICC "weaker" than the ad hoc tribunals but saying nothing about its possible
virtues).
556. Thus, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights notes that the ICC's admissibility
provisions prevent a "functioning" judicial system from coming under the ICC's scrutiny. See id. at 14.
Ultimately, what constitutes a viable system, or a plausible local investigation or prosecution, lies within
the discretion of the ICC's judges and prosecutors. Absent a greater assistance effort by the international
community than that which emerged with respect to Rwanda in the first few years after the genocide, it
is likely that many judicial systems will remain "nonfunctioning" in the wake of mass atrocity, even if
the government is no longer in the hands of those who committed the vast majority of the atrocities. Cf.
supra notes 475-479 and accompanying text (discussing Ratner and Abrams's test and its inadequacies).
557. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 20. Under Article 20's concept of ne bis in idem,
persons convicted or acquitted elsewhere for aggression cannot be tried by the international court. The
same holds for those previously convicted of the other international crimes enumerated in the statute-
that is, the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes-except that in these instances
the international court has discretion to retry the individual if the proceedings in the domestic court were
for the purpose of shielding the person from criminal responsibility or were not conducted independently
or impartially in accordance with due process.
558. See supra notes 140-146 and accompanying text.
559. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 92, at 185.
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proceed on its own. 560 As this suggests, the present statute is silent about a
common conundrum faced by societies in the wake of mass atrocity: how to
fashion a coherent compromise between the need for individualized trials and
the difficulty or impossibility of providing these where so many have been
complicit. Absent considerable flexibility by ICC authorities with respect to
such compromises, it is possible that its proceedings could interfere with or be
incompatible with the fashioning of viable compromises at the local level.
While the ICC's statute has abandoned strict hierarchical supremacy, that
court may not, like the ICTR, be fully responsive to the very real differences
between states in which there is no real hope for criminal accountability and
nations, like Rwanda (and arguably South Africa), where it is reasonable to
expect that, given enough time and assistance, some form of criminal
accountability will be pursued.
As presently drafted, the Rome Statute makes no explicit concessions to
states like Rwanda in mid-July 1994-that is, nations still reeling from mass
atrocities and not yet ready to begin national prosecutions for quite
understandable reasons having little to do with political will. Since the drafters
of the Rome Statute apparently regarded international prosecutions as
functionally equivalent to, if not preferable, to local ones, it is possible that
they assumed that the race to the international courthouse can begin as soon as
a cognizable offense is committed. There is no recognition in the anticipated
arrangements for the ICC that encouragement for local forms of accountability
ought to be, in instances like Rwanda's, a top priority for the international
community, second only to the prevention of further violence. There is
nothing in the present statute for the ICC that addresses the need to provide
judicial assistance to states that have suffered mass atrocities and now have a
new government willing but still unable to undertake criminal prosecutions.
There is no provision, at least on the face of the new statute, for joint
investigations between ICC and local prosecutors while a traumatized nation
struggles to rebuild its devastated judiciary. There is no suggestion that
international prosecutors ought to turn over their evidence or suspects to local
authorities even after ICC proceedings begin should local authorities later
seek to proceed with a prosecution.
Further, despite complementarity, the ICC adheres to the international
legal paradigm's emphasis on the need to develop uniform international
humanitarian norms, even at the expense of local legal traditions or
sentiments. While the ICC's statute recognizes, like the ICTR's, that judges
need to have expertise in criminal as well as international law, its provisions
560. Cf. Rome Statute, supra n6te 13, art. 17(2)(a) (permitting the ICC to proceed with a case
where municipal proceedings are being undertaken or a national decision ig made "for the purpose of
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
court"); LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 555, at 14 (stating that the ICC cannot
claim jurisdiction unless it can be shown that national proceedings "were a deliberate attempt to forestall
international justice"). In addition, as noted at supra note 551, the ICC adheres to a concept of ne bis in
idem that usually precludes a municipal court retrial and could therefore have a wider impact on those
courts' development of the law. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 20; supra notes 341-342 and
accompanying text (noting how ICTR rulings could prevent Rwandan courts from developing the law).
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for applicable law do not explicitly authorize the judges to turn to local law to
fill in the gaps of international humanitarian law. 561 It anticipates that judges
will turn only to the standard international law sources, that is, treaty, custom,
and general principles.562 There appears little room as well for adapting
penalties to the needs or desires of those victimized by such crimes or of the
societies of which they are a part. As with the ICTR and the ICTY, the only
sentences authorized are terms of imprisonment, not the death penalty, and,
unlike the ICTR or the ICTY, judges are not even authorized to consider or to
defer to local sentencing practices where the offense occurred.
5 63
Third, there is nothing in the Rome Statute suggesting that any lessons
have been learned with respect to ethnic neutrality. As with the ICTR and the
ICTY, the new ICC's judicial bench is intended to be independent,
international, and impartial; judges are not to participate "in any case in which
his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned."564 Yet there is no
recognition in the present statute that often, even such "impartial" judges will
be nationals of very partial nations, or at least of states that stood by and did
nothing to prevent mass atrocities and who may be regarded, especially by
local audiences, as complicit in the very atrocities with which they are
dealing. There is nothing, in short, that recognizes that international fora are
not necessarily rendered "impartial" merely because they are international or
that ethnically loaded proceedings may require ethnically sensitive
accommodations to generate verdicts acceptable to local audiences. While it is
possible that the procedural rules of the new court could facilitate the
appointment of judges who are ethnically representative of regions affected by
atrocities, nothing in the statute anticipates such a possibility (as compared to,
for example, the specific provision for party-appointed judges in the ICJ's
statute).56
Finally, there is nothing in the ICC's statute, or in the negotiations
leading up to it, that suggests that any minds have been changed with respect
to the need to focus primarily on select trials of high-level perpetrators.
Exceptionalism appears alive and well. Indeed, given the relatively scarce
resources likely to be made available to a court that when it begins to operate
will cover at least sixty state parties, it is reasonable to assume that practical
561. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, arts. 21, 39 (regarding applicable law). While Article 21
appears to anticipate the application of local law, the wording of that article appears to assume that local
law ought to be used only to the extent necessary to determine applicable general principles of law. It
appears that what is contemplated is the comparative use of local law-that is, that judges look to the
body of local laws in general in order to infer commonly accepted principles among a variety of legal
systems. The use of, for example, preexisting Rwandan law as to the definition of "complicity," if the
acts are committed by a Rwandan national within Rwanda, is not apparently authorized. Cf. supra notes
346-348 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties with existing approaches to gap-filling in the ad
hoe tribunals).
562. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 21.
563. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, arts. 76-78; ICTY Statute, supra note 53, art. 24
(authorizing recourse to the "general practice" regarding sentences in the former Yugoslavia); ICTR
Statute, supra note 53, art. 23 (authorizing recourse to the "general practice" regarding sentences in
Rwanda).
564. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 41(2)(a).
565. See supra notes 257-260,425-430 and accompanying text.
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realities will lead to an emphasis on high profile trials of a selective few,
regardless of any anomalies of inversion that result.
S66
While there is still room for the ICC's mandate, composition, and, of
course, ultimate operation to change, the international legal paradigm that
governed the creation of the ICTR still holds sway. Despite the Rome
Statute's explicit deference to local courts, its provisions do not demonstrate
real awareness of the potential benefits of local criminal trials. The ICC's
envisioned operation evinces little concern for how the operation of
international processes may interact with local processes. There is no evidence
that those who negotiated the new ICC operated on the basis that international
processes should be adapted to local realities rather than the other way around.
There is no suggestion that internationalist priorities may require assistance to
local efforts for accountability.
VII. CONCLUSION
Post-1994 Rwanda demonstrates that not all instances of mass atrocity
present stark choices between legalism and realpolitik-that is, between
prosecution and impunity. Indeed, as international lawyers succeed in
convincing more nations that criminal accountability for international crimes
can be made real, we can expect more genuine enforcement efforts at the local
level, including individual criminal trials as well as Rwandan-styled plea
bargains where such trials are impossible. The establishment of the ad hoe war
crimes tribunals, and the prospect of a permanent international criminal court,
presents us, then, with a paradox: these tribunals' very success in generating
efforts at domestic fora for accountability may require reexamining
fundamental elements of the international legal paradigm.
Not all mass atrocities are alike. International responses to them need to
be sensitive to differences as well as commonalities between them. After the
1994 genocide, Rwanda was in a position that is more analogous to that faced
by Germany during the Nuremberg trials than is the case today with respect to
the Balkans. While in parts of former Yugoslavia, the perpetrators of mass
killings have been treated as heroes, in Rwanda many of these people are in
custody and subject to the victorious wrath of their former victims. 67 While
with respect to the Balkans, the choice in 1993 may have been between
international justice or none at all, with respect to Rwanda, the choices as of
the middle of 1994, when the massive killings ended and the new government
took power, were more complex. Despite the differences, the international
community adhered to the international legal paradigm and took a one-size-
fits-all approach, adapting the statute and rules of the earlier Balkan tribunal,
with but slight modification, to Rwanda. Despite lip service to the importance
of accountability at the national level, both from the Security Council as well
as from legal scholars, the bulk of international attention and resources has
566. Cf supra notes 262-267 and accompanying text (discussing the anomalies resulting from
concurrent prosecutions at the international and national levels).
567. See, e.g., Sohn, supra note 396, at 211.
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gone into constructing international processes enjoying primacy over local
proceedings, and charged with applying an ethnically neutral approach to
select trials of high-level perpetrators.
Supporters of the ICTR overlooked the anomalous and perverse
messages being sent by the "trials of concurrent jurisdiction" to survivors of
mass atrocities, to the vast majority of perpetrators, to Rwandan society
generally, and to the international community.568 The possibility that
jurisdictional primacy for the ICTR could undermine the goals for judicial
truth, for accountability to victims, for fair treatment of all those accused of
crimes, and for the affirmation of the national and international rule of law
was not addressed. No one expressed qualms about the lack of local
representation on the ICTR's bench and the Security Council ignored
complaints from Rwandan authorities about locating the tribunal in a distant
foreign city, about the absence of the death penalty or accountability for pre-
1994 events, and about limiting its resources and mandate.
Instead, caught in the international legal paradigm's vision of justice, the
international community invested its resources, intellectual and material, in
constructing a tribunal of "impartial," "denationalized" judges whose
expertise and ethnic neutrality would hopefully legitimate the uniform
progressive development of international humanitarian law.569 The notion that
the affirmation of the national and international rule of law could benefit from
"inexpert" judges (both those willing to return to the country as well as those
who could be trained) from a devastated African nation was never seriously
entertained. The architects of the ICTR did not consider the probable benefits
of turning to local judges who would not be beholden to an internationalist
agenda and would be farther removed from the political whims of the Security
Council. Nor did they consider a role for such judges at the international level.
Despite the luminous arguments about the need to use criminal processes to
promote a transition to democracy, few argued in favor of local proceedings-
even though such proceedings would have had more representative legitimacy
and, especially with significant assistance, could have been made more
responsive to the demands of human rights advocates. Despite emphasis on
the need to symbolically affirm the rule of law, few considered whether
proceedings in Tanzania would find an audience within the neighboring nation
seriously in need of affirming the credibility of law and its institutions. Few
considered whether proceedings abroad, conducted in a foreign language,
would resonate with Rwandan audiences as well as trials in Rwanda broadcast
on local radio.
For purposes of this Article, I have assumed, as do most international
lawyers, that a truth commission process not accompanied by either the threat
or the reality of criminal proceedings would have been inappropriate in the
568. See supra Section IlI.B.
569. Cf. SCHARF, supra note 5, at 224 (reporting that the one-year-long Tadic trial at the ICTY
cost about $20 million), with HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64, at 88 (reporting that over the
1994-96 period the Rwandan government received about $19 million from U.S. and other international
donors). At present, the international community allocates about $50 million a year to the ICTR's
operation. See supra note 250.
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case of Rwanda. As do most international lawyers, I assume that in cases like
Rwanda's, lasting peace and national reconciliation require some form of
criminal accountability. But one must consider what' is done in the name of
accountability since not all forms of accountability produce the same effects. I
have indicated how, in the case of Rwanda, international accountability
premised on jurisdictional primacy, ethnic neutrality, and exceptionalism has
significant shortcomings through the selection of defendants, the kinds of acts
to be punished, and the parts of history to be preserved. I have suggested why,
contrary to the assumptions of the international legal paradigm, Rwandans
might prefer other processes, including joint proceedings or local trials subject
to international observation, and why they regard contrary demands as
examples of condescending Eurocentrism or racism.
Complaints about the primacy of the ICTR are not merely the result of
parochialism or misconceptions about what international judges and
prosecutors might do. Some of these complaints stem from legitimate
concerns about that tribunal's (limited) jurisdictional basis, meager resources,
available sanctions, judicial makeup, and likely approaches to applicable law.
There are risks in sending some high profile cases to Tanzania for trial, while
leaving the vast number of others, including the vast majority of more
ordinary defendants, to their fate in Rwanda. While Rwandan processes pose
risks that judges will be entirely too involved in local ethnic tensions to render
evenhanded justice, international judges' attempts to render "ethnically
neutral" justice may not produce verdicts acceptable to all sides, and their
judicialized histories may be both insufficiently sensitive to distinct forms of
victimhood and overly sensitive to the political sensibilities of powerful U.N.
patrons. International prosecutions may even on occasion undermine local
ones.
A more ethnically sensitive perspective of the crimes committed in
Rwanda would expand the historical context that needs to be addressed (along
with the number of those who are complicit), the numbers of external
observers that may become interested in these policy decisions, and the
universal appeal of any lessons that might be drawn. An approach to criminal
accountability that acknowledges that these are crimes of hate as well as of
states may also help to redefine the kind of national reconciliation that we are
seeking to achieve within societies devastated by mass atrocities.
Effective international criminal law enforcement requires international
efforts directed at prosecuting crimes such as genocide by the most effective
means any of us are likely to see in our lifetimes-by local police, local
prosecutors, and local courts. While international tribunals need to be kept as
an option of last resort, good faith domestic prosecutions that encourage civil
dissensus may better preserve collective memory and promote the
mollification of victims, the accountability of perpetrators, the national (and
even the international) rule of law, and national reconciliation. The didactic
functions of war crimes trials may best be furthered locally, through thousands
of indictments and trials that truly resonate within a culture and whose lessons
do not appear to be imposed, in top-down fashion, by the international
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community. Properly mediated by international law (and fora where
necessary), local criminal accountability helps to restore the rule of law where
it matters most-at the local level, where all of us live.

